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Abstract
Trustworthy information systems are information systems that fulfil all the func-
tional and non-functional requirements. To this end, all the components of an in-
formation system, either human or technical, need to collaborate in order to meet its
requirements and achieve its goals. This entails that system components will show
the desired or expected behaviour once the system is put in operation. However,
modern information systems include a great number of components that can behave
in a very unpredictable way. This unpredictability of the behaviour of the system
components is a major challenge to the development of trustworthy information sys-
tems and more particularly during the modelling stage. When a system component
is modelled as part of a requirements engineering model it creates an uncertainty
about its future behaviour, thus undermining the accuracy of the system model and
eventually the system trustworthiness. Therefore, the addition of system components
inevitably is based on assumptions of their future behaviour. Such assumptions are
underlying the development of a system and usually are assumptions of trust by the
system developer about her trust relationships with the system components, which
are instantly formed when a component is inserted into a requirements engineering
model of a system. However, despite the importance of such issues, a requirements
engineering methodology that explicitly captures such trust relationships along with
the entailing trust assumptions and trustworthiness requirements is still missing.
For tackling the preceding problems, the thesis proposes a requirements engineer-
ing methodology, namely JTrust (Justifying Trust) for developing trustworthy infor-
mation systems. The methodology is founded upon the notions of trust and control
as the means of confidence achievement. In order to develop an information system
the developer needs to consider her trust relationships with the system components
that are formed with their addition in a system model, reason about them, and pro-
ceed to a justified decision about the design of the system. If the system component
cannot be trusted to behave in a desired or expected way then the question of what
are the alternatives in order to build confidence in the future behaviour of the system
component raises. To answer this question we define a new class of requirements,
namely trustworthiness requirements. Trustworthiness requirements prescribe the
functionality of the software included in the information system that compels the
rest of the information system components to behave in a desired or expected way.
The proposed methodology consists of: (i) a modelling language which contains trust
i
and control abstractions; (ii) and a methodological process for capturing and reason-
ing about trust relationships, modelling and analysing trustworthiness requirements,
and assessing the system trustworthiness at a requirements stage. The methodology
is accompanied by a CASE tool to support it.
To evaluate our proposal, we have applied our methodology to a case study, and
we carried out a survey to get feedback from experts. The topic of the case study was
the e-health care system of the National Health Service in England, which was used to
reason about trust relationships with system components and identify trustworthiness
requirements. Researchers from three academic institutions across Europe and from
one industrial company, British Telecom, have participated in the survey in order to
provide valuable feedback about the effectiveness and efficiency of the methodology.
The results conclude that JTrust is useful and easy to use in modelling and reasoning
about trust relationships, modelling and analysing trustworthiness requirements and
assessing the system trustworthiness at a requirements level.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
...trust is a social good to be protected just as much as the air we
breath or the water that we drink. When it is damaged, the
community as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, societies
falter and collapse
Sissela Bok
Information Systems (ISs) exist in every aspect of our life and our society depends
on them enormously. In particular, organisations need to process a rapidly growing
amount of information and individuals rely on information systems for almost ev-
erything from health care and banking to the weekly shop at the supermarket. ISs
have the ability to collect and store large volumes of information that can easily be
accessed by anyone and from anywhere. Also, software, which is part of information
systems, controls a vast number of systems such as e-health, e-government, and sys-
tems that exist in factories and systems that control air-traffic. Nevertheless, in the
light of ambient, pervasive, and ubiquitous computing, the impact of information
systems is still increasing significantly.
An information system is a collection of software, hardware, humans, and proce-
dures, which aims to support the operations of an organisation. The combination of
software and hardware provides a number of humans with information on specified
topics of interest in a certain organisational context (Iivari and Hirschheim, 1996).
So, an information system collects, stores, analyses, and extracts data information.
Presently, information systems that were monolithic, isolated and independent have
given their place to distributed information systems that operate on a worldwide
scale, across open networks, and across different organisations.
Therefore, because of the importance and the complexity of information sys-
tems and the high demands placed on them, better software engineering approaches
are required. Software engineering designs, implements, and deploys software for
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information systems and on the other hand information systems and informing pro-
cesses are used in software engineering, for example in requirements engineering
and project management, in order to successfully embed software in socio-technical
contexts. According to the definition given by IEEE (IEEE, 1990), ”Software engi-
neering is the application of a systematic, disciplined, quantifiable approach to the
development, operation, and maintenance of software; that is, the application of en-
gineering to software”. Software engineering has a number of phases (IEEE, 1990);
first, the problem to be solved is analysed and the requirements are described in a
very precise way. Secondly, a design is made based on these requirements. Finally,
the construction process, i.e. the actual programming of the solution, is started.
The study of this thesis belongs to the first phase of software engineering, i.e.
requirements engineering, because it addresses the challenges of developing trustwor-
thy information systems that arise during the requirements definition. According
to (Ross and Schoman, 1977), ”Requirements definition is a careful assessment of
the needs that a system is to fulfil. It must say why a system is needed, based
on current or foreseen conditions, which may be internal operations or an exter-
nal market. It must say what system features will serve and satisfy this context.
And it must say how the system is to be constructed”. The discipline that is con-
cerned with requirements definition is called requirements engineering. According
to (Zave, 1997) ”Requirements engineering is the branch of software engineering
concerned with the real-world goals for, functions of, and constraints on software
systems. It is also concerned with the relationship of these factors to precise speci-
fications of software behaviour, and to their evolution over time and across software
families”. The more careful we are during the requirements engineering phase, the
larger is the chance that the ultimate system will meet expectations. However,
requirements engineering involves modelling of the information system under devel-
opment, which includes active components that have the choice of behaviour. So,
by nature, there is uncertainty about whether the actual behaviour of components
will match the expected behaviour, which is reflected in the requirement engineer-
ing models. This uncertainty requires the developer to decide whether or not she
can trust active information system components to behave in an expected way, as
described in her model, and build the system on such decisions that will determine
its success. There is also uncertainty about the behaviour of the environment that
has to be considered by the developer and reflected in the requirements engineering
models, but this is outside of the scope of this thesis. The main contribution of this
thesis therefore, is the methodology named JTrust. JTrust stands for Justifying
Trust and the methodology aims to assist the developer in modelling and reasoning
about trust relationships, model and analyse trustworthiness requirements, and as-
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sess the trustworthiness of the system-to-be at a requirements stage, to eventually
develop a trustworthy information system.
1.1 Motivation and problem statement
Despite the reliance on information systems and the emergence of software engineer-
ing, these systems are often unreliable, prone to errors, and possess vulnerabilities
that could be exploited in security attacks (Fortune and Peters, 2005). We are often
faced with a choice between using a valuable (or even an essential) system, which
is not fully trustworthy, or else forgoing the services it provides (Islam, Mouratidis,
and Wagner, 2010). There is vast number of reported incidents about security and
privacy breaches (Fortune and Peters, 2005) resulting in an especially big concern
regarding security and privacy issues that prevent the full extent of their utilisation.
Also, a lot of times the developed systems do not meet their functional requirements
(Fortune and Peters, 2005). This leads to greater customer dissatisfaction and dis-
appointment resulting in an abandoned system. The consequences of such failures
can be devastating. They can be financial loses or loss of time or even loss of human
lives.
Trust, therefore, is becoming an increasingly important issue for information
systems that process and manage sensitive user and organisational information. As
a result, there is an increasing interest in the development of trustworthy information
systems. Systems that will be worthy of users’ and other stakeholders’ trust, that
there is strong confidence that they will meet all their functional and non-functional
requirements. To this end, new methods and tools for developers are required that
will provide the know-how and guidance on developing trustworthy information
systems.
The development of systems that are trustworthy will have many benefits. First
of all, the successful adoption of information systems in society depends on whether
these systems can be justifiably trusted by the users (Hasselbring and Reussner,
2006). So, trustworthy systems are more likely to be adopted by users. Also, by
being trustworthy they will meet their functional and non-functional requirements,
thus assuring customer satisfaction, which will lead to greater financial profits. Also,
systems will be secure and protect human privacy, which is a major user concern.
In addition, being able to trust a software system is a prerequisite for its social
acceptance (Cofta, 2007) and when there is trust in a software product it will increase
its sales and the willingness of the users to pay even more for that product (Masthoff,
2007). Otherwise, the software system will be rejected and the development of that
software system will result in a failure.
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During the design developers know how to make a system that satisfies non-
functional requirements, such as security and usability (Mouratidis and Cofta, 2010).
Developers have also the knowledge and the tools to carry out the necessary tasks
or they can even hire professionals who have expertise in a specific field. On the
other hand though, they do not have adequate knowledge about trust, since trust is
an interdisciplinary issue and requires knowledge from other sciences such as soci-
ology, psychology, and social psychology and not adequate methods and tools have
been developed yet. Alternatives for developers are trusted computing, trustworthy
computing, and social trust. ”Trusted Computing” entails that certain hardware
components need to be trusted in order to provide security, while trustworthy com-
puting promises security, privacy and reliability and hopes to gain trust of users.
Social trust uses trust that is external to the system (Mouratidis and Cofta, 2010).
Also, there is not a common understanding of trust among developers. Developing
teams might consist of developers from different cultural backgrounds that each one
of them possesses a different perception about trust (Mouratidis and Cofta, 2010).
Trust is a complex notion and depends upon technical and non-technical issues of
the social and organisational setting. Therefore, developers require trust related
abstractions that can be used uniformly by all of them and across different projects.
In the past it was easier for a system be developed trustworthy, as it was very
simple, isolated, and only depending on itself. Modern information systems though
include not only technical components but also human components that exist in
the environment of technical components. There is a distinction between the tech-
nical component, which is one or more computers that behave in a way to satisfy
the requirements with the help of the software, and the environment, which is the
part of the world with which the machine will interact and in which the effects of
the machine will be observed. When the machine is put into its environment, it
can influence that environment and be influenced by that environment only because
they have some shared phenomena in common (Jackson, 1997). Nowadays technical
components are very big in size and complex and interact with other components
of the environment. Thus, the trustworthiness of the system depends also on other
external technical and human components. Furthermore, modern information sys-
tems comprise socio-technical infrastructures that include large numbers of actors,
including humans. Due to the need for constant interaction and communication
with other systems and humans, which do not belong to their infrastructure, tech-
nical components need to interact with systems and humans that they might not
have interacted before. In fact, they might depend on other systems and/or humans
to accomplish tasks and operations that directly affect their operation. Consider
for example the scenario where an information system depends on another system
4
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for information that is crucial for completing some of its operations. In such sce-
nario, trust, to both humans and other systems, is an important issue for modern
information systems as they depend on entities (humans and systems), over which
they do not have direct control, for resources to achieve their goals. It is therefore
important, in order to understand the risks involved in such dependencies, to un-
derstand the various trust relationships that an information system might be part
of (Pavlidis, Mouratidis, and Islam, 2012; Pavlidis et al., 2012; Zarrabi et al., 2012;
Pavlidis et al., 2014).
The developer’s perspective needs to be considered in the analysis of the system
under development. It is the developer who is assigning new goals and tasks to the
components of the information system and her view of the system is important to
the whole trustworthiness of the system.
In addition, to establish systems trustworthiness, it is important that trust re-
lationships between the system and other entities and trust assumptions, which are
usually made during the development process, are properly identified and analysed.
Therefore, it is important in order to understand the consequences that trust rela-
tionships might have on the operation of an information system to be able to analyse,
in a systematic and structured way, the various trust assumptions that are usually
made during the development process of information systems (Cofta, Lacohe´e, and
Hodgson, 2010; Cofta, 2007). By trust assumptions, we refer to assumptions that are
made by developers and/or stakeholders related to the various trust relationships
that a system is part of. The assumptions are underlying the analysis of the system
and can undermine its trustworthiness.
The main measure of success of a software system is the degree to which it meets
its purpose. Thus developers have to make sure that the software-to-be will meet
its purpose. Currently, there is a lack of techniques that attempt to measure the
trustworthiness of the system under development at an early stage.
The introduction of an information system causes not only technical changes but
also social changes. When introduced inside a social environment the social agents
need or are required to change their behaviour accordingly. Sometimes humans
resist and do not accept the changes. By overlooking whether the humans will
accept the changes and behave in an expected way, it results in systems that are
not trustworthy and not socially accepted.
Employing control mechanisms to solve problems increases the complexity and
cost of a system. On the other hand though, employing trust leads to systems that
are less costly and less complex. However, there is a trade-off between trust and
control. Relying on trust entails the acceptance of risk in order to get the benefits
and relying on control you spend more resources in order to increase the assurance.
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Although the literature provides a large body of work related to engineering of
trust in information systems, it fails to provide evidence of a systematic and struc-
tured way to model and reason about trust relationships during the early stages of
the development process and identify trustworthiness requirements. It is important
for such analysis to be made during the early stages since at that stage of the process
is when the trust relationships are formed and therefore it is where changes need to
take place if the relevant assumptions about trust relationships do not hold.
1.2 Research questions
We summarise the following research questions that, as usual in software engineer-
ing (Wieringa and Heerkens, 2006), are a mix of knowledge, design, and empirical
questions:
• RQ1: What are the required trust abstractions and their relationships in order
to reason about trust relationships at a requirements stage?
• RQ2: What are the required abstractions and their relationships that can
ensure the development of trustworthy information systems at a requirements
stage?
• RQ3: How can we assess trustworthiness of the system under development at
a requirements stage?
• RQ4: How well does the methodology support modelling and reasoning about
trust relationships?
• RQ5: How well does the methodology support trustworthiness requirement
modelling and analysis?
• RQ6: How well does the methodology assess the system trustworthiness at a
requirements level?
1.3 Research aims and objectives
The aim is to develop a novel methodology to allow modelling of, and reasoning
about, trust relationships in a structured and coherent way. By trust relationship
we mean the relationship between the developer and the components of the informa-
tion system that are modelled in her requirements model. The trust relationships
of the developer are eventually becoming trust relationships of the system-to-be
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once the system is put in operation. In addition, the goal is also a methodology
to allow modelling and reasoning of trustworthiness requirements that ensure the
trustworthiness of the system-to-be. Furthermore, we aim to develop a methodology
to allow the assessment of the trustworthiness of the system under development at
a requirements stage.
To achieve this aim the following objectives have been defined:
• Develop a modelling language for capturing and modelling relationships of
trust at a requirements stage.
• Develop methods and techniques to analyse and reason about trust relation-
ships and identify trustworthiness requirements from the early stages of the
development, and integrate such methods and techniques to form a methodol-
ogy.
• Provide techniques to assist the automatic evaluation of the system trustwor-
thiness.
• Assess the developed methodology by applying it to a concrete and complex
real world case study and receive experts’ views through questionnaires.
1.4 Research contributions
Besides successfully addressing the research problem, this research has a number of
novel contributions to the state of the art and knowledge. These four novel contri-
butions along with the development of a CASE tool are introduced subsequently:
1. The first contribution of the thesis is the analysis of the problem
of establishing information systems trustworthiness. This included
the identification of problems, limitations, and challenges of the state of the
art with respect to trustworthy information system development, and more
particularly reasoning about trust relationships and identifying trustworthiness
requirements.
2. Definition of trust abstractions for describing, understanding, and
analysing the complex notion of trust. The definition of the trust ab-
stractions along with their relationships with existing Goal Oriented Require-
ments Engineering (GORE) abstractions and control abstractions is a part the
modelling language of the proposed methodology. It establishes a common un-
derstanding of trust among developers within a technical setting of a project
that might have a different cultural background and possess different views
7
Chapter 1. Introduction
about trust. They enable the reasoning about the trust relationships that ex-
ist with the system environment. By using the trust-based concepts such as
resolution, developers can show explicitly why there is trust in a dependency.
The use of the concept of reported trust and control create new dependencies
that reveal the indirect trust relationships. Through this way direct and, in
particular, indirect trust relationships become explicit. The trust abstractions
enable the identification and reasoning of trust relationships that leads to the
natural surface of trust assumptions that need to be examined in terms of their
validity.
3. Definition of control abstractions for describing, understanding, and
analysing the complex notion of control. The definition of control ab-
stractions along with their relationships with the trust abstractions and ex-
isting GORE abstractions is part of the proposed modelling language. The
control abstractions enable the modelling and analysis of trustworthiness re-
quirements. Control abstraction such as observation allows the specification of
the functionality that is required in order to monitor a specific resource in order
to verify if a system component is behaving in the expected way. Moreover,
control abstraction such as deterrence allows the specification of functionality
that prevents the achievement of a system component’s own goal in order to
compel to behave in a specific way.
4. Development of a methodological process that employs the mod-
elling language for the development of trustworthy information sys-
tems. The proposed process is systematic and structured with defined ac-
tivities and tasks that the developers can easily follow and will guide them
towards the development of trustworthy information systems. It allows the in-
cremental development of a trust model of the system under development. It
starts with the identification and reasoning of trust relationships and the early
consideration of trust relationships enables to identify potential vulnerabilities
to the system trustworthiness. In particular potential vulnerabilities to the
system trustworthiness are identified and they are resolved through trust or
control means. Then it includes the modelling and analysis of trustworthiness
requirements. The control means represent the trustworthiness requirements
that fill in the gaps in the chain of trust relationships. In addition, in this
manner the trade-off between trust and control is becoming more explicit for
the developer and assist him to take better decisions by knowing what exactly
is the situation and potential implications. Therefore, the developer can avoid
unnecessary control functions, which can increase cost, complexity and time to
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delivery. Also, the methodology can be used not only for constituting a tech-
nical system trustworthy, but also on making the whole socio-technical system
trustworthy. By applying the methodology not only from the perspective of
the technical system but also from the perspective of all entities in the system
environment then the information system trustworthiness can be established.
Moreover, there is contribution towards the assessment of the trustworthiness
of the system. The process includes algorithms that enable the evaluation of
whether the system will achieve its goals by considering the goals that are as-
signed to it and also goals that are assigned to components of the information
system and are expected to be accomplished. Thus, trustworthiness is exam-
ined from a holistic perspective in order to capture all the properties that are
important in developing trust and not only a subset.
5. Development of a CASE tool for supporting the methodology. The
tool enables the construction of the trust model and the automatic assessment
of the system trustworthiness by executing the proposed algorithms.
1.5 Research approach
The study started with the identification of the research problem, which was to
investigate the issues involved in developing trustworthy information systems and
networks and develop a novel methodology to allow modelling and reasoning of
trust issues in a structured and coherent way. An extensive literature review was
carried out which included a comparison framework for the evaluation of related
work in a consistent way and not in an ad-hoc way. Then the research questions
were identified that drove the rest of the process and in particular the identification
of the research aims and objectives. Figure 1.1 depicts the research approach of this
thesis.
After the research questions have been identified a research method has to be
selected. The main research methods for software engineering are the deductive and
inductive approaches (Partridge, 1997). The deductive method is reasoning from the
general to the specific, while the inductive method is reasoning from the specific to
the general (Partridge, 1997). Also, in the deductive method we have an abstract
generalisation for the specification of the problem, while in inductive method the
problem is satisfied in terms of behaviours, because you know more about specific
behaviours than about the problem abstraction (Partridge, 1997).
Deductive reasoning moves from the general to the particular. It takes a gen-
eral premise and deduces particular conclusions. A valid deductive argument is one
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in which the conclusion necessarily follows from the premise. On the other hand
inductive reasoning moves from the particular to the general. It gathers together
particular observations in the form of premises, and then it reasons from these par-
ticular premises to a general conclusion. In our case, since we have some initial
goals and objectives, the deductive is more preferable because the inductive method
cannot guarantee correct results in the sense that they meet the requirements spec-
ification (Michie, 1982), in our case the initial goals and objectives. On the other
hand, the deductive approach provides adequate guarantees. However, for the in-
dividual components and requisites of the methodology the inductive approach will
be followed. In contrast with the deductive approach, which limits the scope of the
results, the inductive approach does not limit the scope of the results. In addition,
humans have difficulty in expressing in systematic terms the rules of their expertise,
but they are good at taking decisions on specific cases (Michie, 1982).
A hypothesis in software engineering science is a description of the new object to
be constructed, which in our case was the new development methodology. Therefore,
the hypothesis was a specification of requisites of the new object to be constructed
(Marcos, 2005), which was the proposed methodology. For the solution an analysis
of similar cases and a process of imagination and creativity was carried out and
for the verification the application of the methodology on a prototype case study
(Marcos, 2005).
Various validation techniques exist and the most common are (Shaw, 2003):
• Analysis. The results are analysed and have been found satisfactory.
• Evaluation. Given the stated criteria the results meet the criteria.
• Experience/Case study. The results have been used on real examples and there
is evidence of their correctness or usefulness or effectiveness.
• Example. A demonstration of the findings.
• Persuasion. Validation by persuasion is rarely sufficient. It is sufficient only in
some cases of feasibility research questions.
For this research project a combination of analysis, evaluation and experience/case
study were used as validation techniques.
1.6 Publications
Parts of the presented research have been published in journals, conferences, and
workshops.
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1.7 Structure of the thesis
The structure of the rest of the thesis is as follows. Part I describes the state of the
art and consists of Chapter 2, which provides background information about trust
and trustworthiness. It is explained how trust changes over time, and how important
is the context for the decision to trust or not to trust. Also, it defines the meaning
of system trustworthiness in the context of the current work. This chapter also de-
fines a set of requirements that are essential for software engineering methodologies
and Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE) tools. Moreover, it presents
the related work in the field of trust engineering. It offers a classification of the
existing related work into trust modelling, trust management, security engineering,
goal satisfaction reasoning, human computer interaction, trusted computing and
computational trust.
Part II is the main contribution of the thesis, which presents the JTrust method-
ology and consists of three chapters. Chapter 3 describes the requirements of the
methodology and its structure. Also, it introduces a running example that is used
throughout the thesis. In addition, it describes the JTrust modelling language pro-
posed by this research. The concepts of the language are presented along with the
meta-model of the language, which shows the relationships between the concepts.
Also, the trustworthiness requirements are described in this chapter and the formu-
las for calculating the system trustworthiness are presented. Moreover, The content
of this section was published at the IEEE Conference of Research Challenges in In-
formation Science and at the International Journal of Secure Software Engineering.
Chapter 4 describes the process of the proposed methodology. In particular, the
activities included in the process are described. These are, the identification of the
actors and their dependencies, the identification of resolutions, the identification of
entailments, and the identification of the trustworthiness requirements. In addition,
the activity of the assessment of system trustworthiness is presented towards the
end of the chapter. The content of this chapter was published at the International
Journal of Information Systems Modelling and Design.
Chapter 5 describes the JTrust CASE tool that was developed to support the
activities of the methodology. Particularly, it explains how the tool supports the
developer and what are the benefits and the automations that it is offering.
The third and last part of the thesis presents the evaluation of the research and
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conclusions. In particular, Chapter 6 demonstrates the validity of this research. This
is demonstrated in two ways. First, through the application of the methodology in
real case study. And secondly, by getting feedback from experts through the use of
questionnaires.
Chapter 7 provides a critical discussion regarding the proposed trust engineering
methodology and it concludes the thesis. It discusses the contributions and the
significance of this research and it describes directions for future work.
Figure 1.2 provides a diagrammatic model of the thesis’ main claim, and the
propositions upon which this is based. For the thesis to hold we claim that each of
these concepts or statements are valid. The arrows between the boxes indicate that
the tail concept acts as ground for the head.
The validation of the thesis is based on the validity of the case study and the
survey. The validity of the case study and the survey is contingent on the soundness
of the modelling language, the methodological process, the case study methodology
used to design the case study, the survey methodology used to design the survey,
and the tool used to support the proposed methodology. The figure illustrates how
the motivation for developing trustworthy information systems also motivated the
design of the literature review. Given the broadness of the notion of trust and how
it was dealt from different perspectives was used to drive this review. Based on this
review limitations were identified in Chapter 2. These were the lack of appropriate
abstractions and constructive techniques that were required to reason about trust
and its complementary notion of control. Also, the review helped to devise the
methodology for developing the proposed approach and validate it. Guided by the
research methodology, in Chapter 3 the JTrust meta-model was developed, which
provided the foundation of the modelling language. In Chapter 4 a methodological
process was developed based on modelling language. The modelling language and
the process suggested design principles that the tool support should include and
specific characteristics were derived. These characteristics informed the architecture
and the functionality of the JTrust tool prototype presented in Chapter 5. The
JTrust methodology was validated using the case study and the survey described in
Chapter 6.
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Figure 1.2: Thesis claim and supporting propositions
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Part I
State of the Art
Chapter 2
Literature review
In this chapter, we review the current state of the art in the area of trustworthy
information systems development, which is broad, multidisciplinary, and includes
diverse approaches belonging to different research sub-areas. A core element in this
area is trust. This chapter is divided in two parts. Sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5
belong in the first part where we provide background information about trust and
we discuss definitions of trust, In addition, in this part we review the literature that
is relevant and defines our research baseline, covering trust and trustworthiness
in the context of information systems in general and in the context of this thesis
more specifically, development methods and CASE tools for information systems,
and evaluation methods for software engineering research. The second part of this
chapter is the section 2.6, which provides a comprehensive survey on approaches to
trustworthy information systems development, including their main contributions
and criticism. A core element in these works is trust, so we look into how these
approaches are dealing with trust. The areas that are relevant to our proposal
are trust modelling during requirements analysis which deals with capturing the
rationale of trust decisions, trust management, security engineering that considers
trust in order to make the system more secure and in effect more trustworthy,
goal satisfaction reasoning techniques that can provide confidence that the system
can achieve the goals that has been assigned, Human Computer Interaction that
deals with methods of gaining user’s trust but focusing mostly at a user interface
level, Trusted Computing that ensures the trustworthiness by using a hardware
component as a controller for the rest for the components, and computational trust
that develops models that can be used by artificial agents when required to make a
trust decision.
Chapter 2. Literature review
2.1 Trust and trustworthiness
Trust has been the object of research for many years. Here we outline several defi-
nitions of trust and then we make an observation about the common characteristics
of trust:
• According to Oxford Dictionary , ”trust is the firm belief in the reliability or
truth or strength of an entity”. While, the Webster dictionary defines trust
as ”a confidence dependence on the character, ability, strength, or truth of
someone or something”. However, both of these definitions give a very general
view of trust and enable many interpretations.
• A definition given by Deutsch (1962) is ”a) an individual is confronted with an
ambiguous path, a path that can lead to an event perceived to be beneficial
or to an event perceived to be harmful; b) he perceives that the occurrence
of these events is contingent on the behaviour of another person; and c) he
perceives the strength of a harmful event to be greater than the strength of a
beneficial event. If he chooses to take an ambiguous path with such properties,
he makes a trusting choice; else he makes a distrustful choice”.
• Luhmann (1979) defined trust as ”a means for reducing the complexity of so-
ciety; complexity created by interacting individuals with different perceptions
and goals”.
• Barber (1983) defined trust as the subjective expectation of future perfor-
mance.
• In addition, Gambetta (1988) has defined trust as ”a particular level of the
subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group
of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such
action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in
a context in which it affects his own action”.
• Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) defined trust as ”the willingness of a
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation
that the other party will perform a particular action important to the trustor,
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”.
• Rousseau et al. (1998) defined trust as ”a psychological state comprising the
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the in-
tentions or behaviour of another”.
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The meaning of trust given by researchers usually reflected their science. In
psychology trust represents a personal attribute (McKnight and Chervany, 1996),
which is developed through the early psychological development of an individual
and is conceptualised as a belief, expectancy, or feeling that is deeply rooted in the
personality of the individual (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Therefore any attempt to
investigate the development, maintenance and stability of trust should consider the
individual differences, which are a result of different past experiences.
In social psychology trust is a phenomenon that occurs in a social relationship
(McKnight and Chervany, 1996) and is based on the expectation of the other party
in the relationship (Kini and Choobineh, 1998). Trust is also expectancy in the
occurrence of future events and is strongly related to the subjective probability
that the individual assigns to the occurrence of these events (Rempel, Holmes, and
Zanna, 1985). With respect to the decision to trust it involves the importance of the
issue to the individual (Kini and Choobineh, 1998) and, according to McKnight and
Chervany (1996), the attributes of the individual upon which another individual will
base his decision to trust or not are different from situation to situation and from
relationship to relationship.
In sociology trust is viewed as something normal in nature (McKnight and Cher-
vany, 1996) and as a social reality that is functionally necessary for the continuance
of harmonious social relationships (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). The existence of trust
is that it increases engagements and activities in a society. While on the other
hand, lack of confidence will lead to no participation and lack of trust will lead
to no activities (Luhmann, 1988). For example, citizens show trust in their govern-
ments, patients in their doctors, clients in the lawyers and students in their teachers.
When trust is absent in such cases, then crises and riots emerge. Furthermore, (Luh-
mann, 1988) states that trust exist in order to represent a connection between the
familiar and unfamiliar of our world.
In economics trust is seen as a cause that reduces opportunism in a transaction
and as a consequence it can lead to lower transaction cost for the participants
(Rousseau et al., 1998). If there is trust, negotiations are easier and shorter and
there is less need to monitor and enforce the agreement. In other words, lack of
trust is an obstacle to personal relationships and conducting businesses. In addition,
trust allows the reduction of complexity (Luhmann, 1988) by decreasing the control
mechanisms, and as a result there are savings in valuable resources such as time and
money. Also, during crisis and uncertainty trust becomes more important and proves
to be a valuable asset (McKnight and Chervany, 1996). When used properly, trust
is enabler of building collaborations among the participating actors, a necessary
antecedent for cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). However, when abused, trust can act
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as a stopping block for successfully achieving a goal. Moreover, trust in economics
is considered to be a rational choice mechanism (McKnight and Chervany, 1996)
but, nevertheless, the decision to trust or not can be affected both by cognitive and
emotional elements (McAllister, 1995). The cognitive element refers to a rational
assessment of risk, the other party’s reliability and competence, and is therefore
more task-oriented. On the other hand, the emotional element refers to attraction,
in the short term, and loyalty, in the long term. Its orientation is therefore more
inter-personal (Egger, 2003).
Although, there is variety of definitions of trust, there are some common char-
acteristics identified in most of the definitions, such as:
• Interaction: Trust entails the existing or potential interaction between two
parties. We can say that the two parties are engaged in a trust relationship.
• Expectation: When there is trust it means that there is an expectancy of
one party from the other party, or that both parties have expectations from
the other party. When a party has an expectation he is the trustor and the
other party is the trustee. Therefore, in a trust relationship a party can be
simultaneously a trustor and a trustee.
• Uncertainty: Trust acts as a means to remove the uncertainty about the out-
come of an interaction between the trustor and the trustee. In other words,
we consider trust as a means of creating confidence in the outcome of an in-
teraction. In society the problems of confidence are often solved by control
mechanisms such as the law and politics (Luhmann88). For example, an in-
dividual has confidence that his right to express himself will not be taken by
another individual because of the law. On the other hand, the case of trust is
different.
• Vulnerability: When one party trusts another party then it becomes vulnerable
to a potential negative outcome. The implications of the negative outcome are
the risk that the trustor is willing to take. Trust therefore includes a decision
or action and consequently risk. Risk is like a mechanism to represent the
difference of the controllable and the uncontrollable (Luhmann, 1988). Nobody
can predict the future and even if something is planned to bring certain result,
it might lead to a different result, as there will always be parameters that
cannot be fully controlled. Therefore, the possibility of different results than
the ones planed is named risk, which is a term that represents that unwanted
results might be the consequences of our actions (Luhmann, 1988).
20
Chapter 2. Literature review
• Decision: Trust entails a decision about choosing to take or not take an action.
It can lead to disappointment, if you take the action and neglect the possible
bad outcome. The reaction to a bad outcome is internal in the case of trust
since you can blame yourself and regret for taking the action (Luhmann, 1988).
• Trustor subjectivity: There is always subjectivity in case of trust. The decision
to trust or not trust depends on the perspective of the trustor and his personal
characteristics and past experience.
• Trustee attributes: The decision to trust or not trust depends on the attributes
of the trustee as well. Therefore, an individual may trust another individual
who has the desired attributes even though the trustor individual is inclined
not to trust due to his personal characteristics or past experience.
• Context: The same level of trust is not always developed between certain
parties. The conditions of the outside world affect the development of trust
(Luhmann, 1988), so different level of trust, or no trust at all, will be developed
between two parties if they happen to be in different environment conditions.
If we trust a doctor for suggesting a medicine, it does not mean that we have to
trust her when she is suggesting a specific meal at a restaurant. The reputation
as a good doctor it does not help if we are looking for a plumber.
Based on the aforementioned observations, we have adopted the following defi-
nition for use throughout this thesis. This definition considers the aforementioned
characteristics as it is not too narrow to leave important concepts outside and it is
broad enough to capture the richness of the concept of trust.
Trust is positive expectations of the behaviour of another party from whom he
might be positively or negatively affected (Mo¨llering, 2005).
Having defined trust in the context of this research, we need to understand
the process of trusting. Trust is not static, but dynamic, which means that it
is not stable during a time period but it changes over time. When two parties
engage into a relationship there are two categories of factors that have an impact
on the trust process, the extrinsic and intrinsic trust factors (Jøsang, Keser, and
Dimitrakos, 2005). The extrinsic trust factors are all the information about the
trustee that is collected by the trustor without any direct experience, such as the
trustee’s reputation. On the contrary, the intrinsic trust factors are the information
that the trustor collects about the trustee while having a direct experience. In
the early stages of the trust relationship the extrinsic trust factors have a greater
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impact in the trustor’s trust decision. Almost every relationship begins with an
initial phase where the extrinsic factors are more important (McKnight, Cummings,
and Chervany, 1998), however, as time goes by the intrinsic trust factors become
more important since the trustor can make his decision on information that has been
collected from direct experience. Of course, it has to be mentioned that this process
does not consider how the trustor due to his personal subjectivity interprets the
intrinsic and extrinsic factors. In other words two different individuals can take a
different trust decision, even though the intrinsic and extrinsic factors are the same.
The optimum condition though in the trust relationship between individuals that
will benefit the society is reached not when they show unlimited and un conditional
trust but when there is justified trust (Braynov, 2002). Trust that is justified is
the key. Justified trust is when trust of the trustor matches the trustworthiness
of the trustee, and as a result the maximum benefit occurs (Figure 2.1). Trusting
less is a loss of opportunities, while on the contrary trusting too much makes you
vulnerable (Cofta, 2007; Cofta, 2008). For example, let us consider the case of a
software company, where its software developers can develop a software application
in one year. When a client asks for a software application the management of the
company has to make a decision and agree with the client on delivery date. If the
company management under-trusts its software developers and offers a time more
than a year, then it risks losing the contract to a competitor. On the other hand, if
the company management over-trusts its software developers and commits to a time
of less than year, then it becomes vulnerable as the product may not be ready in time
and there may be financial consequences. The key is for the company management
to assess the trustworthiness of its software developers with respect to their ability
of developing the software application and based on this assessment show justified
trust.
Trustworthiness is a characteristic of an individual or thing that is the object of
that individual’s trust. If the object of our trust is worthy of that trust, then it will
fulfil our expectations and our trust will be rewarded, not betrayed.
In (Cofta, 2007) the characteristics that express the trustworthiness of an actor
can relate to continuity, competence, or motivation. Continuity means that the cur-
rent relationship between the two actors will continue in the future and it will not
be only temporary. Competence refers to the capability of the trustee to support
the trustor. An example of competence evidence in a student teacher relationship is
if the teacher has a teaching certificate. Motivation is whatever drives the trustee to
support the needs of the trustor and an obvious example is if the trustor’s interest
matches with the trustee’s interest. In addition, McKnight and Chervany (2000) de-
fine the concepts of competence, benevolence, integrity, and predictability regarding
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Figure 2.1: Optimum trust level
trustworthiness. Competence means that the trustee has the power or the ability
to do what it is needed by the trustor, while benevolence means that the trustee
also cares about the trustor and is motivated to act in his interest. Integrity means
that the trustee is honest and he will keep his promise to the trustor and he will
fulfil the agreement, while predictability means that the trustee’s behaviour is con-
sistent enough so that the trustor can forecast his future behaviour. Furthermore, in
(Riegelsberger, Sasse, and McCarthy, 2005) the properties regarding trustworthiness
are called intrinsic properties that consist of ability, internalized norms, and benev-
olence. Ability is all the skills, competences, and characteristics that are required
by the trustee in order to deliver in his relationship with the trustror. Internalized
norms are all the principles that are considered acceptable by trustee and he behaves
according to them. Finally, benevolence is when the trustee is in a relationship with
a trustor as part of his own gratification and in such a relationship the trustee does
not expect any return from the trustor.
Our conclusion is that the competence or ability of the trustee to do what is
expected from the trustor is the basic characteristic of trustworthiness as it appears
in all the definitions given by the researchers. Other characteristics such as benev-
olence and motivation may be important as well but our focus will be concentrated
on the competence characteristic once we transfer to the context of information
systems. Competence depends on the specific trust relationships and its context.
There is therefore trust between the trustor and the trustee when the trustee pos-
sesses enough evidence of competence that are considered signs of trustworthiness
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within the trustor’s social context. The more such characteristics the trustee pos-
sesses the greater the trust of the trustor in the trustee will be.
2.2 Information System trust and trustworthiness
Having defined trust and trustworthiness in general, can we trust specifically tech-
nical entities, such as computers, mobile devices, or information systems for our
day-to-day activities? Do we actually trust the system, the humans who have devel-
oped the system or the humans who operate the system? The attribution of trust is
still an on-going discussion. On one hand we have researchers (Friedman, Khan Jr,
and Howe, 2000; Shneiderman, 2000) who argue that trust is attributed only to
humans as they possess an intentional behaviour and free will and they can behave
in unpredictable ways. And on the other hand, there are researchers who claim that
trust can be attributed to technical systems as well. Kini and Choobineh (1998)
consider trust in the Internet as a form of social trust that is required, since users are
not technically capable of understanding the technology of the Internet, but they
are willing to use it. Miller and Voas (2009) discuss about what is trust in software
systems. They claim that trust is a relationship between people or between people
and a thing and to trust someone or something is to act as if the object of trust
will perform as promised or as required. As software artefacts become increasingly
sophisticated, trust in them becomes increasingly similar to trust in humans. That
is, when software artefacts exhibit behaviours similar to humans, the relationship of
trust to such artefacts will resemble the trust humans establish with other humans.
We subscribe here to the latter stance with respect to information systems. In-
formation systems consist not only of technical components but also human compo-
nents that have intentional behaviour and collaborate with the technical components
for the fulfilment of goals. A natural consequence is that information systems in-
herit their human component’s intentional behaviour and can be characterised as
intentional entities. Moreover, today’s information systems have become so great in
size and complexity that it is difficult for users to predict their behaviour. Out of
this difficulty arises the need of trust because trust is about future expectations. In
that sense we argue that trust can be attributed to information systems as well.
In the literature there are a lot of definitions given for trustworthy information
systems. Miller and Voas (2009) define trustworthiness as a characteristic of a per-
son or a thing that is the object of someone’s trust. It will fulfil our expectations
and our trust will be rewarded. If a person is trustworthy, it is considered a virtue,
so if a software artefact is trustworthy, then it is considered a mark of high qual-
ity. Berzins (2004) argues that in an ideal world, trustworthy systems would carry
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absolute guarantees that the software will perform its required functions under all
possible circumstances, will do so on time and will never perform any actions that
have hazardous consequences. According to Jayaswal and Patton (2006), a trust-
worthy system is a system that has the capability of meeting customer trust and
developing the capability to meet their stated, unstated, and even unanticipated
needs. Moreover, Avizˇienis, Laprie, and Randell (2004) claims that trustworthiness
of a software system is the assurance that the system will perform as expected.
Based on the previous definitions we observed that trustworthiness of an infor-
mation system is a concern for the parties involved in the development and operation
of the system. In addition, the involved parties expect from a trustworthy system
nothing less than meeting their expectations. Therefore, throughout this thesis we
have given the following definition for a trustworthy information system:
Trustworthy information system is an information system that meets all the
positive expectations of the stakeholders.
In the literature there has been extensive research to define the components
of system trustworthiness. According to Schneider, Bellovin, and Inouye (1999)
trustworthiness is a holistic property, encompassing security, correctness, reliability,
privacy, safety, and survivability and it is not sufficient to address only some of
these diverse dimensions. Hoffman, Lawson-Jenkins, and Blum (2006) proposed
and extended a trust model, which considers privacy, security, reliability, usability,
safety, availability, and user expectations as subcomponents of trust.
All these issues are components of system trustworthiness as they are stakeholder
expectations that are widely considered signs of trustworthiness and trustworthy
systems must do what stakeholders expect and not something else, despite environ-
mental disruption, human user and operator errors, attacks by hostile parties, and
system design and implementation errors. Also, trustworthy systems must be able
to produce reliable and authentic information. More particularly:
• Privacy of personal information plays a very important role in building trust
in an information system. Today, information systems have the ability to
collect and store personal information very easily and providing wider access.
So, there is an increased risk for the personal information to be intentionally
or unintentionally disclosed and will result in decreasing users’ trust in the
information system (Rohm and Milne, 2004). There are multiple examples
in e-commerce and e-banking where the trustee is required to maintain the
privacy of the customer’s name, address and credit card details.
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• Regarding security, if we do not consider trust in the design, then we might end
up with a system that has security measures that are not needed and that they
just make the collaboration of the users through the software system and with
the system more difficult. On the other hand, security measures might not be
taken in cases where it is assumed there is trust among the users or the system
when it actually there in no such trust (Giorgini et al., 2004). Rasmusson
and Jansson (1996) define two types of security, hard and soft security. Hard
security is all the security mechanisms that protect the systems against any
potential attack. However, there are cases that we do not only want to prevent
an attack to a system resource but to protect ourselves from a provider of a
harmful or low quality resource and the approach of protection in these cases
is called soft security. Therefore, the receiver of the resource needs to show
trust only to those resource providers that are trustworthy.
Security is the concurrent existence of availability, confidentiality, and integrity
(Avizˇienis, Laprie, and Randell, 2004).
– Availability when the service of the software system is always ready for
the user to use.
– Confidentiality means that there is no disclosure of information to unau-
thorized users.
– Integrity is when the information is not improperly altered.
• Reliability of a system can be defined as ”the probability that a system will
perform a specified function within prescribed limits, under given environmen-
tal conditions, for a specified time” (Stapelberg, 2009). Also, Avizˇienis, Laprie,
and Randell (2004) define system reliability as the continuity of providing the
correct service. The attribute of reliability of a system as a trustee contributes
significantly to its trustworthiness. When a trustor assigns a subjective prob-
ability to the behaviour of the trustee this is called reliability trust and it
excludes situational parameters (Jøsang, Ismail, and Boyd, 2007).
• Another additional attribute of trustworthiness is usability. According to
Nielsen (1994) and Shackel (1991) usability is:
– How easily the users learn the interface (learnability).
– The efficiency of the interface (task performance).
– How easily the users can memorize.
– The reduction of errors.
– The general satisfaction with the interface.
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Research so far has shown that the usability factors have an impact on trust-
worthiness, especially of the websites, as they increase the perceived ability of
them (Roy, Dewit, and Aubert, 2001). Moreover, usability is a prerequisite to
trust, as users need to trust themselves and their ability that they can use a
software system correctly (Sasse, 2005).
• Safety is when there will not be any catastrophic consequences to the users
or the environment by the use of the software system (Avizˇienis, Laprie, and
Randell, 2004).
• Maintainability is the ability of the software system to be modified or repaired
(Avizˇienis, Laprie, and Randell, 2004).
All the aforementioned attributes contribute towards system trustworthiness.
Some more, some less, depending on the context of the system under development.
For example, a user of a system might be more in interested in the safety of a software
system while another user in the availability. Also, the availability of the system
might be more critical for systems controlling financial transactions, while for other
systems safety is the major concern. Thus, the context plays an important role in
the trust process and as a result it should be considered when trust in analysed and
reasoned.
However, the above system trustworthiness definitions are implicitly referring
to the characteristics of the software component of an information system, neglect-
ing the human components of an information system or other external software
components. Some years ago a system could be trustworthy if for example the soft-
ware component was secure and usable as the information system basically only de-
pended on that software component. Nowadays information systems are more socio-
technical systems and interact with other components, human or system. Thus, the
trustworthiness of the system depends also on other human components and external
systems.
This is what we believe distinguishes a dependable system from a trustworthy
system. In an information system context, dependability refers to the technical com-
petence of the software and hardware components of an information system, such
that reliance can justifiably be placed on them. Trustworthiness of an information
system however, is not only the dependability of the software and hardware com-
ponents (Shneiderman, 2000). So, we argue that trustworthiness of an information
system is the dependability of the software and hardware components, in terms of
security, privacy, etc., plus the consideration of the outcome of the interactions of
the software components with other components that are required for the fulfilment
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of the information system’s goals. For example, even if a software that is part of an
information system is dependable in terms of security, the information system will
not be trustworthy if one of its users does not keep her username and password safe.
A stakeholder will consider an information system trustworthy if the information
system meets his expectations that are considered signs of trustworthiness inside the
social setting. Therefore, the stakeholder expectations are translated to functional
and non-functional requirements as the above. Therefore, this research refines the
definition of system trustworthiness as:
A trustworthy information system is an information system that fulfils all the
functional and non-functional stakeholder requirements. The more trustworthy a
system is, the more likely it is that it will fulfil the stakeholder requirements.
Trustworthiness is the necessary but not sufficient foundation for users to trust
systems with justification. It is not enough for the system to be trustworthy, it must
also show itself to be trustworthy, i.e. provide evidence of trustworthiness. So, the
goal is for the system to be trustworthy so that it will increase the likelihood that
users will reciprocate and trust the system.
2.3 Trust and Information System trustworthiness in the
context of the thesis
In this thesis the focus is not on the trust relationship between the user of a sys-
tem and the system. Also, the focus is not on the trust relationships among the
components of the system. The focus of this thesis is on the trust relationships be-
tween the developer of an information system and the components of an information
system. The system-to-be acts as a proxy for the developer once put in operation
having the same trust relationships. During requirements modelling the developer
is including such components in the requirements model that reflect the behaviour
that is expected from them. The further development of the system is based on such
expectations and eventually its success in meeting all stakeholder requirements. To
this end, in the context of this thesis we define trust as:
Trust is the positive expectations of the developer about the behaviour of the
modelled actors of an information system, from which the technical system-to-be
and the whole information system might be positively or negatively affected.
It is crucial for the success of the system that the developer shows optimum
trust to the components of an information system. Trusting less the developer
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is losing opportunities to make the system less complex and costly. In contrast,
trusting more the developer is setting herself exposed to the information system
components’ uncertain behaviour. Thus, the developer is becoming vulnerable and
eventually the system under development is becoming vulnerable in terms of not
meeting its goals. Therefore, the system trustworthiness is dependent upon the
satisfaction of the goals of the system assigned to achieve by itself and the outgoing
dependencies of the system on the rest of the components of the information system.
As a result, in the context of this thesis we define then system trustworthiness as:
System trustworthiness is a characteristic of the system-to-be that shows to which
degree the system-to-be can achieve the goals that have been assigned and to which
degree its outgoing dependencies are resolved through trust and control.
In section 3.4, we describe how we justify the resolution of dependencies through
trust and control. In brief, trust and control are the means for the developer to feel
confident that the modelled components will behave as expected once the system is
put in operation.
2.4 Information Systems development methodologies
The British Computer Society Information Systems Analysis and Design Working
Group defines a software methodology as ”recommended collection of philosophies,
phases, procedures, rules, techniques, tools, documentation, management, and train-
ing for developers of information systems” (BCS - The Chartered Institute for IT ).
Development of trustworthy software systems is a complex procedure though, where
developers do not have adequate knowledge of reasoning about trust and lack the
aforementioned collection. However, a methodology copes with the complexity and
reduces risks and uncertainties by rendering the development tasks more transparent
and visible (Klopper, Gruner, and Kourie, 2007), thus with the creation of a software
development methodology for trustworthy software systems developers will be able
to model and reason about trust. In general, a software development methodology
includes the following steps:
• Requirements elicitation.
• Analysis.
• Design.
• Implementation
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• Testing.
This research will focus mainly on the requirements, analysis and design stages, and
how the developed designs can be verified as meeting the trustworthiness require-
ments. Nevertheless, it will also investigate what outputs from the former stages
are best suited for the next stages. In addition, the methodology should follow a
traditional methodology pattern for software development and not having and ad-
hoc approach that will be difficult for developers to adopt it (Presti et al., 2006).
Moreover, for a methodology to be characterised as a good methodology (Berard,
1995) requires that it:
• Can be described quantitatively and qualitatively at the same time.
• Can be used repeatedly and achieving the same results every time.
• Can be taught to others easily and in a reasonable time frame.
• Can be applied by others with a reasonable level of success.
• Can be applicable in a relatively large percentage of case studies.
• Can achieve significantly and consistently better results than either other tech-
niques or ad hoc approaches.
In the development of a methodology some characteristics have to be considered.
First of all, the methodology should consider all aspects that affect trust and not
only a subset (Presti et al., 2006). For example, until now only subsets of trust
properties are considered, while neglecting the holistic nature of trust.
Finally, trust should be considered from the early stages of the development
process (Yu and Liu, 2001) in order not to create any conflict with security and the
other functional requirements of the system (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007).
2.4.1 Modelling language
A system under development can be modelled at different levels of abstraction or
from different perspectives. A modelling language contains the elements with which
the model can be described. The grammar of the modelling language describes its
semantics, syntax, and notation (Karagiannis and Ku¨hn, 2002). A modelling proce-
dure describes the steps applying the modelling language in order to create models,
which essentially are the results of the procedure. Mechanisms are algorithms that
can be applied to the models. In Figure 2.2 the components of modelling methods
are depicted and it is used as a reference model in order to develop the modelling
language proposed in this thesis.
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Figure 2.2: Modelling methods components
For modelling languages two major approaches exist to describe their grammar,
graph grammars and meta-models. Often, UML class diagrams are used to describe
the meta-model of the grammar. For grammatical rules that cannot be fully ex-
pressed by class diagrams, additional constraint languages are employed such as
OCL. In our thesis, we use UML class diagram to describe the meta-model of our
modelling language. The semantics describes the meaning of a modelling language
and consists of a semantic domain and the semantic mapping. The semantic do-
main describes the meaning while the semantic mapping connects the syntactical
concepts with their meaning defined in the semantic domain. In this thesis infor-
mal textual descriptions are used to define the semantics of the proposed modelling
language. The notation describes the visualisation of a modelling language. In this
thesis we define symbols for visualising the syntactical concepts of the modelling
language. The modelling language mechanisms provide the functionality to use and
evaluate the models built using the modelling language. In this thesis mechanisms
are proposed to evaluate the trustworthiness level of the technical system under
development.
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2.4.2 CASE tools for Information System methodology
In software engineering there was always the problem of lack of common under-
standing between the developers of the system and the stakeholders. As a result,
graphical modelling has been arisen in order to promote a better communication
between the developers and the stakeholders that will eventually establish a com-
mon understanding of the domain under inspection. Therefore, graphical models
are commonly used to describe and capture functional properties of the environment
and the system, as well as to design the system.
However, graphical modelling most of the time is informal and does not contain
any logic. Hence, formal frameworks have been developed that combine graphical
notations with logic. These tools, called Computer Aided Software Engineering
(CASE) tools support the process of software development and they are highly
interactive and graphic-intensive (Phillips et al., 1998).
The graphical user interface (GUI) of a CASE tool is usually based around a
working canvas. In this area the user produces graphical structures that consist
of predefined symbols that usually appear in a toolbox (Phillips et al., 1998). The
structures are used to model the system under development and, particularly in the
case of this dissertation, the environment in which the system will operate as well.
The elements that can be drawn on the canvas are usually divided into two
categories. The entities that represent units of information and the relationships
that link the elements. For each CASE tool there are certain well defined rules
concerning the appearance of each element. Moreover, the relationships might have
attributes on their bodies and on their ends and there is usually a restriction of the
way elements can be connected (Garc´ıa-Magarin˜o and Go´mez-Sanz, 2008). In detail
the functional requirements of a CASE tool are the following (Phillips et al., 1998):
• Insert elements in the working canvas. Once an element is selected from the
tool box it should be possible to be inserted in the working canvas and also to
enter its properties.
• Edit existing elements. The element or a group of elements should be selectable
so as the user to be able to take a variety of actions, such as copy or cut and
paste them, edit their properties or delete the elements.
• Create links between the elements. The links will describe the relationship
between the elements.
• Edit existing links. The user should have the ability to select links and edit
their properties or delete them.
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• Edit diagrams. The user should be able to re-arrange the diagrams or part of
them, and sometimes place annotations.
• Passive browsing of diagrams. The user should be provided with the ability
to move, zoom or rotate diagrams and hide parts of the displayed information
according to his will.
On the other hand, the non-functional requirements of CASE tools are:
• Ease of actions. The user should be able to carry all his possible actions easily
(Phillips et al., 1998).
• Flexibility of actions. The CASE tool should assist the developers to cre-
ate quality designs without being too restrictive to a point that will alienate
the developers. Therefore, there should be an optimisation of the constraint
environment (Brooks and Scott, 2001).
• Prevention of errors and ease of recovery with the inclusion of multilevel ”undo”
and ”redo” actions (Phillips et al., 1998).
• Aesthetically pleasing screens that comply with usability rules (Phillips et al.,
1998).
• Effective help system, by speaking the developer’s language. The help should
be in words that the developer is familiar with (Seffah and Rilling, 2001).
• Quality feedback at each stage or even in some actions, again by speaking the
developer’s language as mentioned above (Seffah and Rilling, 2001).
CASE tools usually follow the approach of a separated logical model from the
views of that model. This approached is based on the fact that an element might
appear in two diagrams, but actually is one single element. Otherwise, an element
that appears in two different models would be difficult to be processed. Conse-
quently, CASE tools should keep separately the logical model and the views (Garc´ıa-
Magarin˜o and Go´mez-Sanz, 2008).
The ultimate goal of a CASE tool is to place, join and manipulate the elements
of the methodology quickly and easily. Also, the tool should fully support all the
aspects of the methodology and must enforce its rules, for example by not allowing
the user to apply illegal relationships between the entities (Phillips et al., 1998).
Finally, the CASE tool should provide developers the ability to automate many of
their actions (Finnigan, Kemp, and Mehandjiska, 2000), so as to reduce the amount
of time and money spent on projects and improve the quality of the finished product
and its documentation (Finnigan, Kemp, and Mehandjiska, 2000).
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2.5 Evaluation methods for software engineering method-
ologies
An essential part of method development is the evaluation of the method, which
includes also an investigation of its validity. The validity of a method is more an
empirical than a theoretical question, since a lot of methods that sound reasonable
in theory; do not work in practice (Moody et al., 2003). To this end we have chosen
an empirical approach to evaluate the main contributions of this research. The
demand of empirical studies and their contribution to increasing knowledge in the
software engineering domain (Runeson and Ho¨st, 2009; Sjoeberg et al., 2005) is
continually increasing. In the software engineering domain, it is difficult to select
an appropriate empirical method, which is suitable for a specific research context.
Generally, the tools for evaluation of a method are experiment, case study, and
survey, which include data collection and analysis (Kitchenham, Linkman, and Law,
1997; Zelkowitz and Wallace, 1997). However, evaluations are expensive and there
are no mandatory requirements on methods or tools in order researchers to validate
their methods or tools (Kitchenham, Linkman, and Law, 1997). Another challenge
is the availability of resources such as budget, time, and personnel, in order to relax
the idealised assumptions, which are made during the development of a method in
order to enhance the insight and the ability to reason (Wieringa and Morali, 2012;
Easterbrook et al., 2008), much as possible until the method is tested in a real
environment.
There is no one evaluation method that is always the best, but there are many
methods each of which is appropriate in different situations (Kitchenham, Linkman,
and Law, 1997). The DESMET project (Kitchenham, Linkman, and Law, 1997;
Kitchenham, 1996) identified nine evaluation methods:
1. Quantitative experiment. This is an evaluation that includes many subjects
who are asked to perform a task using different methods or tools under inves-
tigation and is aimed at establishing measurable effects of using a method or
tool.
2. Qualitative experiment. This is an evaluation that includes many subjects who
are asked to perform a task using different methods or tools under investigation
and aimed at establishing that a method or tool is appropriate for specific
needs. In this case, the appropriateness of the method or tool is assessed in
terms of the required features provided by the method or tool.
3. Quantitative case study. This is an evaluation where the method or tool un-
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der investigation is tried out on a real project and is aimed at establishing
measurable effects of using a method or tool.
4. Qualitative case study. This is an evaluation where the method or tool under
investigation is tried out on a real project aimed at establishing that a method
or tool is appropriate for specific needs.
5. Quantitative survey. This is an evaluation where humans that have used a
specific method or tool are asked to provide information about the method or
tool and is aimed at establishing measurable effects of using a method or tool.
6. Qualitative survey. This is an evaluation where humans that have used a
specific method or tool are asked to provide information about the method
or tool and is aimed at establishing that a method or tool is appropriate for
specific needs.
7. Qualitative effect analysis. This is a subjective assessment of the quantitative
effect of a method or a tool based on expert opinion.
8. Benchmarking experiment. This is an evaluation based on a number of stan-
dard tests using alternative tools and assessing the relative performance of the
methods or tools.
In this thesis, we have chosen to evaluate our proposed methodology using a
qualitative case study from the e-health care domain in England in order to ob-
serve the effects of our proposed methodology. Additionally, to further validate our
work we have chosen to carry out a quantitative and qualitative survey by asking
academics, industry researchers, and postgraduate students to use our proposed
methodology and support tool and provide us with feedback about the effectiveness
of the methodology.
2.6 State of the art in trust engineering
The state of the art in the area of trustworthy information system development is
very broad and looked from different angles and at different levels. Sutcliffe (2006)
argues that information system design and trust intersect in two ways. Firstly, if the
design of a system is not thought-out prior to the development stage, then there is
a possibility that the system will not be built as per the user’s requirements. When
the user actually utilises the system, she will be made aware that her requirements
have not been fulfilled, hence possibly causing distrust of the system and the pos-
sible rejection of it. The second way that design and trust intersect is by having
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technology acting as a mediator of trust between people, organisations or between
artificial agents who represent humans or organisations. Technology in our days
allows us to communicate and collaborate with people around the world. But also,
it prevents people from interacting face to face, where they are more able to deter-
mine the trustworthiness of the other party. So, there is a need for systems that will
enable the collaborating parties to assess the trustworthiness of each other using
technology as a mediator (Jøsang, Keser, and Dimitrakos, 2005). Trust is therefore
embedded in information systems in multiple ways (Table 2.1). There are lines of
research that are focusing on trust modelling during the requirements analysis stage,
trust management analysis, and consideration of trust during security requirements
analysis. In addition, a branch of human computer interaction research aims to
transmit the appropriate trust signals to the users and improve the trust decision
process or to increase the trust perceptions. Furthermore, there is a line of research
named Trusted Computing, which is focusing on developing trustworthy hardware
components that ensure the trustworthy behaviour of other components. Finally,
computational trust deals with the development of trust models that can be used
by artificial agents to reason about trust.
Table 2.1: Trust engineering approaches
Category Section Description
Trust modelling 2.6.1 Provides trust awareness to systems
Trust management 2.6.4 Enables the assessment of trustwor-
thiness
Security engineering 2.6.2 Considers trust during security
analysis
Goal satisfaction reasoning 2.6.3 Reasons about the satisfaction of
system goals
Human computer interaction 2.6.5 To send appropriate trust signals or
manipulate user trust perception
Trusted computing 2.6.6 To enforce trustworthy system be-
haviour
Computational trust 2.6.7 Trust models used by artificial
agents
2.6.1 Trust modelling
One line of work on trust adopts the approach of embedding trust in an information
system by treating trust as a non-functional requirement, for example such as secu-
rity or usability. Through this approach developers are guided to capture customer
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needs and requirements regarding trust and to reflect them in the functionality of
the system. Then it can be argued that users will trust the system once it will be
put in operation as it possesses the desired trust requirements from the perspective
of the user. Such approaches extend existing software engineering approaches, by
enhancing them with notations and processes to represent and reason about trust
as a non-functional requirement.
A first approach is by Yu and Liu (2001) that addresses the issues of trust at the
requirements level of the system development process. Trustworthiness is modelled
as a softgoal, which does not have clear criteria for satisfaction. i* concepts, such
as actor, goal, softgoal, dependency, are used in order to model the relationships
between the components of an information system. The strategic dependency model
describes the network of dependencies, while a strategic rationale model describes
the reasoning of each actor about her goals. The trustworthiness of the dependee
is modelled as a softgoal for the depender and is refined from her viewpoint. So,
trustworthiness is modelled as an objective of stakeholders, which influences their
dependencies and goals satisfaction. The refinement of the trustworthiness goal
represents the rationale for trust and leads to specific requirements for the system-
to-be. Therefore, trust is considered as a non-functional requirement, where trust
is a combination of all or some quality attributes of the system under development.
Furthermore, control mechanisms can be added to relieve the need for trust, which
contribute to the viability of the dependency. We adopt the principle from Yu that
dependencies introduce vulnerability for the depender, if the dependee does not
fulfil the dependency, and that the developer is led to question the viability of the
dependencies when considering a network of dependencies as a basis upon which the
system-to-be will be developed. Therefore, we add on top of that, that a dependency
is also a potential vulnerability for the developer as well.
Secure Tropos (Giorgini et al., 2005) extends Tropos methodology (Bresciani
et al., 2004) with the concepts of ownership, trust, delegation, permission, and
monitoring. Ownership between an actor and a service exists if the actor is the
legitimate owner of the service. Trust between two actors exists when one actor
trusts another actor for a certain goal. Delegation between two actors exists when
one actor delegates to another actor the execution of a task or access to a resource.
Moreover, the authors define two types of delegation, delegation of permission and
delegation of execution. In the first type of delegation the dependee is authorised
to achieve a goal but she does not have to, while in the second case the dependee
has to achieve the goal. The concept of trust is introduced in order to capture the
existence or non-existence of trust in the cases of delegation, since sometimes actors
delegate goals to actors that they do not trust as long as there are ways to hold
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such dependees accountable. Similarly to delegation, there is trust of permission and
trust of execution. In the first case the depender trusts that the dependee will not
go beyond the achievement of the goal, while in the second case the depender trusts
that the dependee will at least achieve the goal for her. Furthermore, in cases where
there is no trust, the concept of monitoring is introduced. The act of monitoring can
be done by the delegator himself or by another actor who plays the role of monitor
in order to check for the violation of trust. For example, in Figure 2.3 Bob owns his
personal information and while providing that information to Sam there is a trust
of permission that Sam will not misuse his private information. Alice wants from
Sam personal information for statistical reason and there is trust of execution that
Sam will at least fulfil this goal. If Alice does not trust Sam to fulfil the goal then
she can delegate the goal to monitor Sam to Carol. Carol then will monitor if Sam
is fulfilling the goal to provide personal information to Alice. Through this way,
the developer can capture trust relationships in a normal functional requirements
model, and with the introduction of the mentioned concepts security and trust
requirements are deriving. We agree with the authors that sometimes there may be
dependencies on other components that are not trusted, as long as there are ways
to hold those dependencies accountable. To this end, monitor is a solution to check
if dependencies are being fulfilled.
Figure 2.3: Monitoring example
Bimrah (2009) extends the Secure Tropos (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007) method-
ology with the concepts of request, action, trust relationship, trusting intention,
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reputative knowledge, recommendation and consequence in order to model trust
(Figure 2.4). Request is the act when an actor is asking for something to be done
or given by another actor, while the activity of the second actor, as a response to
the request of the first actor, is the action. A trust relationship indicates that one
actor expects another actor to behave in a certain way. Trusting intention is defined
as the intent of the trustor on how far she actually trusts the trustee to carry out
the action to her request. Reputative knowledge is the knowledge that the trustor
has about the trustee. Recommendation is the representation in favour of another
actor while consequence is the effect of a trust relationship. The developer is guided
through a series of models, using the aforementioned concepts, in order to analyse
and reason about trust relationships. The first model is the Request/Action Model
(R/AM), which models the action and the request, along with the resources and
security constraints that are put upon the actions and request. The next model
is the consequence model, which models the possible consequences of a request,
which can be positive or negative. The model that follows is the recommendation
model, which shows the recommendation for an actor. The consequences model, the
trusting intention and the reputative knowledge of the trustor towards the trustee
influence the recommendation of the trustee. The final model is the Trust Relation-
ship Model, which shows whether an actor trusts another actor, what is the trust
level, and whether other actors should trust the trustee, which ultimately help the
developer make design decisions. The author’s proposal captures in detail why one
actor trusts another actor.
In (Yan and Cofta, 2003) the system analysis and design considers different
domains in mobile communications. A trusted domain is a set of domain elements
such that all domain elements share certain defining statements regarding their trust
definition, which must be fulfilled in order an element to be trusted. Even though
the trust definition is common among the elements of a domain, however, there are
trust gaps between trusted domains because of the subjectivity of trust definitions.
To address this, certain elements bridge the gap and are responsible for ensuring
trust at a higher level than the one of the domains. The component that is trusted
by more than one domain and is acting as a bridge between them is named trusted
bridge. The methodology contains four steps: model the mobile communication
system and identify the different trusted domains and their entities, analyse each
domain to identify the trust statements, identify bridging solution for domains that
do not share any trusted component, and form the trusted bridge. To form the
trusted bridge the developer can use an existing component, create a new one, or
create a new separate domain that will bridge the two original domains as shown
in Figure 2.5. The methodology can be applied to any system analysis and we
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Figure 2.4: Bimrah meta-modell
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agree here with the authors that it is vital for the system analysis not to contain
any gap in the chain of trust relationships especially between the developer and the
components of the system.
Figure 2.5: Methods for bridging trusted domains
Presti et al. (2006) describe a holistic methodology to analyse trust during the
development of the system that focuses on the user of the system. The methodology
contains five steps as shown in Figure 2.6. The first step is the identification of
scenarios, which are short narratives that describe the user’s behaviour focusing on
the use of services provided by the system under development. Individuals external
to the trust analysis and the system design then validate the scenarios. The second
step is the trust analysis using the Trust Analysis Grid. The rows of the grid
represent aspects of the system described by one or several sentences of the scenarios,
while the columns represent categories of trust issues, subjective; system; and data;
that the authors have derived by studying the of the art in trust. The developer then
checks the ones that are satisfied in those aspects of the system. The completion of
the cells is done with a number of X or Y marks, the name of a more precise issue, or
a signed number, that indicate the importance of the trust issue to the specific aspect
of the system, the more precise issue, or the scale of trust issue respectively. The
third step involves examination of the previous trust issue by peers of the developer
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and from the perspective of another potential user. The fourth step contains the
refinement of the scenarios based on the previous peer review, and the last step is
the construction of guidelines for identifying trust requirements based on the Trust
Analysis Grid constructed previously. The guidelines are derived from the insight
that was achieved during the previous four steps.
Figure 2.6: Holistic trust analysis process
This direction of research investigates trust from the perspective of the users or
other stakeholders attempting to capture their trust related needs and requirements.
However, trust requirements are not a subset of requirements but all possible re-
quirements. There cannot be a requirement that it is not a trust requirement.
Furthermore, we investigate the trust relationships, which come into existence be-
cause of the dependencies, not from the perspective of the depender but from the
perspective of the developer. These are equally important for the developer, as the
system-to-be will be built according to that configuration of network of dependen-
cies. If the developers models dependencies and trust relationships that are not
valid then the system will not be built on solid foundations and there might be po-
tential vulnerabilities, which will constitute the system untrustworthy. Regarding
this aspect, the approaches mentioned in this section fail to provide support to the
developer. Moreover, there is limited support in providing required abstractions
that will enable the developer to enforce the fulfilment of dependencies in cases
where there is not trust. Furthermore, the previous approaches they do not look
into whether the system will be able to do what it is supposed to do in order to
be trustworthy because they do not reason about the system interactions that are
necessary for the satisfaction of the system goals. Therefore, trust in the system is
partially blind, as it has not been fully justified. So, the focus is on trust modelling
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but without supporting the developer in reasoning about trust relationships inside
an information system that are important to the system trustworthiness. The devel-
oper is left without guidance and as a result trust relationships from the perspective
of the developer are not investigated.
More particularly in (Yu and Liu, 2001), there are no constructive techniques
that can guide the developer in the refinement of the trustworthiness softgoal, for
example what are the aspects of trustworthiness. In addition, there are no control
related concepts and techniques available to guide the developer in identifying and
analysing the appropriate control mechanisms for the system-to-be. Giorgini et al.
(2005) fail to provide method for the developers to reason why there is trust in a
specific relationship. Also, even if monitoring mechanisms are in place still they are
not enough to enforce the fulfilment of a dependency. Furthermore, indirect trust
relationships are omitted from investigation, for instance, in case of monitoring de-
pendency, which is actually an indirect trust relationship, it is left unexamined and
there is not analysis on whether there is trust. If it proves that there is no trust
then the system will not achieve its designed functionality. Therefore, indirect trust
relationships stay hidden without proper justification and assessment and becom-
ing a serious threat for the proper operation of the developed information system.
In (Bimrah, 2009), although it provides a mechanism for reasoning about trust re-
lationships, it fails to capture indirect relationships as well. For example, should
an actor trust the recommendation provided from other actors. In addition, there
are no constructive techniques to guide the design of the system in case of luck of
trust in a dependency. In (Yan and Cofta, 2003) there are no constructive tech-
niques available on how the developer will identify the components that will act
as a trusted bridge or how she will create one or create another domain that will
bridge the two original components. Finally, Presti et al. (2006) identify what the
system must do in order the user to trust it. However, a trust requirement is not a
subset of the system requirements, but it is the system requirements and even more.
Moreover, even though the approach forces the developer to identify trust issues,
this approach does not provide concepts and techniques in terms of supporting the
developers in reasoning about trust.
2.6.2 Security engineering considering trust
This line of research includes contributions that even though some of them do not
claim that their goal is to achieve system trustworthiness, nevertheless, they sig-
nificantly improve system trustworthiness in terms of security, which is considered
widely as one very important aspect of trustworthiness. Also, in this category fall
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approaches that deal with domain knowledge and trust in order to achieve security.
Trust is an enabler of security because all security services rely to a great extend
on some notion of trust (Viega, Kohno, and Potter, 2001; Ray and Chakraborty,
2004; Haley et al., 2006). Secure systems have been built under the premise that
concepts like trustworthiness or trusted are well understood, unfortunately without
even agreeing on what trust means. Therefore, such works have investigated the
concept of trust in order to build secure systems.
In (Go´rski et al., 2005) a trust case represents a complete and explicit argu-
ment that influences trust in the system under development in terms of security
and safety. The trust case is decomposed into claims, using the Claim Definition
Language (CDL), that posit trust related properties and then follows the collection
and production of supporting evidence and development of a structured argument
that the evidence is supporting the claims. The evidence can be a fact, which is a
statement of verified information about something, an assumption, which is a state-
ment assumed to be true for which there is no supporting material, or another claim
for which the same procedure needs to be followed. The trust cases can be modelled
using UML stereotypes that influence the trust level of the trustor in the system.
Also, a UML based graphical language is used to represent the context in which
a specific claim is interpreted. Figure 2.7 depicts the conceptual model of a trust
case. We agree with the authors that security and safety are two important proper-
ties of system trustworthiness, and especially that it of paramount importance that
trust in the system under development needs to be justified by considering the trust
assumptions that underlie the system development.
Haley et al. (2006); Haley et al. (2008) investigate trust assumptions in the con-
text of analysis of security requirements. This framework consists of four activities:
identification of functional requirements; identification of security goals; identifica-
tion of security requirements; and construction of satisfaction arguments; In the last
activity the developer constructs two satisfaction arguments, named outer and inner
arguments, that enable her to identify incorrect assumptions about security related
system components. The outer arguments are claims for the system environment
expressed in formal logic, in particular that the system environment is correctly de-
fined and that the system will not introduce any undesired behaviour by the system
components. The inner arguments are informal arguments that support the claims
in the outer arguments and are based on trust assumptions. Trust assumption is
defined as ”a statement about the behaviour or properties of the world the system
lives within, made in order to satisfy a security requirement and assumed to be
true”. The process includes the annotation of the system environment with the
relevant phenomena between the system component and the specification of the de-
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Figure 2.7: Trust case conceptual model
sired behaviour from the components along with their justification. We agree with
the authors and we recognise as well that to say there will not be any undesired
behaviour by a system component is a very strong assumption and that we cannot
totally ensure the trust of the assumptions, still though it enables the system to be
built on strong foundations in order to be as trustworthy as possible not only in
terms of security though but in terms of its full functionality.
Elahi and Yu (2009) propose a method for discovering trade-offs that trust re-
lationships bring between trust and control. The method contains seven steps:
identification of actors and their dependencies; modelling and reasoning of actors’
goals; modelling trust relationships; recording trust rationale; replacement of the
trustee party with a malicious party; analysis of vulnerabilities; and analysis of the
trade offs. In this approach the trust modelling techniques from i* (Yu, 1995) and
(Giorgini et al., 2005) are adopted and the trust rationale is captured as a belief
from the viewpoint of the depender in order to reveal implicit trust assumptions.
Then the dependee entity is replaced with a potential malicious entity that has the
same access and capabilities as the legitimate entity. As a result the developer can
then model and analyse the vulnerabilities and their impact that the potential ma-
licious entity may bring. The analysis is a cost/benefits analysis where the cost is
the risks that the malicious entity is bringing. The aim of the trade off analysis is to
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evaluate if the potential vulnerabilities because of lack of trust in the entities that
have been assigned with goals outweigh the benefits of the dependency relationship.
If the potential vulnerabilities outweigh the benefits then the developer can choose
an alternative dependee that offers better ratio of benefits and vulnerabilities. The
costs and benefits of each alternative dependee are evaluated in terms of satisfaction
or denial of top goals of the depender.
The following security engineering methods aim towards the development of
secure systems. Security is a main aspect of trustworthiness and has a unique role
in the establishment of trust in the information systems. For example, a user might
use and trust a system even though it does not have certain functionality but it is
most probable that he will use and trust a system that it is not secure.
Trustworthy Computing (Lipner, 2004; Charney, 2012) is an initiative by Mi-
crosoft, which uses the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) for the development
of their software that must withstand attacks. The initiative is concentrated on
planning activities in the areas of security, privacy, reliability, and business integrity.
Security objectives should be identified along with security feature requirements that
are based on customer demand and compliance with standards. Then additional se-
curity features are identified as part of threat modelling. More specifically, threat
modelling includes four steps: identification of use scenarios; identification of assets;
identification of threats; and identification of countermeasures. Threat modelling is
carried out component by component followed by the identification of the assets the
system-to-be will manage along with the interface used to access them. Then the
threats for these assets are identified followed by the countermeasures that mitigate
the risk and protect the assets. The countermeasures can be in the form of security
features, such as encryption or access control, or in the form of proper function of
the system.
Secure Tropos (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007) is an extension of Tropos method-
ology (Bresciani et al., 2004) and is based on the concept of security constraint to
analyse the security requirements. With Secure Tropos, the security requirements
can be modelled, reasoned, and transformed into a design that satisfies them. New
concepts, such as security constraint, secure dependency, and secure entity, are in-
troduced in order to enable the developer to analyse the security of the system
under development. Security requirements are captured as security constraints that
represent a security related restriction in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability. Secure dependency is a dependency with security constraints that restrict
its fulfilment unless the security constraints have been satisfied by the depender or
the dependee. Secure entity is a secure goal, plan, or resource. First, the developer
models the system-to-be and the actors of system environment and the she models
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the security constraints imposed to the actors. Then, secure entities are modelled
by identifying the secure goals, plans, and resources that are satisfying the secu-
rity constraints. Secure Tropos was extended in (Pavlidis, Mouratidis, and Islam,
2012) in order to consider domain knowledge and reason about trust relationships
with components of the environment of the system. In particular, trust and control
resolution of dependencies on actors with secure goals are identified in order the
developer to build confidence that such a component of an information system will
fulfil its secure goals once the system in put in operation to ensure its security.
KAOS (Van Lamsweerde et al., 2007) is a goal-oriented requirements engineering
methodology that supports developers in understanding what are the requirements
of the system under development. Its conceptual model, the associated language and
its techniques enable the developer to identify functional and non-functional require-
ments, including security requirements. The elaboration of security requirements is
performed using anti-models, where anti-goals are used to capture the behaviour
of the potential attackers and they represent a threat to the security goals of the
system. The anti-models are constructed once the goals of the system under de-
velopment have been defined. Then the developer derives new security goals as
countermeasures to counter the anti-goals of potential attackers. The security goals
assigned to components of the system-to-be environment are expectations, which
are essentially assumptions.
In (Hatebur, Heisel, and Schmidt, 2007), authors defined patterns for structuring,
characterising, and analysing problems that occur frequently in security engineering,
which are named security problem frames and they are served to analyse security
related requirements. Security problem frames are special types of problem frames
(Jackson, 2001), which refer to the problems concerning security and consider se-
curity requirements. The transformation of security requirements into concretised
security requirements is achieved by selecting security mechanisms, which is essen-
tially the security solution. Every security problem frame is constructed based on a
security problem frame template that consists of the following fields: name, which
specifies the kind of security problem frame; frame diagram, which shows the do-
mains, their interfaces, and the security requirements; security requirement, which
states the security requirement informally; declarations, which are necessary enti-
ties for stating the preconditions and postconditions; preconditions, which need to
be met by the environment in order the frame to be applicable; postconditions,
which are formal representation of the security requirement; and related, which are
related security problem frames; The preconditions are essentially the assumptions
that need to be true in order the security requirements to be met. In order the de-
veloper to guarantee that the preconditions hold there are two alternatives. Either
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to be assumed true or they have to be established, or in other words enforced, by
using another security problem frame whose postconditions match the preconditions
of the initial frame.
CORAS (Lund, Solhaug, and Stølen, 2010) is a method for model driven security
risk analysis of a system. It consists of a specialised language for communication,
documentation, and analysis of security threats and risk scenarios. In the beginning
it was defined as a UML profile but it was later refined and customised. The
CORAS method includes seven steps (Figure 2.8). In the first step, which is an
introductory step the target, scope, and the size of the analysis are specified in order
the necessary preparations to be made. The second step includes the specification
of the targets that need to be protected and a common terminology to be used by
the developers and the customers. The third step establishes a more correct and
refined understanding of the target and the objectives of the customer in order to
eliminate any misunderstandings. Moreover, assets are identified and a high-level
risk analysis is carried out. Step four includes the agreement between the developer
and the customer on the target to be analysed, including the scope, focus, and all
assumptions. The fifth step is the risk identification, followed by the sixth step
the estimation of risk level of risks. The seventh step is the risk evaluation, while
the last step is the risk treatment identification and analysis. In step four is when
assumption are being made, and the authors define assumptions of a risk analysis
what we take for granted or accept as true, although it may actually not be so.
They also state that an assumption is something for which there is strong evidence
or high confidence in. The language used for documenting and reasoning about
assumption is named dependent CORAS since it is used to document dependencies
on assumptions being made. Assumptions in CORAS are used as a means to choose
the desired or appropriate focus and scope of the analysis, by assigning a likelihood
level to the likelihood of an assumption to occur.
Moreover, UMLsec (Ju¨rjens, 2005) is an extension of Unified Modelling Language
(UML). It is a UML profile that enables the developer to express security properties
on design models. Standard UML extension mechanisms in the form of labels are
used such as stereotypes together with tags to formulate the security requirements
and assumptions on the system-to-be environment. More specifically stereotypes
and tags represent a set of desired properties. The developer can use the labels to
give a specific meaning, with respect to security, to elements of a design model.
The approaches presented in this section mostly focus on the security of the sys-
tem and in that context consider assumptions and trust. However, despite the fact
that most of the approaches acknowledge the importance of trust in the achieve-
ment of security, they do not offer a trust assumption reasoning method for the
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Figure 2.8: CORAS’ steps
developers.
More particularly, (Go´rski et al., 2005) trust cases were only focusing on the
security and safety of the system, excluding important other trust properties such
as privacy and usability. Even though the development of the context model en-
ables the identification of the components that are involved in trust assumptions,
there is no systematic and structured method for identifying specific assumptions.
Thus, the developer has to identify the specific trust assumptions in an ad-hoc
way, possibly omitting important ones. Furthermore, this approach was limited in
identifying only the assumptions for components with whom there are direct trust
relationships, omitting assumptions about indirect trust relationships. Also, there
were no constructive techniques for alternative solutions in case the assumptions
are not valid. Haley et al. (2008) approach has been developed for the purpose of
ensuring the satisfaction of only security requirements and not for the rest of the
requirements. Furthermore, this approach does not provide a systematic process
for annotating the context with phenomena from which the desired behaviour of
components is derived. Thus, some trust assumptions might be omitted by the de-
veloper. Moreover, there is no support in case of lack of trust, such as requirement
abstractions and techniques that will enable the developer to identify system func-
tionality in case of rebuttal that will ensure the desired behaviour of an untrusted
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component. Elahi and Yu (2009) approach although it deals with dependencies on
other entities and the corresponding trust relationships, it is inadequate in its trust
reasoning techniques. It offers modelling concepts to capture trust rationale, but it
does not offer a systematic process that can guide the developer in identifying that
trust rationale. Furthermore, the developer might not always find an alternative
dependee with an adequate ratio of benefits and vulnerabilities. Trustworthy Com-
puting . For Secure Tropos there was no support for the developer to reason about
why a component of the information system will fulfil a secure goal. Even though
the extension addressed this limitation, it offered limited constructive guidance and
alternative solutions. KAOS enables the partial identification of assumptions and
even though it provides support for the developer to reason about the ability of a
component to achieve a goal it fails to provide support for reasoning about whether
the component will achieve a goal. Hatebur, Heisel, and Schmidt (2007) approach
lead to partial identification of assumptions as the process does not ensure that
the developer will identify all assumptions. Moreover, there is no support in rea-
soning about such assumptions. However, the assumptions in CORAS are more
assumptions about the condition of the physical environment of the system under
development and moreover the focus is to use the assumptions in order to choose the
desired or appropriate focus and scope of the analysis rather than reasoning about
the assumptions. UMLsec (Ju¨rjens, 2005) supports the developer in documenting
assumptions on design models. However, there is no systematic process for the de-
veloper to identify the assumptions and most importantly the analysis of whether
the assumptions hold should be carried out at the requirements stage where it is
more cost effective. Finally, the approach related with the extensions of use cases
and UML does not support the modelling and analysis of security requirements at a
social level, but they treat security as technical solutions (Mouratidis and Giorgini,
2007). Security though is a multidimensional issue that has social characteristics,
since the software system will operate in a human social environment and the human
factor plays a very important role in security (Mouratidis and Giorgini, 2007).
2.6.3 Goal satisfaction reasoning
At the heart of requirements engineering is the investigation of alternative options
and the impact of such options on the system, which generally have different contri-
bution to the degree of satisfaction of top-level goals. To this end various qualitative
and quantitative frameworks have been proposed to assist in the assessment of al-
ternatives for decision-making. Also, there has been work on exceptional behaviour
of entities upon which goals have been assigned and obstacles are used to repre-
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sent such exceptional behaviour. Finally, the state of the art includes approaches
that enable the developer to reason about the realisability of a goal that has been
assigned to a component.
The NFR framework (Chung et al., 2000; Chung and Prado Leite, 2009) con-
centrates on modelling and analysis of non-functional requirements. The authors
emphasise the need that non-functional requirements need to be identified from the
early stages of information system development in order to assist the developer in
making design decisions, and also that non-functional requirements should be con-
sidered along with the functional requirement throughout the development process.
Non-functional requirements are represented as softgoals, which are goals that don’t
have clear-cut criteria of satisfaction. The non-functional goals are satisfied through
the collaboration of the software system behaviour and environment phenomena
caused by the rest of the components of the information system. It supports the
developers in specifying positive or negative influences of different alternatives on
non-functional goals. Softgoals interdependencies are captured with positive (”+”)
or negative (”-”) contributions. NFR is used to evaluate and compare the contribu-
tion of alternatives to the softgoals qualitatively. By analysing these alternatives,
the developer can select the one that best meets top-level quality requirements of
the system under development.
A quantitative approach to goal satisfaction reasoning is given by Giorgini et al.
(2003), where the authors offer a precise semantics for the relationships between
goals which comes in qualitative and numerical form. that is based on a probabilis-
tic model. For every goal there can be full evidence that the goal is satisfied or
denied or there can be partial evidence that the goal is satisfied or denied. To this
end, two variables are introduced for each goal, which represent the current evidence
of satisfiability and deniability of that goal and two constants are introduced that
represent full evidence and different level of partial evidence. A probabilistic model
has been adopted where the probability that a goal is satisfied or denied represents
the evidence of satisfiability or deniability respectively. The starting point of the
process is the externally provided assertions as initial conditions. Then the satisfia-
bility and deniability evidence and numeric values are propagated through the goal
model according to propagation rules in order to deduct satisfiability and deniability
values for the top-level goals. To support the developer the authors propose a label
and numeric value propagation algorithm. The authors acknowledge the issue of
considering the reliability and competence of the initial source of evidence as the
whole process is based on the assumption that the initial evidence is valid.
In (Letier and Lamsweerde, 2004) the authors propose techniques for specifying
partial degrees of goal satisfaction and for quantifying the impact of alternative
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decisions on the degree of satisfaction on goals. The partial degree of satisfaction
of a goal is defined by annotating the goal with quality attributes and objective
functions, which are goal related variables and functions that define quantities to be
maximised or minimised. Then the authors provide propagation rules that enable
the developer to estimate the degree of satisfaction of a higher-goal based on the
degrees of satisfaction of its subgoals. To this end the authors provide a catalogue
of quantitative goal refinement patterns to assist the developer in specifying goal
refinements equations. A bottom-up propagation of quality variables of the low level
goals is used to evaluate the alternative system designs, while a top-bottom prop-
agation of quantitative requirements of high level goals is used to specify concrete
quantitative requirements of low level goals. The estimations on goal satisfaction
assigned to the system under development are quantitative requirements while esti-
mations of goal satisfaction assigned to entities of the environment are quantitative
assumptions.
KAOS (Van Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000) has embraced obstacles and provides
well-developed methods for detecting and mitigating the obstacles. An obstacle to
a goal is defined as an assertion that is consistent with the domain information, but
the negation of the goal is the logical consequence of the combination of the asser-
tion and the domain information. In other words, obstacles represent the potential
ways in which a system might fail to meet its requirements. Once identified, obsta-
cles are refined similarly as goals in order to identify subobstacles. The goal of the
obstacle analysis is to anticipate exceptional behaviour of entities upon which goals
have been assigned and to derive more complete requirements and realistic require-
ments, by specifying alternative ways of resolving such problems early during the
development of the system to be. Examples of techniques for obstacle resolution are
obstacle prevention, goal substitution, agent substitution, and obstacle tolerance.
The process stops when the developer has identified goals that prevent an obstacle
or substitute goal and there are no more obstacles or the remaining obstacles are
acceptable without resolution.
In (Letier and Lamsweerde, 2002) the authors propose a method to refine goals
until they are assignable to single entities and to assign a goal to entity only if
the entity can realise a goal. Their proposal also includes a complete taxonomy
of realisability problems. In particular a goal is not realisable if there is: lack of
monitorability; lack of controllability; reference to future; external unachievability;
unbounded achievement; In case there is unrealisability then the developer is guided
to address the problems with the help of a catalogue agent based refinement tactics
that refine the unrealisable goals and make the realisable.
To mitigate the vulnerability that a dependency is introducing the viability of
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the dependency is analysed in (Yu, 1995) by identifying patterns of dependencies
that may serve to enforce commitment, assure success, or insure against failure.
There if there is a way for the depender to make a goal of the dependee to fail then
the commitment is enforceable.
The NFR framework (Chung et al., 2000; Chung and Prado Leite, 2009) does not
provide any reasoning technique in the case where a goal that contributes of a top-
level softgoal cannot be accomplished by the system and the system is depending
on another component of the information system to fulfil it.
In (Giorgini et al., 2003) there not techniques to reason about the trustworthiness
of the source of evidence, which means that the analysis is based on unjustified
assumptions. Furthermore, even though this approach can be applied to goals that
are dependent upon other entities for fulfilment, the issue of trust on the other entity
for goal fulfilment is not considered in the goal reasoning process. Reasoning that
an entity can achieve a goal does not imply that it will actually show the desired
behaviour and achieve it.
In (Letier and Lamsweerde, 2004) the specification of partial degrees of goal
satisfaction is based on real data to determine the level of satisfiability, such as
statistical analysis of the current system or reliability figures about standard devices,
while often it is the case that the developer is required to make decisions that include
a lot of uncertainty about the developed system.
In (Van Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000), the developer still faces the problem
of reasoning about his trust relationship with the entity upon which a goal, that
prevents an obstacle or substitutes a goal, has been assigned.
The main drawback with this approach is that addresses the issue of whether an
entity that has been assigned with a goal can realise it, but the problem of whether
that entity can be trusted to realise the goal, even thought it can realise it, is not
addressed.
However, this only applies in the cases of reciprocal dependencies. If there is
evidence that the dependee will fulfil the dependency then there is assurance. For
example, there is evidence that the depender and the dependee have common inter-
ests related to the dependum. There is an insurance against the non-fulfilment of a
dependency if there are alternatives dependees that can fulfil the dependency.
2.6.4 Trust management
The PolicyMaker approach (Blaze, Feigenbaum, and Lacy, 1996) is proposed for
trust management of Internet applications and builds trust relationships between
entities. Every entity has a public key and is bind to some credential, where a cre-
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dential allows an entity to a specific system environment. Essentially, PolicyMaker
is a query engine, which evaluates whether a proposed action is consistent with the
trust policy. Also, a next version of Policy Maker is KeyNote (Blaze, Feigenbaum,
and Keromytis, 1999), is enhanced in the verification of such polices.
REFEREE (Chu et al., 1997) is a trust management system for web applications,
which specifies a language for defining trust polices and provides a general policy
evaluation mechanism for web clients and servers. It evaluates requests and returns
a tri-value and a statement list, which is the justification of the answer. A tri-value is
true, false or unknown. There are two phases, where the first phase, which is called
bootstrap, the host application gives the unconditionally trusted assertions and a
module database. In the second phase, called the query phase, the host application
provides the actions and other arguments such as credentials. Then the interpreter
with the policy and the list of arguments is run and then it returns an answer to
the host application.
TPL (Herzberg et al., 2000) is similar to PolicyMaker, but permits negative
rules preventing access. Every entity may get a certificate from a trusted third
party. Then the decisions will be taken based on the evaluation of those certificates
that the entities are holding. The trust establishment module validates the client’s
certificate and then maps the certificate owner to a role. Then the information is
sent to another module, which stipulates the access rights that are bound to the
particular role.
The Simple Universal Logic oriented Trust Analysis notation (SULTAN) is a pro-
posed trust management solution that allows the developer to perform management
of trust relationships. Trust management is defined as ”the activity of collecting, en-
coding, analysing and presenting evidence relating to competence, honesty, security
or dependability with the purpose of making assessments and decisions regarding
trust relationships for Internet applications” (Grandison, 2003).
Trust management in the previous line of work is mostly focused on access con-
trol for resources and especially with authentication and authorisation capabilities.
Therefore, the goal of the developer is on defining the trust rules and the ways ac-
cess control will be implemented and consequently the focus is at a very low level.
However, the aforementioned approaches lack guidance on how to write the predi-
cates in policy and certificate assertions that reflect the trust policy and they are
designed for servers that are managed by an administrator.
Tan (2003) proposes a matrix model, which can enable trading partners in elec-
tronic commerce to analyse trust building services. An e-service is represented in the
form of a grid and the grid rows represent a theoretical decomposition of the notion
of trust into four reasons namely social signs, personal experience, understanding
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and communality. Each reason is split into two sources, according to whether they
correspond to trust created by the other party of the transaction, named party
trust, or by a control mechanism, named control trust. This analysis is carried out
at three different layers: communication with the other party; trade documents and
regulation of the transaction; business relationship, which is considered the most
important as it can compensate for problem in the previous layers.
TrustCoM is a framework (Wilson et al., 2007) for trust security and contract
management for dynamic virtual organisations. In contains a set of semantically
well-founded concepts and relationships for describing and reasoning about trust
and security in dynamic virtual organisations. In addition it contains an abstract
architecture reflecting the previous concepts and providing a flexible structure and
organising principles for systems based on the framework. And the third component
is profiles extending existing open specifications of services and protocols to imple-
ment the TrustCom framework. The framework models trust relationships based on
electronic contracts, policies, and reputation systems. Thus it will allow companies
to integrate services, processes and resources and form virtual organisations.
Uddin and Zulkernine (2008) present the UMLtrust framework, which considers
trust from the early stages of the development process and it is a scenario based
analysis of trust. It uses UML, which is well accepted among software developers,
and extends it with specialised notation in the domain of trust. A framework is
also described that enables the developers to specify the trust scenarios and de-
rive trust rules based on such scenarios. Since the framework is incorporated in
the software development lifecycle the developers are able to identify the relevant
system requirements for monitoring and trust decision making during the run-time.
For example, a server would be able to decide whether a user that requests access
should be authorised based on the derived trust rules. However, the framework is
inadequate in providing guidance in identifying the trust cases and ultimately the
trust relationships.
In (Pourshahid and Tran, 2007) the proposed method makes use of the Goal
Requirement Language (GRL) and Use Case Map (UCM) which both of them belong
to the User Requirement Notation (URN). Specifically, trust is captured as a soft
goal of the trustor because of its uncertainty of whether is satisfied or not and
because of its fuzzy nature. First, the UCM is used in order the developer to
visually define the trust making process of the trustor and the trust and distrust
paths that she can take. Then, the GRL is used in order to model that contribute
to the establishment of trust, along with the their threshold values. The threshold
values are the points where the trustor will decide between trust and distrust. After
the soft goals of the trustor have been investigated, then it is the turn to investigate
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how the trustee can increase trust in her. A trust model is provided as a reference
(Figure 2.9), which includes three layers. The first layer shows the decomposition of
trust into a cognitive and affective type of trust. The second layer shows the further
refinement of cognitive and affective types of trust, while the third layer shows some
indicative tasks that the trustee can carry out that contribute to the establishment
of trust. Further analysis of trust as a soft goal eventually leads to well-defined tasks
for the trustee in order to gain the trust of the trustor. The two GRL models of
the trustor and the trustee can be combined by the developer in order to show the
importance of the trustee’s attributes to the trustor and identify the requirements
for the system-to-be.
Figure 2.9: Trust reference model
Similarly, the trust analysis is carried out from the viewpoints of the users and
not from the perspective of the developer. Also, even though this approach contains
information regarding the specific properties of trustworthiness, such as competence,
motivation, and prediction, it fails to provide constructive techniques on how to
identify requirements for the system to enable it to express the trustworthiness of
the trustee.
This line of research although is referred as trust management, however little
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relation has with the actual management of trust but more with the management
of access control (Cofta, 2007). As trust management we consider the area that
aims to provide the means to one entity of a system to assess the trustworthiness
of another entity of the system and be able to make a trust justified trust decision.
In other words, trust management should aim at systems the enable trust to be
communicated among users in order to determine the trustworthiness of a remote
user through computer mediated communication and collaboration. At the same
time, trustworthy users need the means to enable them to reliably report their true
trustworthiness and be recognised as such (Jøsang, Keser, and Dimitrakos, 2005;
Cofta, 2007).
2.6.5 Human Computer Interaction in the context of trust
There are two lines of research in this area. On one hand is the research that tries to
gain users trust for a system that may or may not be trustworthy by making changes
at a human computer interaction level. We believe this approach eventually will fail,
as the user sooner or later will recognise if the system cannot be trusted and will
create great disappointment to the users. On the other hand, there is research at a
Human Computer Interaction level, which aims to identify the technological means
to signal signs of trustworthiness to the users. We believe that this category of
research adheres to the vision of creating systems that provide the means so that
users can assess the trustworthiness of a remote user and proceed to a correct trust
decision.
To this end, there has been initial research from Riegelsberger, Sasse, and Mc-
Carthy (2005) and Cofta (2007). Riegelsberger, Sasse, and McCarthy (2005) argue
that contextual properties will be of higher importance in first interactions and
one off encounters, while intrinsic properties of the trustee, such as ability, norm-
compliance, and benevolence, are more important in continued exchanges and be-
come increasingly important as trust matures. They also identified two types of
signals, symbols and symptoms. Symptoms are signals of trustworthiness that are
given as by-product of behaviour and they are preferable to symbols, which may be
costly to emit and less reliable.
Similarly, Cofta (2007) identifies three types of evidence that need to be expressed
in digital terms in order to enable the assessment of a user’s trustworthiness. The
first two are competence and motivation, which are considered as easier to be trans-
lated into the digital domain, while the third evidence which is competence and it is
the hardest one to be translated into the digital domain. More specifically, for com-
petence the technical protocols that can deliver evidence of trust are performance
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indicators, for motivation inter-dependent processing and for continuity standards
and norms.
This area although it is important for a trustworthy system to be able to signal
that trustworthiness to they users, it is outside of the scope of this thesis. We are
interested in developing a system that is trustworthy. The case that a system should
be able to express such trustworthiness is not considered. Trust is very subjective
and it may be impossible to gain every users’ trust. However, by making the system
trustworthy we hope that the user when she will interact with it she will recognise
it and built trust to the system.
2.6.6 Trusted Computing
Trusted computing (Pearson and Balacheff, 2003) is an initiative that was started
by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) (TCG14). TCG consists of AMD, Cisco,
Fujitsu, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Infineon, Intel, Juniper, Lenovo, Microsoft, and
Wave. They have proposed a trusted computing platform solution based on tamper-
resistant hardware physically located inside the platform. This tamper-resistant
hardware provides the computer platform with a root of trust, and it supports an
important feature, called integrity challenge of the platform. The integrity challenge
feature helps to build a chain of trust, which allows local and remote users to
verify whether selected functions and resources of the computing platform have
been installed and are operating in a way that satisfies them.
However, trusted computing entails blind trust in the hardware component that
acts as the root of trust. This implies that the piece of hardware is being trusted
independently of whether it is trustworthy. Apart from technical issues, there are
also a lot of concerns about the privacy and freedom of actions of the users who are
using trusted computing platforms. Finally, there is a concern from Anderson that
whoever controls Trusted Computing infrastructure will acquire a huge amount of
power, as a company could have the encryption keys of your word documents.
Despite the limitations and the concerns, this line of research can contribute
towards more secure and dependable, and eventually more trustworthy software.
However, the achievement of goals of an information system is not only a matter of
the software-to-be component of an information system, but the goals are achieved
through the collaboration of the software-to-be component and the rest of the com-
ponents in the information system environment, human or technical. Thus Trusted
Computing directly related with the research of this thesis and not discussed further.
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2.6.7 Computational trust
Another direction of related work is in the area of multi-agent systems. In such
systems artificial agents have to make decisions about several issues in various sce-
narios. Such decisions might be to share information with another agent or not, to
accept help or not and from whom to accept, from whom to buy a product and at
which price, and so on. As in any decision that contains risk, trust plays an impor-
tant role in such decisions and is part of the decision making process. Therefore,
computational models of trust have been developed that can be used by artificial
agents in order to reason about trust. Introducing a way for the artificial agents to
reason about trust gives them more solid footing in the human societies into which
they are introduced.
One of the earliest computational models is by Marsh (1994), who takes into
direct interaction and defines three types of trust, basic trust, general trust, and
situational trust. These three values enable the agent to decide whether she will
trust another agent. Another approach is by Schillo, Funk, and Rovatsos (2000)
where an agent will trust another agent depending on the probability that the
second agent is honest in the next interaction. The value is derived from direct
interaction information and from information gathered from third party agents that
have interacted with the second agent in the past. A cognitive computational trust
model was proposed by Castelfranchi and Falcone (1998), where an agent’s decision
to trust or not is based on competence, dependence, and disposition beliefs about
the trustee agent.
However, as Marsh and Briggs (2009) points out ”In much the same way that
Artificial Intelligence is not real intelligence, the computational concept of trust
isn’t really trust at all”. Although, the thesis and this line of work share the similar
principles regarding the trust decision process, this line of work on trust is outside
of the scope of this thesis, but the interested reader can see a detailed survey on
computational trust in (Sabater and Sierra, 2005).
2.7 Chapter summary
This chapter aimed to establish a common language for the understanding of the
next chapters as the concept of trust and trustworthiness is overloaded with multiple
meanings. To this end, we have reviewed and discussed several definitions of trust
and trustworthiness in the human context and we clarified the definitions that we
adopt in this thesis (section 2.1). We also discussed trust and trustworthiness in
the context of information systems and we clarified the definition of trustworthy
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information system (sections 2.2, 2.3). We then discussed high level requirements
of methodologies (section 2.4) and evaluation methods (section 2.5).
Moreover, we have reviewed the state of the art of several areas related to this
thesis, such as trust modelling (section 2.6.1), trust management (section 2.6.4),
security engineering (section 2.6.2), goal satisfaction reasoning (section 2.6.3), Hu-
man Computer Interaction (section 2.6.5), Trusted Computing (section 2.6.6), and
computational models of trust (section 2.6.7). The main contribution of this chapter
is to investigate existing approaches to determine if they can be used or adapted in
our approach and show how existing approaches are inadequate to build trustworthy
information systems. Most of the approaches ignore the behaviour of the human
components, and focus on technical components only. Also, they do not contain
the required trust and control software engineering abstractions that can enable
developers to reason about trust relationships in a structured way and identify
trustworthiness requirements. Table 2.2 depicts the various approaches that were
examined in this section along with the issues that they are dealing with. Most
of the approaches enable the identification of assumptions, and trust relationships
and their reasoning. However, only Secure Tropos (Trento) enables the developer to
identify observation functionalities. The state of the art lacks techniques that enable
the developer to identify indirect trust relationships, trustworthiness requirements
including both observation and deterrence functionalities and the assessment of the
system trustworthiness. These limitations are addressed by this work. In the next
sections we describe the trust and control constructs of our modelling language and
a systematic process to reason about trust relationships and identify and analyse
trustworthiness requirements.
Figure 2.10 depicts the area of application of the state of the art in trust en-
gineering and the area of application of JTrust. Trust management deals with the
management of trust in the relationship between components of an information sys-
tem, while trust modelling and HCI approaches are focusing on the relationship
between the human and technical components of an information system with the
technical system under development. Trusted Computing and goal satisfaction ap-
proaches focus on the technical system-to-be and particularly how to make it more
trustworthy while neglecting the other components of the system. Computational
trust provides mechanisms for a technical component to reason about trust. JTrust
though is focusing on the relationships of the developer with the human and techni-
cal components of the system and also on the technical system-to-be by identifying
trustworthiness requirements.
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Table 2.2: Comparison table of state of the art in trust engineering
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Figure 2.10: Application areas of state of the art in trust engineering
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Part II
JTrust: A Trustworthy
Information System Development
Methodology
Chapter 3
JTrust modelling language
Without recognizing all the entities and their trust relationships
in a software system during the requirements phase of a project,
that project is doomed from the start
(Viega, Kohno, and Potter, 2001)
In the previous chapter we carried out a literature review of the areas we believe
are relevant to this research. In this chapter, we first describe the requirements for
our proposed methodology. These requirements were derived from the literature re-
view and the limitations of the state of the art in trust engineering. In section 3.2 we
describe the structure of the methodology. In particular, we explain the components
of the methodology, how are related, who are the users, and so on. In section 3.3, we
describe a running example, which is used throughout the thesis to better explain
the methodology and the benefits that it offers.
Secondly, in this chapter, we propose a trust modelling language to capture the
trust relationships between the developer of a system and the entities with which
the system is interacting, and also a trustworthiness model to assess the system
trustworthiness at a requirements level. As we have introduced in Chapter 1, such
trust relationships are critical for the ability of the system to be trustworthy, and
may require extra functionality from the system in order to meet its requirements.
Such trust relationships need to become explicit and be reasoned about by the
developer. We explain the principles our modelling language is based on, give an
overview of the Goal Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE) approach, define
the basic terms used throughout the thesis, and we propose a modelling language:
• We describe the constructs related to trust and control that are required by
developers to reason about trust relationships and analyse trustworthiness re-
quirements across different projects.
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• We propose a meta-model of our trust modelling language, which shows the
relationships between our defined constructs.
In other words, in this chapter we attempt to answer research questions 1 and 2,
stated in chapter 1: What are the required concepts and their relationships regarding
trust that will allow the development of trustworthy information systems at an early
stage? In the last section of this chapter we propose a trustworthiness model.
3.1 Methodology requirements
Based on the literature review on development methodologies and the identification
of limitations of the state of the art in trust engineering certain requirements for
the JTrust methodology were derived and are the following:
• Modelling of trust relationships. The methodology must enable the developer
to identify and model trust relationships between her and the components of
an information system. It should be a system way in order to consider all trust
relationships and avoiding omitting trust relationships that are not so obvious,
especially the indirect trust relationships.
• Reasoning about trust relationships. The methodology must provide the means
to the developer to reason about trust relationships and describe the trust
rationale in a uniform and consistent way.
• Identification of trust assumptions. The methodology must enable the devel-
oper to identify assumptions that underlie the system development and can
harm the trustworthiness of the system if they are not valid once the system
is implemented.
• Modelling of trustworthiness requirements. The methodology must enable the
developer to model and analyse trustworthiness requirements. These are re-
quirements that will constitute the system trustworthy and have to be fully
satisfied by the system.
• Assessment of system trustworthiness. The methodology must enable the de-
veloper to evaluate the trustworthiness of the system under development by
considering if the system can achieve goals assign to it and the achievement of
the system goals assigned to components of the information system.
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3.2 Methodology structure
The structure of the methodology is depicted in Figure 3.1. The methodology con-
tains a modelling language, a process, and a supporting tool. In turn, the modelling
language includes trust and control abstractions and a meta-model that describes
the relationships between those abstractions. The JTrust process has a number of
activities that the developer can follow in order to use the trust and control ab-
stractions to model and reason about trust relationships, model and analyse trust-
worthiness requirements, and assess the trustworthiness of the system under devel-
opment. In addition, it includes algorithms for the calculation of resolution level,
confidence level, and system trustworthiness. The last component of the methodol-
ogy is the supporting tool that enables the developer to construct the trust model
of the system-to-be and it automatically calculates the resolution level, confidence
level, and system trustworthiness using the respective algorithms.
Figure 3.1: JTrust methodology structure
3.3 Running example
In this section, we briefly explain an example of an information system and we use
it to explain our proposed methodology. We consider a virtual learning environment
(VLE) for supporting the education of students at a university. Using such a system
the students can download learning material, such as lecture handbooks and slides,
communicate, and collaborate with other students. They can be accessed both
on and off-campus, meaning that they can support students’ learning outside the
lecture hall 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In such a scenario one of the goals of
the system is to provide lecture slides to the students three days in advance of the
lecture. So, students will have the opportunity to go online to view the slides and
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be prepared for the lecture. To accomplish this goal the technical system-to-be has
another goal to receive the slides from the lecturer. Another goal of the system is
to provide the students with access to any relevant administration forms and their
student record. Similarly, the administration staff of the university has to upload
the administration forms to the system.
Out of this scenario a number of issues arise regarding the trustworthiness of the
system. For example, if the lecturer does not upload the lecture slides in advance
of the lecture then the system will not be trustworthy because it will not have the
lecture slides available for the students. Similarly, if the administration staff do
not show the expected behaviour, which is to upload the administration forms to
the system, then the system will not be trustworthy, as it does not have the forms
required by the students and as a result the students will probably not trust such
a system. Whatever method is used by the developer to model the requirements
of such a system, it will contain the modelling of the expected behaviour of the
lecturer and the administration staff, which are to upload the lecture slides and the
administration document. Therefore, there are implied trust relationships formed
between the developer and the lecturer and between the developer and the adminis-
tration staff. If the lecturer and the administrator staff can be trusted to behave as
expected then the system will be trustworthy, otherwise if they cannot be trusted
it will not be trustworthy. Therefore, the questions that arise from such a scenario
are the following:
• How can the developer explicitly capture her trust relationships with the lec-
turer and the administration staff?
• How can the developer capture any possible indirect trust relationships? For
example, there may be a trust relationship between the developer and the
administration staff because the administration staff is controlling the lecturer
to upload lecture slides in advance of the lecture.
• How can the developer reason about her trust relationships with the lecturer
and the administration staff? For example, why is she trusting or not trusting
the lecturer or the administration staff.
• How can the developer systematically identify the assumptions that are deriv-
ing from her trust relationships? For instance, in case the administration staff
controls the lecturer this contains the assumption that the administration staff
is trusted to do so.
• If the developer does not trust the lecturer or the administration staff and no
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other entity can control them, how can the developer feel confident that they
will behave as expected in order to build a trustworthy system?
• How can the developer assess the overall system trustworthiness at a require-
ments stage in order to decide if she is satisfied with the current level of system
trustworthiness and proceed to the next stages of system development?
These are questions from the running example that the JTrust methodology pro-
posed in this thesis envisages to address. Requirements engineering is all about
decision making and JTrust envisages to support the developer in making such de-
cisions that will lead to an information system that is as trustworthy as possible.
3.4 Confidence as the key to modelling uncertainty
Modelling is a core process in requirements engineering upon which the implementa-
tion of the system is based and to a great extent it will define its success once is put
in operation. In requirements modelling the existing system/organisation as well as
the possible alternative configurations for the system-to-be are modelled in order
to understand complex, real world systems and their behaviour. More particularly,
modelling enables the requirements engineer to look at the domain systematically
and helps him look beyond less important details and focus on more important
parts of the system and reveal key problems in a timely manner. Requirements en-
gineering models serve as basic common interfaces among developers to the various
activities of requirements engineering (Van Lamsweerde, 2000). Besides, models help
communicate requirements to customers, and other possible stakeholders. Models,
also provide a basis for requirements documentation and evolution, and allow for
requirements reuse within the domain. An additional benefit of modelling is also
to support heuristic, qualitative or formal reasoning schemes during requirements
engineering (Lamsweerde, 2001). While informal models are analysed by humans,
formal models of system requirements allow for precise analysis by both software
tools and humans. The analysis can reveal the presence of inconsistencies in the
models, which is indicative of conflicting and/or infeasible requirements.
An information system contains active components, such as humans, devices,
and software. Active components have choice of behaviour opposed to passive ones
that do not have (Lamsweerde, 2001). Especially humans who are entities with con-
sciousness and make their own decisions. Moreover, economics dictates the use of
commercial off the shelf components wherever possible, so developers have neither
control nor detailed information about many of their systems’ components (Schnei-
der, Bellovin, and Inouye, 1999), which create an uncertainty about their future
68
Chapter 3. JTrust modelling language
behaviour. This situation is well described in (Iivari and Hirschheim, 1996) who
contrast design optimism with design pessimism. Design optimism assumes that
only existing resource constraints limit the development and acquisition of desired
information systems, and that the systems can be implemented without difficulty.
Design pessimism, in contrast, assumes no such ease. People are assumed not to
behave rationally and the social nature of information systems development makes
any design exercise difficult.
As a result modelling includes modelling of active components that their be-
haviour can be unpredictable and different from the one in the model. Consequently
this will have negative implications for the operation of the system to be. More
particularly, Goals have long been recognised to be essential elements involved in
requirements modelling. Unlike requirements, a goal may in general require the co-
operation of a number of multiple components to be achieved (Lamsweerde, 2001).
A goal under responsibility of a single component in the software-to-be becomes a
requirement whereas a goal under responsibility of a single component in the envi-
ronment of the software-to-be becomes an assumption (Van Lamsweerde, Darimont,
and Letier, 1998; Van Lamsweerde and Willemet, 1998). A goal assigned to especially
an active component is an assumption that the active component will behave ac-
cording to the model. Important distinction must be made about requirements and
environment assumptions (sometimes called expectations). Even though they are
both optative, requirements are to be enforced by the software, while assumptions
are to be enforced by active components in the environment. Unlike requirements,
assumptions cannot be enforced by the software-to-be, but they will hopefully be
satisfied thanks to organisational norms, and regulations, physical laws, etc. (Lam-
sweerde, 2001). The assumptions specify what the system expects of its environment
(Jackson, 1997; Parnas and Madey, 1995) and consequently incorrect assumptions
about the environment of a software system are known to be responsible for many
errors in requirements specifications (Lamsweerde and Letier, 2004).
Behind the approaches that are used to develop information systems, lie a num-
ber of implicit and explicit assumptions and views. Although, alternative assump-
tions and views guide the information systems developer in the choice of various
analysis, design and implementation options and hence have important consequences
for the development of successful system, only rarely they appear to be critically
reflected upon or challenged (Iivari and Hirschheim, 1996). First-sketch specifica-
tions of requirements, goals, and assumptions in requirements modelling are often
too ideal and they are likely to be violated from time to time in the running system
due to unexpected behaviour those active components. A survey showed only 10%
of these failures are due to technical issues, with 90% attributed to social and organ-
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isational factors (Doherty and King, 1998). The lack of anticipation of exceptional
behaviours may result in unrealistic, unachievable and/or incomplete requirements
(Lamsweerde, 2001). Also, developers face uncertainty in prediction of the impact of
their interventions due to complex interactions between the elements in the design
and the change context (Lyytinen and Newman, 2008).
This situation requires information systems to be viewed from a different per-
spective. An information system at the organisational level may be considered a
technical artefact or tool, just as a hammer, for example, which is socially pro-
duced and used, but which does not embody any deeper social meaning. Such a
view is technical. Alternatively, an information system may be considered an arte-
fact, which entails inherent social and organisational aspects. This we characterise
as a social view. An intermediate position between these two extremes, termed
the socio-technical view, emphasises that an information system comprises both a
technical subsystem and a social subsystem that should be designed jointly (Iivari
and Hirschheim, 1996; Bostrom and Heinen, 1977). Nevertheless, the prominent
tendency in software modelling until some years ago was to abstract programming
constructs up to requirements level rather than propagate requirements abstractions
down to programming level (Mylopoulos, Chung, and Yu, 1999). In others words
the social aspects regarding the behaviour of the active components are not taken
into account sufficiently who are endangering the fulfilment of the goals of an infor-
mation system. Even though a sociotechnical view of information systems has been
adopted recently, the state of the art still fails to provide abstract constructs, which
are applicable over time and space, and enable the developer to feel confident in the
assumptions that are underlying the system development.
In our approach, we adopt a sociotechnical view of an information system, a
system that combines a technical system and its environment. The environment
can be human components or other existing technical components that will interact
with technical system-to-be. Moreover, Information technology has the potential
to change social and organisational structures and simultaneously be affected by
these structures in its design, implementation, and use (Luna-Reyes et al., 2005).
Therefore, it is not sufficient simply to assemble components that are themselves
trustworthy. Integrating the components and understanding how the trustworthi-
ness dimensions interact is a central challenge in building a trustworthy information
system (Schneider, Bellovin, and Inouye, 1999).
The assumptions underlying the modelling of an information system originate
because of the dependencies of the developers on the system components. When
a developer is modelling an information system, she depends on the active compo-
nents of that system to behave as modelled in order the system fulfil its goals. The
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dependencies of the developers are eventually becoming dependencies of the tech-
nical system-to-be once put in operation and potential vulnerabilities if the active
components do not behave as modelled. Thus, the focus should be shifted on how
remove the potential vulnerability and uncertainty a dependency is bringing. The
developer by some means should be confident that when modelling the behaviour
of an active component, this component will behave as modelled once the system is
put in operation.
The developer when modelling an information system that contains active com-
ponents requires confidence. Confidence in her decisions during requirements mod-
elling, i.e., confidence in the dependencies on the active components that they will
behave as modelled and confidence that her assumptions are valid, confidence in
order to remove any uncertainty about the future behaviour of the active compo-
nents and the potential vulnerabilities they may introduce to the system. In this
thesis we view confidence as an optimisation of the decision making process during
requirements engineering as it provides the reassurance about the behaviour of the
active components.
To this end, adopt we adopt the model of confidence (Figure 3.2 from (Cofta,
2007)). The consciousness of confidence originates from two separate sources: trust
and control (Das and Teng, 1998; Cofta, 2007). If individuals are going to depend on
something and they want to feel confident in that, there are two ways to achieve that
confidence, either by trust or control (Cofta, 2007; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Das
and Teng, 1998). The confidence of an individual in another individual depends upon
her trustworthy behaviour. The cause of that behaviour can be her trustworthiness,
which enables the first individual to trust her. However, if the trustworthiness is
low then control can be applied in order to change the behaviour of that individual
and cause her to behave in a trustworthy manner. The first individual cannot trust
her but she can still feel confident in her behaviour because of control. Therefore,
control means that there is a way by which a component of a system will behave in a
predictable way and no unpleasant surprises will occur. Effective control generates
a sense of confidence (Cofta, 2007; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Das and Teng, 1998).
On the other hand there is trust which means, as we defined it in the previous
chapter, the positive expectations about the behaviour of an active component by
which there can be positive or negative affection. Trust generates confidence since
the trustor has a positive stance towards the active component’s behaviour even in
the absence of control. Particularly, trust is required when there is lack of control
(Dasgupta, 2000) in order to gain confidence. In contrast, when it is fully possible
to trust an active component then there is no need to control its behaviour (Das
and Teng, 1998). Therefore, during requirements engineering the developers needs
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to use means of trust or control in order to feel confident in her dependencies on
active components and her assumptions about their behaviour.
Figure 3.2: Model of confidence
However, there is a duality of trust and control and not dualism (Mo¨llering,
2005). These concepts are not opposite and cannot be investigated independently.
Control is presupposed in case of trust and trust is presupposed in case of control.
When there is trust in the behaviour there is the assumption that this behaviour
has a meaning and a connection in the environment. When there is control of
the behaviour by the environment there is the assumption that the environment is
trusted to do so. Also, trust refers to control and vice versa. Whether there is trust
or not, there is also an assessment of how much trust is needed because of possible
existence of control. Whether to control or not, there is also an assessment of how
much trust there is already. In addition trust creates control, and control creates
trust. Controls force components to behave in a specific way and this can create trust
in their behaviour. Also, inside a particular environment trust can be generalised
according to an environment norm and this trust creates control on components.
For example, when components know that their trustworthiness is assumed in a
particular environment then this will make them feel obligated to behave in a specific
way. Components refer to their environment in order to understand which behaviour
is expected and which behaviour is not expected. The developer should consider all
these issues when reasoning about his trust relationships with the active components
of the system-to-be and evaluate whether control is required on top of trust or vice
versa. In such cases there is also a trade off between the extra confidence and the
less complexity added to the system because of control.
The ultimate goal of a trust analysis is to support the developer in considering
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the aforementioned issues. To this end appropriate software engineering abstractions
related to trust and control should be developed and accompanied constructive tech-
niques that can guide the developer in using the abstractions. Also, it is necessary
the developer to understand the relationships among the entities within the socio-
technical system; in particular, to know the dependencies among the entities and
how they are resolved, i.e., dependencies that will be fulfilled once the system is put
in operation and the assumptions that are made are valid. Dependencies thus need
to be identified and resolved at a requirements stage in order to produce robust
requirements and hence more trustworthy system.
Traditional system modelling approaches though treat requirements as consist-
ing only of processes and data and do not capture the rationale for the software
systems, thus making it difficult to understand requirements with respect to some
high-level concerns in the problem domain. Also, most techniques focus on mod-
elling and specification of the software alone. Therefore, they lack support for
reasoning about the composite system comprise of the system-to-be and its envi-
ronment (Lamsweerde and Letier, 2004). Non- functional requirements are also in
general left outside of requirements specifications. Additionally, traditional mod-
elling and analysis techniques do not allow alternative system configurations where
more or less functionality is automated or different assignments of responsibility are
explored, etc. to be represented and compared. The prominent tendency in soft-
ware modelling has been to abstract programming constructs up to requirements
level rather than propagate requirements abstractions down to programming level
(Mylopoulos, Chung, and Yu, 1999). This explains why the stakeholders with their
needs and the rest of the social context for the system could not be adequately
captured by requirements models.
As mentioned in Chapter 1 the first two objectives of this thesis is to define
a requirements based modelling language and methods for developing trustworthy
information systems. In the foundations of our methodology is the Goal Oriented
Requirements Engineering (GORE) approach, which is concerned with the use of
goals for eliciting, elaborating, structuring, specifying, analysing, negotiating, doc-
umenting, and modifying requirements (Lamsweerde, 2001). GORE has emerged as
a prominent approach within RE and the main concept in GORE is goals. Goals
can be formulated at different levels of abstraction ranging from high-level, strate-
gic concerns to low-level, technical concerns (Lamsweerde, 2001). Goals also cover
different types of concerns, such as functional concerns associated with the service
to be provided, and non-functional concerns associated with quality of services, i.e.,
safety, security, accuracy, performance, and so forth (Lamsweerde, 2001). Goals are
important to requirements engineering for many reasons:
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• Goals enable the achievement of requirements completeness. They provide
the criterion for sufficient completeness of requirements specification. The
requirements specification is complete if all goals can be achieved (Yue, 1987).
• The use of goal enables to avoid the inclusion of irrelevant goals. A requirement
is pertinent with respect to a set of goals if its specification is used in the proof
of one goal at least (Yue, 1987). Therefore, a system functionality is relevant is
it is part of reaching a goal of the stakeholders, otherwise its implementation
is not justified.
• Explaining requirements to stakeholders is another important issue. In partic-
ular a goal refinement tree provides traceability links from high level strategic
objectives to low level technical requirements, so goals may be used to relate
the software-to-be to organisational and business contexts (Yu, 1993). Through
this way the stakeholders can get answers to questions such as ”why do we need
to do this”, and ”how to we reach this” and so on.
• Goal refinement provides a natural mechanism for structuring complex require-
ments documents for increased readability (Lamsweerde, 2001). This refine-
ment is occurring by asking how, and how else, and how good each alternative
is.
• Requirements engineers are faced with many alternatives to be considered dur-
ing the requirements elaboration process. Goal refinements provide the right
level of abstraction at which decision makers can be involved for validating
choices being made or suggesting alternatives overlooked so far (Lamsweerde,
2001).
• Managing conflicts among multiple viewpoints is another problem. Stakehold-
ers are different in their interests and priorities of these interests. This may
lead to conflicts about what requirements to fulfil and how, and how well to
fulfil them. Goals enable to detect conflicts among requirements and to resolve
them eventually (Van Lamsweerde, Darimont, and Letier, 1998). For example
achieving, a goal may deny the achievement of another.
• Separating stable from volatile information is another important concern for
managing requirements evolution. Requirements are more likely to evolve
rather than goals. The higher a goal the more stable it will be. Different
system versions often share a common set of high-level goals. The current
system and the system-to-be correspond to alternative refinements of common
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goals in the goal refinement graph and can therefore be integrated into one
single goal model (Lamsweerde, 2001).
• Goals drive the identification of requirements to support them; they have been
shown to be among the basic driving forces, together with scenarios, for a sys-
tematic requirements elaboration process (Dardenne, Lamsweerde, and Fickas,
1993).
• Dependencies among components of the domain of interest (Yu, 1995).
In (Lamsweerde, 2001) there is an overview of the GORE field and a report by
(Lapouchnian, 2005) provides an overview of some of the approaches that follow the
principles of GORE.
3.5 JTrust modelling language concepts
The GORE approach is adopted because it already has useful concepts such as
actor, goal, and dependency. These concepts are used to describe the system and its
environment. We adopt these concepts and we enrich it with trust related concepts
including experiential trust, reported trust, normative trust, and external trust,
and control related concepts including observation and deterrence. These concepts
allow the developer to capture trust relationships and to reason about them in a
systematic way. Also, the concepts enable the developer to make a justified decision
about the future behaviour of the active components of the information system-to-
be at a requirements stage. Moreover, the developer is able to model and analyse
trustworthiness requirements and assess the trustworthiness level of the system-to-
be. Here we illustrate the main concepts of GORE that will be used in the rest of
the thesis.
Goal represents a component’s strategic interest and is a condition that system
components want to achieve (Yu, 1995). Goals capture the reasons why a system
is required (Anto´n and Potts, 1998), thus becoming objectives that the information
system should achieve through the cooperation of the components of the system
(Van Lamsweerde, 2000). Of course, this can be done in more than one way so al-
ternatives of achieving a goal can be considered. There can be different types of goal
(Lamsweerde, 2001). Functional goals underlie services that the system is expected
to deliver whereas non-functional goals refer to expected system qualities such as
security, safety, performance, usability, flexibility, customisability, interoperability,
and so forth. More particularly, there can be satisfaction goals, which are functional
goals concerned with satisfying request from system components, information goals
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are functional goals concerned with keeping such components informed about ob-
ject states. Non-functional goals can be specialised in a similar way. For example,
accuracy goals are non-functional goals requiring the state of software object to
accurately reflect the state of the corresponding monitored/controlled objects in
the environment. Such goals are often overlooked in the requirements engineer-
ing process and their violation may be responsible for major failures. Performance
goals are specialised into time and space performance goals, the former being spe-
cialised into response time and throughput goals. Security goals are specialised into
confidentiality, integrity, and availability goals. Also, there are privacy goals that
are specialised into authentication, authorisation, identification, data protection,
anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability, and unobservability (Kalloniatis, Kavakli,
and Gritzalis, 2008).
In GORE there are two categories of goals; Hard goals or simply goals that have
clear-cut definition and clear-cut criteria to judge whether it are satisfied; And goals
that are called softgoals and their satisfaction cannot be established in a clear-cut
sense. Thus there cannot be trust based reasoning about these goals if we do not
have clear criteria. But, these goals can be refined further into goals that have clear
criteria and contribute to the satisfaction of softgoals. These goals then can be used
for trust analysis.
The identification of goals is not an easy activity, as a lot of goals are implicit.
Thus the goal elicitation process should analyse the current system environment and
elicit goals from sources such as documents, interviews, scenarios, use cases, policies,
and so on. Scenarios help for identifying goals and the different ways through which
they may be implemented and fulfilled. An informal technique for finding out more
abstract, parent goals is to keep asking ”why” questions about operational descrip-
tions already available (Van Lamsweerde, 2000). The usefulness of identifying more
abstract goals is that once a more abstract goal is identified, it may be possible to
refine it and identify subgoals that were initially not identified. Thus, the identifi-
cation and refinement of more abstract goals leads to a more complete requirements
specification.
Once some goals have been identified the next step is to refine them into pro-
gressively simpler goals until these goals can be easily implemented. The refinement
of goals is captured by goal models. Goal models serve as means of communication
among developers and stakeholders, but also as an abstraction specification of the
system-to-be. An informal technique for finding out subgoals and requirements is to
keep asking ”how” questions about the goals already identified (Van Lamsweerde,
2000), but formal goal refinement patterns may also prove effective when goal spec-
ifications are formalised. They help finding out subgoals that were overlooked but
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are needed to establish the parent goal (Van Lamsweerde, 2000).
Decomposition is the relationship link that that represents the goal refinement
and essentially defines the goal structure. The refinement of goals occurs through
AND/OR refinements. So, when a goal is refined through and AND-Decomposition,
it means that fulfilling all subgoals is mandatory for the fulfilment of the goal that
is being refined. When a goal is refined through an OR-Decomposition it means
that fulfilling one of these goals is enough for the fulfilment of the goal that is being
refined. In other words, the OR-Decomposition represents the alternatives ways to
fulfil a goal.
Actor is an entity of the domain of interest that possesses strategic goals and
intentionality by carrying out actions that will fulfil those goals (Yu, 1995). It is
a unit that encapsulates intentionality, rationality, and autonomy. Actors want to
achieve goals either using their own capability or depending on another actor. An
actor can be a human entity playing a certain role, an organisation, or a technical
entity, such as software or device. For example, a lecturer represents a human actor
and a university virtual learning environment (VLE) represents a technical actor.
Dependency is the relationship link that indicates that one actor depends on
another actor to fulfil a goal (Yu, 1995; Yu et al., 2011). The goal around which the
dependency centres is named dependum. By depending on another actor for a goal,
an actor is able to achieve goals that otherwise he would not be able to achieve alone,
or not as easily or as well. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the dependee
will fulfil the goal and also the dependee is given the freedom to choose how to do
it, as the depender is only concerned about the outcome.
A Corresponds link represents the relationship between the goal of the depen-
der and the goal of the dependee that satisfies the depender’s goal, which is the
dependum. The tail element of the link is the depender’s goal, while the head ele-
ment is the goal that the dependee is achieving in order to achieve the goal of the
depender.
A natural drawback of a dependency is that the depender becomes vulnerable. If
the dependee fails to fulfil the dependency then this will have negative consequences
for the depender to achieve his goals. Therefore, the depender is exposed to the
behaviour of the dependee, which is not always predictable. Such dependencies
need somehow to be resolved in order to be confident that the dependee will fulfil
the dependency.
Trust relationship is any dependency relationship between the actors of an
information system because in dependencies the depender has expectations from the
dependee to fulfil the dependency by achieving the goal instead of him. Moreover,
the outcome of the dependency can have positive or negative effect on the dependee.
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Similarly, the trustor is the depender and the trustee is the dependee. However, in
a trust relationship the level of trust might be high or low. For this reason the
concept of dependency is used to capture trust relationships. Furthermore, trust
relationships can be divided into two categories:
• Direct trust relationship, which is a trust relationship that exists for its
own reasons.
• Indirect trust relationship, which exists only to support other trust rela-
tionships.
For such trust relationships, not only is the trustor/depender concerned, but
also the developer of an information system. The developer’s goal is to build and
information system that satisfies the goals of the stakeholders who are modelled as
actors in her model along with their dependencies.
Resolution is the means to offset the potential vulnerability that a dependency
introduces. In order to find resolutions the developer needs to ask the question of
why does he feel confident that the dependee will achieve the goal and hence fulfil
the dependency. The resolutions essentially reveal the assumptions that must be
valid for the system to be built on strong foundations. In the running example, the
system has a goal to receive the lectures slides, which cannot accomplish on its own.
Therefore, the system depends on the lecturer for uploading the lecture slides. For
this dependency and its accompanying potential vulnerability a resolution is required
to be identified by the developer in order to build confidence in the fulfilment of the
dependency.
A Resolves link represents the relationship of the resolution with the depen-
dency that it is resolving. The tail element is the resolution and the head element is
the resolved dependency. Based on the confidence model presented in the previous
section that states that confidence can be achieved through trust and control, we
define two types of resolutions, trust resolution and control resolution. So, in our
running example the developer can feel confident that the lecture will upload the
slides three days in advance either because she trusts him or she controls him to do
so.
A Trust Resolution indicates that the developer trusts that the dependee will
fulfil the dependency by achieving the goal once the information system-to-be is
put in operation. For example, the developer of the VLE can choose to resolve the
dependency on the lecturer to upload the lecture slides three days in advance of
the lecture with a trust resolution because she trusts the lecturer for doing so. We
propose four different types of trust resolution:
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• Experiential Trust is trust that originates from previous direct experience
with the trustee. The parties have verifiable information by first hand interac-
tional or transactional experience with each other (McKnight and Chervany,
2006; Sabater and Sierra, 2005). This information concerns the trustee’s in-
trinsic properties, including ability and motivation, which affect trust more in
a relationship that has been established for some time (Riegelsberger, Sasse,
and McCarthy, 2005). In the running example, if there is an experiential trust
resolution of the dependency on the lecturer to upload the slides then this
means that the developer trusts the lecturer to do so on the basis of previous
direct experience that she had with the lecturer.
• Reported Trust is trust that originates from a third party (the reporter)
who reports that the trustee is trustworthy (Sabater and Sierra, 2005; Bigley
and Pearce, 1998). This is valuable when the trustor does not have first-hand
information of the trustee. In effect a new dependency is introduced; the
trustor depends also on the third party for the accuracy of the information that
she is providing to her. This is an indirect trust relationship because it only
exists to support the original trust relationship. For, example the developer
of the VLE may feel confident in the fulfilment of the dependency with the
lecturer because of reported trust resolution. This means, for example, that
the university administration, which is another actor inside the VLE system
environment, reports that the lecturer can be trusted to do so. In effect, then
the developer is depending of the university administration for the accuracy
of the information. This trust relationship on the university administration
is an indirect trust relationship because it supports the original direct trust
relationship with the lecturer.
• Normative Trust is trust that originates from the system environment norms.
Trustees are motivated to behave in a specific way by their desire to act in ac-
cordance with internalised norms (Riegelsberger, Sasse, and McCarthy, 2005;
Sabater and Sierra, 2005). As mentioned in the previous section trust assumes
the existence of control and also it creates control (Mo¨llering, 2005). Environ-
ment norms constitute actors obliged to behave in a certain way. Therefore,
in a way, actors of a system environment are embossed by the environment
norms to show specific behaviour. By system environment we mean the tech-
nical system-to-be, the stakeholders, and the humans and other technical sys-
tems that interact with the system-to-be. It is the developer’s task to set
the boundaries of the system environment. Back to our example, the devel-
oper may decide to resolve the dependency on the lecturer by using normative
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trust resolution. This means that the developer decides to trust the lecturer
to behave as modelled, i.e., upload the lectures slides three days in advance
of the lecture, because it is an environment norm in the specific university
environment for the lecturers to do so.
• External Trust is trust that originates from sources outside of the system
environment. Such sources can be laws and external policies. In our running
example, the developer may decide to resolve the dependency on the lecturer
using an external trust resolution. This means the developers trusts the lec-
turer to fulfil the dependency because there is government policy that says that
it is the lecturer’s responsibility to upload the slides three days in advance of
the lecture.
Trust resolution is one way to resolve the uncertainty that a dependency is intro-
ducing. Confidence though in the fulfilment of a dependency can also be achieved
through control.
Control resolution: Control is a key source of confidence (Das and Teng, 1998;
Cofta, 2007). Control is the power that one actor has over another actor to influence
her behaviour (Marsh and Briggs, 2009). In essence, when a developer uses a control
resolution as a resolution of a dependency this means that she is confident that the
dependee will fulfil the dependency by achieving the goal once the system is put in
operation, because either the depender or another actor is controlling the dependee
and forcing her to do so. However, if the controller is a third party, such as another
actor, then this situation implies that there is a new dependency, and eventually
a trust relationship, on the third party to control the original dependee. This new
dependency is required to be resolved as well. This new trust relationship is an
indirect trust relationship. In our example, the developer of the VLE may decide
to resolve the dependency on the lecturer and feel confident in the fulfilment of the
dependency once the system is put in operation, with a control resolution because
the university administration is controlling the lecturer and forcing him to do so.
Therefore, there is a new dependency on the university administration to control
the lecturer for uploading the lecture slides.
An Introduces link represents the relationship between a reported trust resolu-
tion or a control resolution and the new dependency they are introducing. The tail
element is a reported trust resolution or a control resolution and the head element
is the new dependency. The new dependency in case of reported trust resolution or
control resolution is on the reporter or on the controller respectively.
Control requires knowledge and influence from the depender’s side. Knowledge
specifies the ability of an actor to gather information about another actor’s be-
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haviour in order to decide whether to execute an action that will directly influence
her behaviour. In addition, control specifies the action that is required for the de-
pendee to behave in an expected way. In other words, control is in place in order to
punish the depender in case of deceitful behaviour (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman,
1995). We define two concepts that represent the above notions, observation and
deterrence:
• Observation is the continuous examination of whether that dependee actor is
behaving as expected and she is fulfilling a dependency. It is required as part of
an effective control mechanism in order to alert that a dependency is not being
fulfilled and possibly to trigger further actions. Back in the running example,
the observation capability apparently may be the university administration
to check three days in advance of a lecture, if the lecture slides have been
uploaded by the lecturer.
• Deterrence is the prevention of a dependee’s goal in case she fails to fulfil a
dependency, so that it can influence her behaviour. Only through observation
a control mechanism cannot be effective. It requires also an action that can
be taken against a dependee who fails to achieve a goal of a dependency.
This action should prevent the dependee from accomplishing one of his own
goals, so eventually it will influence her behaviour. The more important is the
dependency for the depender the more important the goal that is prevented
should be. Deterrence acts both as a threat and as a punishment for the
dependee. In the running example, the deterrence may be that the lecturer
will be given a fine and it will be deducted from her salary if she does not
upload the slides three days in advance.
A Prevents link shows the relationship between the deterrence and the goal
of the dependee that it is being prevented. The tail element is the deterrence,
while the head element is the prevented goal.
A Contributes link represents the relationship between the observation and
the control resolution and between the deterrence and control resolution. The tail
element is observation or deterrence and the head element is control resolution.
By modelling the resolutions of the dependencies of the information system, the
developer is reasoning about the trust relationships that exist inside the information
system-to-be. This leads to the explicit exposure of the trust assumptions that are
underlying the development of an information system and which we define them as
entailments.
Entailment is a condition of trust that is required to be valid for having con-
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fidence in the dependency from which it is originally generated. Entailments are
created because of the resolutions that have been defined by the developer. In our
running example, if there is a control resolution of the dependency on the lecturer
because the university administration is controlling the lecturer to upload the lecture
slides, then this resolution requires an entailment that the university is trusted to
control the lecturer. Similarly, if there is a normative trust resolution of the depen-
dency on the lecturer because it is a university environment norm for the lecturers
to do so, then this resolution requires an entailment that the university environ-
ment norm is trusted for the lecturer to upload the slides three days in advance. An
entailment has to be validated against the reality.
A Requires link represents the relationship between the resolution and the re-
quired entailment. The tail element is the resolution and the head element is the
entailment. We define this relationship as ”Requires” because the entailments are
required to be valid in order the development of the system-to-be to be based on
sound trust assumptions. Such assumptions of trust conditions need evidence in
order to be justified and considered valid so as the development of the information
system to be based on strong foundations and the system to be trustworthy once
put in operation. For example, if there is an entailment that the university envi-
ronment norm is trusted, is there any evidence that supports this assumption? If
such assumptions are left unquestioned then they may introduce vulnerabilities to
the system and the system will not be trustworthy.
The assessment of the entailments is a complex task. The developer needs to
seek any kind of evidence that will enable him to decide whether the entailment is
valid or not. Sources of evidence for the developer to look into are historical data,
surveys, interviews and so on. If there is evidence that supports the validity of the
trust assumption then the developer can be confident that the dependency will be
fulfilled once the system is put in operation. In contrast, if there is no evidence that
supports the validity of the entailment then this dependency might be a potential
vulnerability that will affect the ability of the system to meet its goals.
3.6 Trustworthiness requirements
The goals of an information system are accomplished with the collaboration of
the actors that are part of that information system. In order for the goals to be
achieved every actor should do its part. The technical system-to-be has to meet its
requirements and the other technical components and human actors need to behave
in the way they were modelled during the requirements modelling stage of system
development. We have proposed a number of concepts that enable the developer
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to reason about the trust relationships with the human actors or other technical
actors. Nevertheless, there will be cases where human or other technical actors
are not trusted or cannot be controlled by another human actor to behave in the
way that it is desired. This can lead to potential vulnerabilities and to a system
that will not be able to achieve its goals. For this reason, we recognise the need of
requirements that will influence the actors to behave in a specific way. We call such
requirements trustworthiness requirements.
This must be a requirement of the technical system-to-be, since the developer has
direct control over the software that she is developing. The software-to-be can act
as an extension of the developer and compel the other actors to behave in a desired
way once is put in operation. We therefore define trustworthiness requirement as
follows:
Trustworthiness requirement is the functionality of the technical system-to-be that
influences the behaviour of a dependee actor, with respect to the fulfilment of a
dependency inside an information system.
This functionality must provide the system with the ability to control other
actors. As discussed in the previous section control consists of observation and
deterrence capabilities. Consequently, the system requires having at least one ob-
servation and at least one deterrence capability, in order the control to be effective
in influencing a dependee actor to fulfil a dependency inside the information system.
The observation capability is in place to check whether a dependee actor fulfils a
dependency. The deterrence capability is in place in order to prevent the dependee
actor to achieve one of his own goals. The more important to the system trustwor-
thiness is a dependency, the more important the goal of the dependee the developer
can choose to prevent through the deterrence.
3.7 Meta-model of the JTrust modelling language
In section 3.5 the trust and control abstractions of our modelling language were
defined and motivated. In this section we present and describe the meta-model of
our modelling language (Figure 3.3) and we justify the relationships between the
concepts. The meta-model was developed using standard UML notation. Therefore,
the rectangles represent classes while the arrows represent associations and gener-
alisations. We illustrate each aspect of the meta-model using the running example
describe in section 3.3
In the meta-model the actor is the main concept and has zero to many goals that
she wants to achieve. There is a hierarchy of the goals and the high level goals are
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Figure 3.3: JTrust modelling language meta-model
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decomposed into smaller goals through AND/OR decomposition links. Figure 3.4
shows the goal structure of the VLE technical system and how the goals are linked
together. The high level goal of the VLE system is to provide services, which is
decomposed into smaller and more concrete goals. Two subgoals of the system-to-
be are to provide administrative services and academic services. These are further
decomposed. A subgoal of the academic services is to manage the lecture slides,
which is further AND-decomposed to obtain lecture slides from the lecturer and
provide the lecture slides to the student. In addition, the goal to manage timetable
is AND-decomposed to obtain time and provide timetable
Figure 3.4: Goal model example
For some of these goals the actor is able to achieve them by herself. However,
there are goals that cannot achieve by her and she therefore needs to depend on other
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actors to achieve them for her. There is a one to one correspondence relationships
between the goal that cannot be achieved by the actor herself and the corresponding
goal of the dependee actor. As a result she forms dependency relationships with zero
to many actors where she is the depender. At the same time, other actors might
depend on her in order to achieve goals for them. So the initial actor can also be a
dependee in zero to many dependencies. Figure 3.5 illustrates how these concepts
come together. In the VLE scenario there are a number of actors involved, such as
the VLE technical system-to-be, the lecturer, the university administration, and the
student, that for the goals that cannot achieve by themselves they depend on other
actors to do so. For example, the system has a goal to obtain the timetable so there
is a correspondence link between the obtain timetable goal and the upload timetable
goal of the university administration. Similarly, the student has a goal to submit
assignments so there is a correspondence link between the submit assignment goal
and receive assignment goal of the VLE System. The VLE system has a goal to
obtain the lecture slides, so there is a correspondence link between the obtain slides
goal and the upload slides goal of the lecturer. The correspondences links result
into dependencies between the actors.
In order to have confidence in the fulfilment of a dependency, by the dependee,
the dependency needs to be resolved by trust or control. In case of trust there
are four different types of trust. A dependency can have zero to many reported
or external trust resolutions, depending on how many are the reporters or the ex-
ternal sources of trust. Also, a dependency can have zero to one experiential or
normative trust resolutions, as there can be only one norm and the depender is one
individual. Furthermore, a dependency can have zero to many control resolutions,
depending on how many are the controllers. A reported trust resolution introduces
one dependency, on the reporter, while a control resolution introduces zero to one
dependency depending on whether the controller is the depender herself or a third
party. If the controller is the depender then there is no new dependency, otherwise
if the controller is a third party then there is new dependency on the third party.
Dependencies that are introduced because of reported trust or control resolutions
need to be resolved again in the same way. Figure 3.6 illustrates how these con-
cepts come together. The dependency on the lecturer to upload the lecture slides
is resolved with control, where the university administration is the controller. This
means that there is the initial belief after discussion with the stakeholders that the
administration is controlling the lecturer in order to upload the lecture slides. As
a result, this introduces a new dependency on the university administration to con-
trol the lecturer because if it does not do so then the lecturer will not upload the
lecture slides. The new dependency on the administration is resolved with expe-
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Figure 3.5: Dependency model example
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riential trust, because there is previous direct experience with the administration
that suggests that it will control the lecturer. The dependency on the university
administration to upload the timetable is resolved with experiential trust as well,
because there is previous direct experience with the administration that suggests
that it will upload the timetable.
Figure 3.6: Resolution model example
Resolutions require entailments that are valid in order to have confidence in the
fulfilment of the dependencies that will be reflected in the system trustworthiness.
Each resolution has exactly one entailment, which can be true or false with respect
to their validity. These concepts are illustrated in Figure 3.7 using the running
example. The control resolution requires an entailment that the university admin-
istration is trusted to control the lecturer. The experiential trust resolution of the
dependency introduced by the control resolution, requires an entailment that the
developer trusts herself on whether the university administration will control the
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lecturer or not. The other experiential trust resolution requires an entailment that
the developer trusts herself on whether the developer will upload the timetable to
the VLE system.
Figure 3.7: Entailment model example
If an entailment is not valid then the developer should investigate alternative so-
lutions. As an alternative we have proposed in the previous section the identification
and analysis of trustworthiness requirement. Dependencies that are not resolved by
trust or control by a system environment actor can be resolved by control where
the system-to-be is the controller. Such kind or control resolution will ensure the
trustworthiness of the system-to-be. The analysis includes the identification of ob-
servation and deterrence capabilities for the system. As shown in the meta-model
one system control resolution can have zero to many observations and zero to many
deterrence. Of course, in order to be effective needs to have at least one observation
capability and at least one deterrence capability. For each deterrence capability
there are one to many goals of the dependee that are being prevented. Figure 3.8
illustrates how these concepts come together. The entailment that the developer
trusts herself on whether the university administration will control the lecturer was
not valid, and therefore a trustworthiness requirement is identified. The analysis
of the trustworthiness requirement results in an additional system functionality to
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check for every lecture if the lecture slides have been uploaded three days in advance
as an observation capability. Also, the analysis results in an additional system func-
tionality to prevent the lecturer from accessing his email account unless he has
uploaded the lecture slides. The trustworthiness requirement acts as a threat and
as a punishment in order to enforce the lecturer to behave in a specific way.
Figure 3.8: Trustworthiness requirement model example
3.8 Trustworthiness assessment model
Information system trustworthiness has two dimensions. The first dimension is if
actors can achieve goals and the second dimension is if they will achieve them. A
distinction has to be made between the technical system under development and
the rest of the actors of the information system, which may include human or other
technical actors.
Let us consider the case of the technical system under development. Its goals
exist because they are needed by the system stakeholders. Some of these goals are
accomplished by the system itself, but for others it needs to interact with other
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system environment actors. To reason that the technical system-to-be can achieve
its goals appropriate implementation mechanisms have to be modelled that show
how the system will achieve the goals. There are multiple methods in the literature
to deal with this task. On the other hand, for the goals that the technical system-
to-be depends on other actors, first the capability of the actor achieving that goal
has to decided, again following available methods in the literature, and then to
trust if the actor will actually achieve the goal once the system is put in operation.
Back in the running example, the system trustworthiness of the VLE system in
Figure 3.4 depends on the extent to which the high level goal, provide services, will
be accomplished. As this high level goal is decomposed into smaller goals, the extend
of accomplishment of the high level goal depends on the extend of accomplishment
of the lower level goals, i.e., obtain timetable, provide timetable, obtain lecture
slides, provide lecture slides, receive assignments. For the goals provide timetable
and provide lecture slides, the developer can specify appropriate implementations
and provide the system with the capability of achieving the respective goals. For
the rest of the goals though a resolution of the dependency needs to be found.
Consequently, any attempt to measure the trustworthiness of an information system
needs to consider these two dimensions of trustworthiness.
In our proposed trustworthiness assessment model, any goal has a confidence
level. If the goal is a lowest level goal then its confidence level C is:
• one(”1”) if the actor can achieve the goal by herself.
• zero(”0”) if the actor cannot achieve the goal by herself and there is no other
actor to depend upon for this goal.
• the resolution level of the dependency if the actor cannot achieve the goal by
herself and depends upon another actor for this goal.
The resolution level of a dependency, which shows the degree of confidence in the
fulfilment of a dependency, is calculated as:
R =
(
V alidEntailments
TotalEntailments
)
× ConfidenceLevel (3.1)
ConfidenceLevel is the confidence level of the corresponding goal of the dependee
actor.
Once the confidence levels of the lowest level goals are calculated then there is a
bottom-up propagation of these values to the higher level goals until the highest level
goals have a confidence level value. The propagation algorithm takes into account
the decomposition share of subgoal to its parent goal.
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ST is the system trustworthiness level, which shows how trustworthy the system
is, i.e., how confident we are that the system will meet its requirements.
I is the importance of the high level goal to the overall system trustworthiness,
and it is defined by the developer.
If n is a set of direct system dependencies then the system trustworthiness is
calculated using the following formula:
ST =
(∑n
x=1 Ix × Cx∑n
x=1 Ix
)
× 100 (3.2)
3.9 Chapter summary
This chapter has introduced the trust related concepts and a meta-model as the basis
of a modelling language for trustworthy information systems development. During
the development of systems the social architectures of trust need to be considered
and reflected in the technical architectures of trust. Therefore, our goal is to capture
trust relationships and to ensure that the design of the system conforms to them.
As a result, the developer’s trust assumptions during the analysis of the system
need be identified, validated and if not validated then revised in order to lead to a
system that is trustworthy for fulfilling its requirements. The proposed meta-model
allows identifying both the direct and indirect trust relationships and reasoning
about them in a structured and systematic way. Also, in cases where assumed trust
relationships are not valid, control mechanisms are enforced in order to fill in the
gaps in the chain of trust relationships.
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JTrust process
In this chapter, we describe a methodological process for modelling and reasoning
about trust relationships, modelling and analysing trustworthiness requirements and
assessing the system trustworthiness at a requirements level. The trust and control
abstractions and the meta-model presented in Chapter 3 facilitate the development
of trustworthy information systems by stipulating concepts that need to be taken
into account. However, the meta-model alone is not adequate without the proper
constructive techniques on how these concepts should be elicited. The JTrust process
describes five activities as well as the artefacts produced. In particular, for each
activity the steps and the relevant artefacts are specified. These activities are placed
after the requirements elicitation and before the requirements specification. The
Software and Systems Process Engineering Metamodel (SPEM) specification (SPEM
2.0 ) is used to specify the process, the activities, the steps, the artefacts and the
roles involved. Figure reffig-process depicts an overview of the JTrust process with
the following five activities:
• Goal and dependency modelling: to identify the stakeholders of the system-
to-be along with their goals and their dependencies.
• Resolution modelling: to identify the resolutions of the dependencies along
with possible introduced dependencies.
• Entailment modelling: to identify the trust assumptions that underlie the
system under development and examine their validity.
• Trustworthiness requirement analysis: to identify the observation and de-
terrence functionalities that are required from the system in order to influence
the fulfilment of dependencies.
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• System trustworthiness assessment: to measure the system trustworthi-
ness at a requirements stage.
Figure 4.1: JTrust process
4.1 Activity 1: Goal and dependency modelling
The trust analysis of the information system begins with the modelling of actors’
goals and dependencies. The main focus of this activity is to understand the or-
ganisational context and the system requirements. It contains three steps: actor
identification; goal identification and refinement; and correspondences and depen-
dencies identification. Figure 4.2 depicts the goal and dependency modelling activity
with its steps and relevant artefacts.
In the first step, the actors of the information system need to be identified and
modelled. This includes the technical system-to-be, human actors of the system
environment and also other technical actors of the system environment. Human
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actors are usually the stakeholders of the system, while the other technical actors are
technical systems that the technical system under development is going to interact
with. The developer can identify such information in organisational documents
and interviews with the stakeholders. Every actor has a trustworthiness attribute,
which influences the trustworthiness of the whole information system through the
collaboration with other actors for the achievement of the information system goals.
In the second step the actors’ goals are identified and refined in order to construct
a goal structure for each actor. Goal identification is not an easy task. Sometimes
they are explicitly stated by stakeholders or in preliminary material available to re-
quirements engineers. Most often they are implicit so that goal elicitation has to be
undertaken. Goals can also be identified systematically by searching for intentional
keywords in the preliminary documents provided, interview transcripts, and so on
(Van Lamsweerde, 2000). The preliminary analysis of current system, if it exists,
is an important source for goal identification. Such analysis usually results in a
list of problems and deficiencies that can be formulated precisely. Negating those
formulations yields a first list of goals to be achieved by the system-to-be. Once
a preliminary set of goals and requirements is obtained and validated with stake-
holders, many other goals can be identified by refinement and by abstraction, just
by asking how and why questions about the goals and requirements already avail-
able (Van Lamsweerde, 2000). The benefit of goal modelling is to support heuristic,
qualitative or formal reasoning schemes during requirements engineering. Goals are
generally modelled by intrinsic features such are their type and attributes, and by
their links to other goals and to other elements of requirements model. In our pro-
posed method goal refinement is done through AND/OR decompositions and every
decomposition link has a share attribute. Also, every goal has a confidence level
attribute. Additionally, the top level goals have an importance attribute. Therefore,
once the goal model is constructed the developer has to specify the importance of
the high level goals. Also, she needs to specify the share of every subgoal to his
parentgoal. The share property denotes how much the parent goals is achieved with
the achievement of the subgoal. For OR decompositions the share is ”1”. At the end
the confidence levels of the lowest level goals need to be specified. The confidence
level is ”1” if the actor can achieve the goal by herself and ”0” if she cannot achieve
it by herself.
In the third step the correspondences and the dependencies need to be modelled.
Goals cannot always be achieved by the actors themselves and such goals would have
been specified with zero confidence level at the previous step by the developer. For
these goals the developer has to seek for actors that can achieve them and specify the
correspondence between the goal that cannot be achieved by the depender and the
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corresponding goal of the dependee. Based on the correspondences between goals
the dependencies are then specified. Therefore if the actor depends on another actor
for a goal, then the confidence level is equal to the resolution level of the dependency.
Figure 4.2: Goal and depedency modelling activity
 
1 Activity {kind: phase }: Goal and Dependency Modelling
2 ProcessPerformer {Kind: primary}
3 RoleUse: Requirements Analyst
4 WorkDefinitionParameter {Kind: in}
5 WorkProductUse: Oganization Processes
6 Work DefinitionParameter {Kind: out}
7 WorkProductUse: List of Actors
8 WorkProductUse: Lists of High Level Goals
9 WorkProductUse: Goal Diagrams
10 Steps
11 Step: Study organization setting documents
12 Step: Identify actors
13 Step: Identify high level actor goals
14 Step: Model actors
15 Step: Model high level goals
16 Step: Refine actors ’ goals
17 ProcessPerformer {Kind: primary}
18 RoleUse: Requirements Analyst
19 WorkDefinitionParameter {Kind: in}
20 WorkProductUse: List of High Level Goals
21 WorkProductUse: Goal Model Diagrams
22 WorkDefinitionParameter {Kind: in}
23 WorkProductUse: List of dependencies
24 WorkProductUse: Actor Diagram
25 WorkProductUse: System Goal Diagram
26 Steps
27 Step: Model system and environment actors in the actor diagram
28 Step: Refine goals
29 Step: Identify goals that cannot achieved by their owners
30 Step: Identify correspondences among actors
31 Step: Model dependencies in the actor diagram 
4.2 Activity 2: Resolution modelling
Once the dependencies among the actors of the information system have been mod-
elled, the next activity is to identify and model the resolutions of the dependencies.
This activity identifies the means of offsetting the uncertainty and potential vul-
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nerabilities that dependencies introduce to the information system. The activity
consists of two steps: model the resolutions and model the dependencies that the
resolutions may introduce and resolve them as well until no further dependencies
are introduced (Figure 4.3).
In the first step, each dependency is examined carefully in order to identify
resolutions. To complete this task the developer has to consider the four types
of trust resolution, i.e., experiential, reported, normative, and external, and the
control resolution, and has to ask questions such as ”is there confidence in the
fulfilment of the dependency because of experiential trust?”, ”is there confidence in
the fulfilment of the dependency because of reported trust?”, ”is there confidence in
the fulfilment of the dependency because of control?”, and so on. Such questions
will enable the developer to decide if there is confidence and what is the reason
behind this confidence by modelling the appropriate trust and/or control resolutions.
Then the respective resolutions are modelled in the trust model along with the
dependencies that they resolve.
The next step of this activity is to model the dependences that reported trust
and control resolutions are introducing. Reported trust resolution introduces a new
dependency on the reporter, while control resolution creates a new dependency on
the controller, if the controller is not the depender herself. Such dependencies need
to be resolved in the same way following the first step of this activity. This is an
iterative activity, which ends when there no dependencies left without resolution or
if there are any unresolved dependencies then for these no resolution could be found.
In the former case the developer can move on to the next activity to identify and
validate the resolution entailments. In the latter case however, the trustworthiness
requirement modelling activity should be followed.
 
1 Activity {kind: phase }: Resolution modelling
2 ProcessPerformer {Kind: primary}
3 RoleUse: Requirements Analyst
4 WorkDefinitionParameter {Kind: in}
5 WorkProductUse: List of Dependencies
6 WorkProductUse: Actor Diagram
7 WorkProductUse: System Goal Diagram
8 Work DefinitionParameter {Kind: out}
9 WorkProductUse: List of Resolutions
10 WorkProductUse: Resolutions diagram
11 Steps
12 Step: Identify outgoing system dependencies
13 Step: Identify type of resolution
14 Step: Model resolution
15 Step: Identify possible new outgoing system dependency
16 Step: Model possible new outgoing system dependency 
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Figure 4.3: Resolution modelling activity
4.3 Activity 3: Entailment modelling
In the third activity the entailments are specified and validated. The entailments
represent the trust assumptions that underlie the system under development. This
activity contains two steps: the specification of the entailment according to specific
guidelines, and the collection of evidence in order to examine the validity of the
entailments (Figure 4.4).
In the first step of the activity the specification of the entailments is carried
out based on the type of resolution. For each resolution identified in the previous
activity an entailment is specified according to the following rules:
• Experiential trust requires an entailment that the trustor trusts himself.
• Reported trust requires an entailment that the reporter is trusted.
• Normative trust requires an entailment that the system environment norm is
trusted.
• External trust requires an entailment that the external source of trust is
trusted.
• Control based resolution requires an entailment that the controller is trusted.
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In the second step the validity of the entailments has to be examined because
if the entailments are not valid then there will be a potential vulnerability to the
system that will affect its trustworthiness. The examination needs to be based
on evidence. The developer can seek evidence in historical documents, carry out
surveys and interviews. The entailment has a validity property that takes Boolean
values true or false. If the entailment is valid then the validity property is set to
true, otherwise it is set to false.
Based on the results of the entailments validation the resolution level of the
dependency is calculated. Ideally it should be 100%, but it is up to the developer to
decide what is the level upon which he considers that the dependency is resolved.
If the dependency is resolved then there is confidence that the dependee will indeed
behave as expected, otherwise there is no confidence that the dependee will behave
as expected and additional functionality is required by the system to enforce the
desired behaviour.
Figure 4.4: Entailment modelling activity
 
1 Activity {kind: phase }: Entailment Modelling
2 ProcessPerformer {Kind: primary}
3 RoleUse: Requirements Analyst
4 WorkDefinitionParameter {Kind: in}
5 WorkProductUse: List of Resolutions
6 WorkProductUse: Resolutions Diagram
7 Work DefinitionParameter {Kind: out}
8 WorkProductUse: Entailments diagram
9 WorkProductUse: List of valid entailments
10 WorkProductUse: List of invalid entailments
11 Steps
12 Step: Identify entailments based on resolutions
13 Step: Collect evidence regarding entailments
14 Step: Check validation of entailments 
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4.4 Activity 4: Trustworthiness requirement analysis
The fourth activity of the JTrust process concerns the modelling and analysis of
trustworthiness requirements. During the previous activity the validity of the en-
tailments was examined. If the entailments are not valid the dependency is not
actually resolved and alternative solutions need to be considered. An alternative
solution is to add such functionality to the system-to-be that will act as a controller
and enforce the fulfilment of an unresolved dependency. In essence, this is a control
resolution of the dependency where the system-to-be is the controller. Therefore,
this activity contains three steps: the identification of the control resolution, the
specification of the observation functionality, and the specification of the deterrence
functionality (Figure 4.5).
In the first step, every dependency is examined and if it has not been adequately
resolved then a control resolution is modelled that resolves the dependency. In such
a resolution the system under developer acts as the controller that will compel the
dependee to behave as expected, i.e., fulfil a specific goal.
In the second step observation functionality for the system is modelled. This
functionality enables the system to monitor if a specific actor is fulfilling a specific
goal. To this end, a resource that enables the system to proceed to such a judgement
has to be modelled as well. The developer in cooperation with the stakeholders
identifies the relevant resource for that purpose.
The third and last step includes the modelling of the deterrence functionality for
the system. This functionality will enable the system to compel actors to behave
in a specific way. In particular the developer in cooperation with the stakeholders
has to identify a goal of the dependee that should be denied if the dependee is not
behaving in an expected way. The deterrence functionality along with the goal that
is preventing are modelled.
Figure 4.5: Trustworthiness requirement analysis activityl
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 
1 Activity {kind: phase }: Trustworthiness Requirements Modelling
2 ProcessPerformer {Kind: primary}
3 RoleUse: Requirements Analyst
4 WorkDefinitionParameter {Kind: in}
5 WorkProductUse: List of invalid entailments
6 WorkProductUse: Entailments diagram
7 Work DefinitionParameter {Kind: out}
8 WorkProductUse: List of trust requirements
9 WorkProductUse: Revised system goal diagram
10 WorkProductUse: Revised actor diagram
11 WorkProductUse: Revised actors ’ goal diagrams
12 Steps
13 Step: Trace back unresolved dependencies based on invalid entailments
14 Step: Assign control goal to system
15 Step: Decompose control goal to observation and deterrence goal 
4.5 Activity 5: System trustworthiness assessment
This is the final activity of the JTrust Process, which measures the trustworthi-
ness of the system-to-be. The measurement can be applied for all the actors of the
information system but we believe the most useful approach is to measure the trust-
worthiness of the technical system-to-be. Assessing the system under development
at the requirements stage is beneficial in order to identify potential vulnerabilities
and address them as early as possible. Otherwise, any possible fix at late stage will
cost more resources, such as time and money. Moreover, if potential vulnerabilities
left unidentified and the system is put in operation then it may fail to meet its goals
and users will not accept it. This activity contains four steps: assignment of impor-
tance level to the top level goals, assignment of confidence levels to the bottom level
goals, calculation of the resolution levels, calculation of the system trustworthiness
(Figure 4.6).
In the first step of this activity the top level goals of the system-to-be are assigned
an importance value. The stakeholders are responsible for providing the importance
values to the top level goals of the system-to-be. The range of importance is from
zero to one.
During the second step the lowest level goals are assigned with confidence levels.
The confidence level is one if the system can achieve the goal by itself, zero is the
system cannot achieve the goal by itself, and if the system cannot achieve the goal
by itself but depends on another actor to do so then the confidence level is the
resolution level of the dependency. The confidence values will be propagated to the
higher level goals until the top level goals.
The next step is the calculation of the resolution level of a dependency of the
system-to-be with other actors. The resolution level is calculated according to the
formula described in Section 3.8 (3.1).
The last step of this activity is the calculation of the technical system-to-be
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trustworthiness level. It is calculated based on the formula described in Section 3.8
(3.2).
Figure 4.6: System trustworthiness assessment activity
4.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a process for reasoning about trust relation-
ships, analysing trustworthiness requirements and assessing the trustworthiness of
the system-to-be. Section 4.1 presented the initial activity, which is focused on
modelling the organisation context of the system-to-be and especially to capture
the trust relationships as dependencies. In Section 4.2 the resolution modelling ac-
tivity was described. It concerns with the identification of experiential, reported,
normative, and external trust resolutions and control resolutions of dependencies in
order to offset the uncertainty that the dependencies introduce. In addition, in this
activity the dependencies introduced by reported and control resolutions are iden-
tified along with their resolutions. The next Section, 4.3 described the activity of
entailment modelling. In particular, specific constructive techniques were described
according to which an entailment is derived from each resolution. In addition, it is
pointed out that the validity of the entailments needs to be examined by collecting
relevant evidence. The trustworthiness requirement analysis was described in the
following Section 4.4. The analysis consisted of modelling the trustworthiness re-
quirement and specifying the observation and deterrence functionality required by
the system-to-be in order to enforce the fulfilment of dependencies. Section 4.6 pre-
sented the formulas for measuring the trustworthiness of the technical system-to-be.
The JTrust process is part of the requirements engineering phase of system develop-
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ment. It can be applied along with the elicitation and analysis of other functional
and non-functional requirements. It leads to the identification of trustworthiness re-
quirements that will be added in the requirements specification of the system under
development.
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JTrust tool
If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it
Lord Kevin
In this chapter, we describe JTrust, a Computer Aided Software Engineering
(CASE) tool to support developers in modelling and reasoning about trust relation-
ships and analysing trustworthiness requirements. Also, it automatically assesses the
trustworthiness of the system under development. It has a graphical user interface
and the formulas for the system trustworthiness assessment are fully implemented.
However, the tool is still a prototype and it can certainly be improved and optimised.
First, we describe its architecture and the visual layout of the tool in Section 5.1,
and then we describe the graphical notation of the JTrust concepts along with their
properties in Section 5.2, followed by a description of the functionality of the tool
in Section 5.3.
5.1 Tool architecture
For the implementation of the JTrust tool we used the Eclipse Integrated Envi-
ronment (IDE) . Eclipse is a mature and extensible IDE framework that offers a
powerful and flexible customisation framework. In particular, the implementation
meta-model of our modelling language was defined as an Ecore model using the
Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) . EMF is a modelling framework and code
generation facility for building tools and other applications base on a structured
meta-model. The meta-model is an independent artefact. Being defined using EMF
means that it is decoupled from the code. Our implementation meta-model is shown
in Figure 5.1.
In addition, the Eclipse Graphical Modelling Framework (GMF) was used to
create our graphical editor. GMF builds on top of EMF and the Graphical Editing
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Figure 5.1: Implemenation meta-model
Framework (GEF), to provide a generative component and runtime infrastructure.
GMF build on the principles of Model-Driven Development (MDD), which advocate
the use of design time models as the basis for code generation (Figure 5.2). It offers
a layer of abstraction above the code level to define core properties of editors and the
automatic generation of model editing code. This code is customised and expanded
to support features specific to our proposed methodology. A visual layout of the
JTrust tool is depicted in Figure 5.3.
The main graphical user interface (GUI) consists of the drawing canvas, the
menu bar, the toolbar, and the properties panel. The drawing canvas is the area
where the developer is incrementally constructing her JTrust model, while the menu
bar has the standard functions, such as create new model, open model, save, and
so on. The toolbar contains elements and links that correspond to concepts in the
JTrust meta-model. The tool bar elements are laid out according to when these
concepts might be used in a typical JTrust process.
The JTrust tool was developed in an iterative way. In the first phase, the tool
was used only to model dependency resolutions in order to reflect the initial meta-
model. During later stages, additional concepts, such as types of trust resolutions
and observation and deterrence, were added to the meta-model and the tool was
further developed to support these concepts. As the meta-model became more
elaborate, additional functionality was incorporated into the tool. Further feedback
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Figure 5.2: Model driven architecture
Figure 5.3: JTrust tool visual layout
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about the methodology and the tool was obtained during the evaluation stage.
5.2 Concepts graphical notation
Given the difficulty associated with grasping new concepts and learning new nota-
tions, the tool and its artefacts need to be familiar. Adopting a tool should require
no more cognitive overhead than learning how to use the techniques associated with
JTrust methodology. When new notations are introduced, these need to be parsi-
monious in terms of visual complexity. Therefore, the new graphical notation was
created in order to resemble the existing graphical notations of the actor and goal.
The notations of the concepts used in the JTrust methodology are shown in Fig-
ure 5.4. In the next sections we present the properties of the main concepts of our
proposed methodology.
Figure 5.4: Concepts notation
ACTOR
The actor has two properties (i) the name; (ii) and the trustworthiness (Figure reffig-
actor). The name is the name of the actor specified by the developer, while the tool
computes the trustworthiness of the actor automatically. Its value can range from
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0% to 100%. The tool considers if the actor can achieve his goals and the resolution
levels of the outgoing dependencies on other actors. If this actor represents the
technical system under development then this property shows the trustworthiness
of the system.
Figure 5.5: Actor properties
GOAL
The goal has a number of properties (Figure 5.6). The capability property denotes
whether the actor can achieve the goal or not. The confidence level is automatically
set to 1.0 if the actor can achieve it and to 0.0 if the actor cannot achieve it. In
the latter case if there is also a dependency on another actor then the confidence
level becomes the resolution level of the dependency. If the goal is decomposed
then the confidence level is calculated based on the subgoals confidence levels and
decomposition shares. Additionally, in the case of dependency the correspondence
property shows the corresponding goal of the dependee actor. The decompositions
property shows the decompositions of the goal, while the dependency property shows
the dependency that the goal is part of. The importance property specifies how
important is the goal for the system trustworthiness. The name property shows the
name of the goal, while the super link property shows the decompositions that the
goal is part of.
DECOMPOSITION
The decomposition link has a property AND, which is Boolean, and denotes whether
the decomposition is an AND or OR decomposition (Figure 5.7). The confidence
contribution denotes how much confidence in the achievement of the parent the
subgoal contributes. The value is automatically computed by the tool taking into
account the decomposition share and the confidence level of the subgoal. The decom-
poses property shows the goal that is being decomposed, while the name property
denotes the name of the decomposition. The share property is specified by the de-
veloper and represents the contribution of the subgoal in the achievement of the
parent goal. Finally, the sub property shows the subgoal of the parent goal.
TRUST RESOLUTION
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Figure 5.6: Goal Properties
Figure 5.7: Decomposition Properties
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The trust resolution concept has a name property as usual that denotes the name of
the trust resolution (Figure 5.8). Also, it has a requires property that shows which
entailment is required from the resolution, while the resolves property shows which
dependency is resolved. The last property trustee show who or what is trusted for
the resolution.
Figure 5.8: Trust resolution Properties
CONTROL RESOLUTION
The control resolution concept has a controlee and a controller property to denote
the actor who is being under control and the controller actor respectively (Fig-
ure 5.9). Also, it has a name property to denote the name of the control resolution.
The last two properties are the requires and resolves, which show which entailment
is required by the control resolution and which dependency is resolved by the control
resolution respectively.
Figure 5.9: Control Resolution Properties
ENTAILMENT
The entailment concept has two properties, the name and the valid (Figure 5.10).
The name property denotes the name of the entailment. The valid property is
a Boolean property that is specified by the developer after she has examined its
validity by collecting evidence and denotes whether the entailment is valid or not.
DEPENDENCY LINK
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Figure 5.10: Entailment Properties
The concept of dependency has two properties depender and dependee, which show
the dependee actor and the depender actor of the dependency respectively (Fig-
ure 5.11). Also, it has a dependum property that show goal of the dependency and
a name property that denotes the name of the dependency. The resolution level is
automatically computed by the tool taking into account the confidence level of the
goal of the dependee and the validity of the resolution entailments of the depen-
dency. The last property is the resolutions property, which shows the specified by
the developer resolutions.
Figure 5.11: Dependency Properties
5.3 Trust tool functionality
JTrust tool is a tool for the construction and analysis of JTrust models as part of
the trust analysis of the system under development. The main functionalities of
the CASE tool are to support the modelling activities of the trust process. There-
fore, the tool enables the developer to perform goal and dependency, resolution,
entailment, and trustworthiness requirement modelling. The tool allows developers
to draw JTrust graphical models using a pallete of shapes. Standard features such
a saving, zoom, cut, copy, and paste are provided as well. The tool also checks
the syntactical correctness of a model during its development. For example, if the
developer attempts to connect two concepts, that cannot be connected, with a link,
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then the tool will prevent such action. In addition, the meta-model we presented
contains OCL constraints. The meta-model provides the structure of the JTrust
models, while the OCL constraints restrict the allowed syntax. These constraints
enable to check if the model is well formed.
Furthermore, OCL was used to implement the formulas presented in this thesis.
1. Once the dependencies inside the socio-technical system have been specified
and the entailments of the dependency resolutions have been defined as valid
or invalid by the developer, then there is an algorithm that automatically
calculates the resolution level of the dependency, from which the entailments
originate. The OCL code that implements the formula 3.1 is as follows: 
1 if self.dependum ->isEmpty ()
2 or self.resolutions ->isEmpty ()
3 or self.resolutions ->collect(requires)->isEmpty ()
4 or dependum.ConfidenceLevel =0.0
5 then 0.0
6 else resolutions ->collect(requires)->collect(Valid)->
7 count(true) / resolutions ->size() * dependum.ConfidenceLevel
8 endif 
2. Once the confidence levels of the lowest level goals of an actor have specified
by the actor or automatically by the tool in case of existence of dependencies
during the previous calcluation, then the tool automatically computes the con-
fidence levels of the parent goals until the top level goals. In other words there
is a bottom-up propagation of the confidence levels in the goal structure. The
OCL code that implements the formula is as follows: 
1 if self.decompositions ->notEmpty ()
2 then if decompositions ->collect(AND)->count(false) = 0 then
decompositions ->collect(ConfidenceContribution)->sum()
3 else self.decompositions ->
4 sortedBy(ConfidenceContribution)->last().
ConfidenceContribution
5 endif
6 else if self.Capability
7 then 1.0
8 else if self.correspondence ->isEmpty ()
9 then 0.0
10 else if self.correspondence.dependency.dependum ->
11 isEmpty ()
12 or self.correspondence.
dependency.resolutions ->
13 isEmpty ()
14 or self.correspondence.
dependency.resolutions ->
15 collect(requires)->isEmpty ()
16 or self.correspondence.
ConfidenceLevel =0.0
17 then 0.0
18 else self.correspondence.dependency
.resolutions ->
19 collect(requires)->collect(
Valid)->count(true) /
20 self.correspondence.dependency.
resolutions ->size() *
21 self.correspondence.
ConfidenceLevel
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22 endif
23 endif
24 endif
25 endif 
3. Once the importance levels of the top level goals of an actor have be speci-
fied by the developer, the tool automatically computes the trustworthiness of
the actor. If the actor is the system under development then the trustwor-
thiness value is the trustworthiness of the system-to-be. The OCL code that
implements the formula 3.2 is as follows: 
1 if wants ->notEmpty ()
2 then
3 if self.wants ->select(superLink ->isEmpty ())->
4 collect(Importance)->sum() > 0
5 then (self.wants ->select(superLink ->isEmpty ())->
6 collect(ConfidenceLevel*Importance)->sum()/self.
wants ->
7 select(superLink ->isEmpty ())->collect(Importance)->
8 sum())*100
9 else 1.0
10 endif
11 else 1.0
12 endif 
5.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter the JTrust CASE tool that assists the developer in using the JTrust
methodology was presented. We have described the tool development and the visual
layout of the tool, the graphical notation of the JTrust concepts and their properties,
and the functionality of the tool that enables the developer to construct all the
required models of the methodology and provides automatic computation of the
trustworthiness level of the system under development.
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Evaluation
This chapter focuses on the evaluation of the proposed JTrust methodology, in
particular, assessing the strengths and the weaknesses and demonstrating the ad-
vantages. This part of the research is empirical research that includes research
questions that are focused on the way that the world is and are the last three
research questions of this research:
• RQ4: How well does the methodology support modelling and reasoning about
trust relationships?
• RQ5: How well does the methodology support trustworthiness requirement
modelling and analysis?
• RQ6: How well does the methodology assess the system trustworthiness at a
requirements level?
Therefore this study aims to provide strong support for the validity of the
methodology. We adopted two methods of evaluation for the methodology of this
thesis that are depicted in figure 6.1. The first evaluation method was a confirmatory
qualitative case study to test the developed theory, i.e. the JTrust methodology.
Confirmatory because a case study can be used for both generating and testing
hypotheses (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Seaman, 1999) and the aim was to build a convinc-
ing body of evidence to support the propositions of this thesis. And qualitative
because the assessment was based on the required features that the JTrust method-
ology provided. Furthermore, it included observational and historical data collection
techniques, because relevant data were collected as the project developed and also
from projects that had already been completed.
The case study that was selected was the e-health care services of the National
Health Service (NHS) in England (NHS, 2013a). The NHS e-health services are
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centred on the Summary Care Record (SCR), which envisages improving the safety
and quality of patient care. As of 26/04/2013 almost 27 million records had been
created across England. Having a SCR gives authorised healthcare staff a quicker
way to get important information about the patient, in an emergency or out-of-
hours situation. The SCR is an electronic record which contains information about
the medicines the patient takes, allergies the patient suffers from, and any bad
reactions to medicine the patient the patient had. The case study is appealing for
a number of reasons; they are real, safety critical concerns and involving important
trustworthiness requirements both in terms of security and privacy. Information
might be concerning an abortion, a psychiatric care, or sexual transmitted diseases,
which in case of disclosure can cause social embarrassment, prevent us from getting
a job or influence our medical insurance. Therefore, the case is an appropriate one as
it is a typical and critical case for testing a well-formulated theory because if theory
holds for this case, it is likely to be true for many others. In terms of the validity
of the study, data and method triangulation techniques were used to mitigate any
threats and feel confident in the evaluation.
The evaluation method were chosen according to the selection criteria identified
by the DESMET project (Kitchenham, Linkman, and Law, 1997). So, the confir-
matory case study was selected because the benefits could be observed on a single
project. Moreover, software engineering is a multidisciplinary field involving areas
where case studies normally are conducted, such as psychology, sociology, and po-
litical science. This means that many research objectives in software engineering
research are suitable for case study research (Runeson and Ho¨st, 2009), and that
there was the need to investigate not only methods and tools but also the social and
cognitive processes surrounding them (Easterbrook et al., 2008). In these areas the
objectives are to increase knowledge about personal, social, and political phenomena
in their context, which is similar with our objectives to increase knowledge regarding
the practitioner’s ability, knowledge, understanding, to capture trust relationships
during information systems development. Case study research is appropriate for
situations where the context is expected to play a role in the phenomena.
The second evaluation method was according to Zelkowitz and Wallace (1998)
a quantitative survey. The subjects were academics, researchers, and postgraduate
students that used the methodology and the tool and were asked to provide infor-
mation about the methodology and the tool in order to investigate the quantitative
impact. It included controlled data collection methods, in particular a question-
naire based survey, that provided multiple instances of an observation for statistical
validity of the results. The collected information was then analysed using standard
statistical techniques. The analysis focuses on the methodology’s perceived useful-
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ness and ease of use. The results will be evaluated by a combination of quantitative
and qualitative analysis. The survey was also used for qualitative evaluation, which
was a feature-based evaluation.
Also, the quantitative and qualitative survey methods were selected because
there was availability of participants with experience of using methodologies and
tools and also participants were prepared to learn about new methodologies and
tools. They can confirm that an effect generalises to many projects. Also, this
is a more satisfactory means of evaluation of the benefits than a simple review of
the methodology by the participants. It is also very useful for identifying practical
problems with the methodology, such as ambiguities or missing conditions to name
a few.
Figure 6.1: Evaluation approach
6.1 Study 1: Evaluation of JTrust by case study research
in the health care domain
This chapter reports the experience of conducting a case study on the application
of JTrust methodology in the health care domain in the UK. The goals of this chap-
ter are to evaluate the JTrust methodology and to show that it efficiently enables
practitioners to model and reason about trust relationships and assess the trust-
worthiness of the system under development at a requirements stage. We wanted
to demonstrate JTrust in action, so our preferred evaluation method was a con-
firmatory qualitative case study. A project was selected and monitored, and data
was collected over time. It is used to demonstrate the applicability and the advan-
tages of the methodology and serves as a first test before a more formal validation.
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Therefore, this chapter illustrates and assesses the various techniques described in
the preceding chapters on a real case study of a significant size and complexity.
According to Zelkowitz and Wallace (1998) taxonomy for validating new method-
ologies, this study is using historical data collection methods and as a result it can
also be characterised as literature search based method of validation, as there was
also collection of data from projects that have already been completed and analysis
of papers and other documents that are publicly available. In particular, some con-
clusions were drawn based upon surveys available in the literature and documents
related to the selected case study.
In addition, based on the Zelkowitz and Wallace (1998) taxonomy the study can
also be characterised as an assertion type of case study because the researcher was
both the experimenter and the subject of the study. This was the case because of
time and cost constraints. But, it served as a first step towards a future more formal
evaluation.
The process steps that our case study included were the following (Verner et al.,
2009; Runeson and Ho¨st, 2009; Kitchenham et al., 2002; Wohlin et al., 2012):
• Research initiation. This phase included the defining of the research objectives,
i.e. what to achieve, performing a deep literature review, and decision on the
appropriateness of the case study. The appropriateness was decided based on
the findings form the research objectives and the literature review.
• Case study administration, which dealt with legal, publishing, and schedul-
ing issues. It was an ”ad hoc” phase that was done in parallel with all the
other phases. It included the review of legal agreement, the identification of
publishing criteria, and dealing with partners and their schedules.
• Case study focus, which included activities such as the identification of the
boundaries of the case study. Also, the identification and selection of feasible
cases. The case was expected to be ”typical”, ”critical”, and ”revelatory”.
Also, what documents should be accessed were selected.
• Design case study plan, which includes ensuring strategy for data validity, the
minimisation of the confounding factors, defining the data collection strategy,
process and methods, procedure and protocols, how the results will be analysed
and designing the case study plan step by step.
• Data collection, which basically included observational methods where data
was collected during the development of the project. Furthermore, it included
the collection of data from multiple sources, such as literature search to exam-
ine previously published studies, legacy data to examine to examine data from
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completed projects, static analysis to examine the structure of the developed
product, and lessons learned that examined qualitative data from completed
projects.
• Data analysis. This phase included the evaluation and the conclusion with
respect to the case study. However, as case study methodology is a flexible
design strategy, there is a significant amount of iteration over the steps, and the
data collection and analysis were conducted incrementally. During the whole
process there was constant updating of research notes, and the structure of the
case study report was in the form of a single case study narrative report.
6.1.1 Case study design
CASE STUDY OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the case study were defined in a way to provide answers to the
research questions of the evaluation research and are confirmatory and/or improving.
Therefore the objectives of the case study were to:
O1: Apply the JTrust methodology in the health care domain.
O2: Evaluate the applicability of JTrust methodology for modelling and reasoning
of trust relationships and requirements in health care domain.
O3: Evaluate the applicability of JTrust methodology for assessing the trustwor-
thiness of the system under development at a requirements stage.
O4: Evaluate the efficiency of JTrust methodology.
O5: Improve our understanding about the issues relating to the JTrust methodol-
ogy with the intention of improving it.
CASE SELECTION/CONTEXT - E-HEALTH CARE SERVICE IN
ENGLAND
The case study that was selected was the e-health care services of the National
Health Service (NHS) in England (NHS, 2013a). The project was launched in 2002
and its aim was ”to reform the way that the NHS in England uses information, and
hence to improve services and quality of patient care” (Office, 2011). Central to the
programme was the creation of fully integrated electronic care records system that
is designed to reduce reliance on paper files, make accurate patient records available
at all times, and enable the transmission of information between different parts of
the NHS. The system was intended to comprise a health care record for each NHS
patient that will contain full details of the patient’s medical record and treatment,
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that will be accessible to a patient’s GP and local community and hospital care
settings. Such health care systems will cost less and will be more effective with
the use of healthcare networks (Bangemann et al., 1994). Also, health care services
can significantly be enhanced with the use of the Internet. The program envisages
providing such advance services to patients and the NHS employees and ultimately
to improve the quality of patient care. As the delivery of patient care is now often
shared across a number of NHS clinical or business areas and suppliers, so the
effective linking up and flow of information related to a patient has become even
more important.
The NHS e-health services are centred on the Summary Care Record (SCR).
The SCR envisages improving the safety and quality of patient care. It will give
healthcare staff faster, easier access to reliable information about the patient to
help with his treatment. The patient information was shared by letter, e-mail, fax,
or phone. At times, this could be slow and sometimes things got lost on the way.
As of 26/04/2013 almost 27 million records had been created across England. The
SCR is held nationally, while the Detailed Care Record is held locally at places
that treat the patient regularly, like the GP or the local hospital. Having a SCR
gives authorised healthcare staff a quicker way to get important information about
the patient, in an emergency or out-of-hours situation. The SCR is an electronic
record which contains information about the medicines the patient takes, allergies
the patient suffers from, and any bad reactions to medicine the patient the patient
had. This information could make a difference to how a doctor decides to care
for you, for example which medicines they choose to prescribe for you. It is very
helpful for pharmacists as well to understand the core essential information about
the patient. It is optional for patients to add extra information to their SCR, such
as current illness or care plan. Only health care staff involved in the patient’s care
can see the patient’s SCR. Healthcare staff will only see the information they need
to do their job, and they will ask your permission every time they need to look at
the patient’s SCR. If they cannot ask the patient, for example if he is unconscious,
they may look at the patient’s SCR without his permission. If they do this, they
will make a note on the patient’s record to say why they have done this.
By law, everyone in, or on behalf of, the NHS must respect the patient’s privacy
and keep all the patient’s information safe (NHS, 2011b). If someone accesses the
patient’s record unexpectedly, for example if someone who does not usually treat
the patient looks at his record, an alert will be sent to a member of staff. They
will investigate and, if it is found that this was unreasonable, they will let you
know. To keep the patients information secure and confidential the NHS is employs
several measures. Any member of staff being given access to national systems, which
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hold health information, has a smartcard along with a username and password.
Besides smartcards other measures used are the recording permission to access,
access control, and audit trails.
For the delivery of care record systems the department of health awarded five
10-year contracts to four suppliers: BT in London; Accenture in the East and in the
North East; Computer Sciences Corporation in the North West, and West Midlands;
and Fujitsu in the South. The aim was for care records systems to be delivered
to all NHS trusts and GP practices. Currently, the program, which was called
”National Program for IT” has been dismantled into its separate components parts,
and the revised completion date is 2018 because of difficulties in implementation,
ethical issues that cause delays, and contractual issues. However, the vision remains
for a paperless NHS in UK, under the supervision of a newly set up organisation
called ”Health and Social Care Information Centre”, but with a balance between
standardisation across the NHS and the desire for local ownership and flexibility
(Public Accounts, 2013).
The main purpose of the e-health care services is to make the patients’ data
accessible from anywhere. For this purpose, the patients’ data is going to be stored
nationally. Employees of the NHS, such as GPs, can have access to the patients’ data
in order to provide effective health care. After the patient has been examined the GP
must update the Summary Care Record (SCR), which contains the patients’ data,
and electronically sign the prescription that will enable the patient to collect the
medicine from a pharmacy (Figure 6.2). The GP is allowed to cancel the prescription
at any time until it is dispensed, but when doing so he must inform the patient for the
reason of the cancelation. In addition, the pharmacy needs to electronically confirm
what has been dispensed and to electronically submit endorsement messages to the
reimbursement agency for dispensed prescriptions to support the reimbursement
process.
The case study concerns the patients’ health care record in the health care do-
main, and specifically the former National Program for Information Technology
(NPfIT) in United Kingdom. The case study is appealing for a number of rea-
sons; they are real, safety critical concerns and involving important trustworthiness
requirements both in terms of security and privacy. Information might be concern-
ing an abortion, a psychiatric care, or sexual transmitted diseases, which in case
of disclosure can cause social embarrassment, prevent us from getting a job or in-
fluence our medical insurance. Moreover, there is a lot of history medical privacy
issues such as drug stores providing medical information to marketing companies,
employers taking employment decisions based on medical information, employees
or individuals selling medical information (Rohm and Milne, 2004). This is not the
121
Chapter 6. Evaluation
Figure 6.2: e-Health scenario
case only in Britain, but also in the U.S.A. where the majority of the patients are
concerned with issues varying from use of their medical information for marketing
purposes to identity theft or fraud (McGraw et al., 2009). Therefore, privacy for the
programme is very important and we have to provide assurance for privacy that will
ensure trustworthiness and enable the development of trust by the users. There-
fore, the case is an appropriate one as it is a typical and critical case for testing a
well-formulated theory because if theory holds for this case, it is likely to be true
for many others.
UNIT OF ANALYSIS - A TYPICAL SCENARIO
To assess the effectiveness of the trust process we apply the trust based concepts
and the process in the case of e-health care services of the National Health Service
(NHS) in England. Then the trust relationships will be identified and examined
if the trust assumptions are justified. If not, then additional functionality will be
proposed to make the system trustworthy. Also, towards the end, there was an
assessment of the system trustworthiness with the intention the system to be as
trustworthy as possible.
The technical system under development for the NHS will be interacting with
other components of that whole information system, either human or technical.
These interactions constitute dependencies between the system and the other com-
ponents and vice versa. The unit of analysis is the dependency between the technical
system and other components of the information system. As there were multiple
dependencies there were multiple instances of this unit of analysis. Another unit
of analysis will the identification of trustworthiness requirements. Similarly, there
were multiple instances of this unit of analysis. The last unit of analysis was the
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assessment of trustworthiness of the system under development.
DATA COLLECTION METHODS
Several methods of data collection were used in the case study (Figure 6.3).
The developed diagrams using the JTrust methodology were collected, along with
qualitative notes that were taken on those diagrams. Also, documents related with
the existing development of the NHS system were collected. Also, information
was gathered by discussing with staff from BT. Finally, documents related to past
surveys were collected.
Figure 6.3: Case study collection methods
DATA ANALYSIS METHODS
The existing functionalities of the NHS system were compared with the identified
functionalities using the JTrust methodology. Then, there was an evaluation of
the non-quantifiable benefits of the JTrust methodology by gathering qualitative
information from the comparison.
CASE STUDY VALIDITY
The validity of the study is discussed in this section, since it could not be finally
evaluated until the analysis step. There are four aspects of validity (Runeson and
Ho¨st, 2009; Wohlin et al., 2012; Easterbrook et al., 2008).
Construct validity was focused on whether the operational measures for the
concepts being studied were correct. Therefore, to improve construct validity the
operational measures with regards to the confidence in the fulfilment of a system
dependency were developed by using multiple sources of evidence, such as literature
and expert opinion.
Our case study was by nature comparative. We tried to reduce the expectation
bias on the case study results by identifying a valid basis for assessing the results.
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To this end, we compared the actual implementation of the NHS e-health system
developed with another method and the potential implementation of the NHS e-
health system developed with our proposed method. Therefore, we improved the
internal validity as we compared our proposed method while using the same infor-
mation system. Furthermore, the comparison was on the basis of identifying the
system dependencies and contrasting whether there has been any reasoning about
their fulfilment.
External validity focuses on whether our claims for the generality of the results
are justified. To ensure external validity we used data triangulation to limit the
effects of one interpretation of one single data source, data were collected from mul-
tiple sources. So, in terms of gathering information about the NHS System various
data were collected from documents from BT, NHS England, UK Department of
Health, and research publications about the NHS e-health system. Based on this
data the JTrust models were constructed and used as a data source. This way the
conclusions reached are stronger than conclusions based on a single source. Data
triangulation ensured the external validity of our case study, which justified the
generalisation of our results.
Another validity concern is the representativeness of the selected case study,
which ensured the external validity of our case study. An e-health information sys-
tem was selected, as it is a typical information system, which his trustworthiness
depends a lot on other interacting entities such as a doctor. Also, its trustworthi-
ness is of paramount importance because it has serious consequences on citizens’
health. Furthermore, when we chose the system dependencies of our case study we
applied theoretical sampling in order to capture all possible variations of a depen-
dency resolution and gain a deeper understanding. Therefore, among the selected
dependencies there were dependencies resolved by control, dependencies resolved
by trust, and dependencies that were not resolved and we identified and analysed
trustworthiness requirements. Theoretical sampling of the system dependencies was
also a way to ensure data triangulation of our case study and ensured its external
validity.
Reliability focuses on whether the case study yields the same results if another
developer replicates it. Triangulation, developing and maintaining a detailed case
study protocol, spending sufficient time with the case ensured a certain level of
similarity of results and improved the validity of the study. However, due to the fact
that the trust analysis is carried out from the perspective of the developer it is very
natural that the results can differ in certain aspects. In particular, when reaching
the stage to decide the type of resolution of a dependency, another developer can
identify the same control, normative trust, or external trust resolutions as these
124
Chapter 6. Evaluation
resolutions are related with the system environment and they are not related to the
developer. On the hand resolutions, such as experiential trust and reported trust are
strongly related with the individual developer. As a result, another developer might
not resolve a dependency with an experiential trust or reported trust resolution
because he might not have a direct experience with the trustee or not know the
reporter respectively. This can also occur vice versa, for example another developer
might identify an experiential trust resolution for a dependency while we didn’t
because we didn’t have any direct experience with the trustee.
In addition, method triangulation was used to improve the external validity.
The first data collection method was observation, a direct kind of method, where
there was direct contact and real time data collection. Observation was conducted
in order to investigate how a certain task is conducted by a practitioner. The
advantage of the observation data collection technique was that it provided a deep
understanding of the phenomenon that was studied. The second data collection
method was a documentation analysis of archival data. It included the analysis of
work artefacts which were already available. One disadvantage of such kind of data
collection technique was that the documents were created for another purpose that
that of the research study, so it is not certain if the requirements on data validity
and completeness were the same.
6.1.2 Data collection - Applying the JTrust methodology
We apply the JTrust methodology. This entails that there is already a scenario
and requirements from the stakeholders. There have already been discussions with
domain experts. Therefore, at this stage of the system development the JTrust
methodology can be applied to model the NHS system requirements to model and
reason about the trust relationships and assess the trustworthiness of the NHS sys-
tem. We performed the role of the requirements analyst to carry out the following
steps of the methodology. The identified trust relationships are between the require-
ments analyst and the various entities with which the system is interacting.
ACTIVITY 1: DEPENDENCY ANALYSIS
From the scenario, we identify the following main actors, Patient, GP, Pharma-
cist, NHS England, Health and Social Care Information Centre and NHS System.
We carried out discussions with domain experts and studied organisation documents
that were publicly available. These documents were describing the structure of the
NHS in England and its policies.
• Patient: The patient is a person who wants to receive health care service in
England (NHS, 2013b). This includes access to local services such as the GP,
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hospital or clinic, or health improvement services provided by the patient’s
local community . In addition, the patient wants his information to be kept
confidential and his privacy to be respected. This does not mean that his
information will not be shared but it does mean that it will only be shared
with his agreement (consent) or if there is another legal basis. Also, the patient
can choose the GP practice that he would like to register. The patient can
also nominate a pharmacy from where he wants to collect his medicines. The
patient has an NHS number that is the only National Unique Patient Identifier,
used to help healthcare staff and service providers match the patient with his
health record. Everyone registered with the NHS in England and Wales has his
own NHS number. The NHS number acts as the key to unlocking services such
as Choose and Book and the Electronic Prescription Service. A patient should
know his NHS number as this can help those treating him to find his records
more quickly and share them more safely with other health care professionals.
• NHS England: The NHS England is an independent body, at arm’s length
to the UK government (NHS England). The main aim of the NHS England
is to improve the health outcomes for people in England by commissioning
primary care and specialist services and to oversee the operation of clinical
commissioning groups, which include GP practices and NHS hospitals.
• Health and Social Care Information Centre: HSCIC is the UK national
provider of information, data and IT systems for health and social care (NHS,
2013a). It supports the delivery of IT infrastructure, information systems, and
standards to ensure that information flows efficiently and securely across the
health and social care system, in order to improve patient outcomes. It can be
directed by the secretary of state or NHS England.
• NHS System: It is a group of systems that offer health care services. Some
of them are the following (NHS, 2013a):
– Automatic Identification and data capture (AIDC), which is the use of
machine readable codes such as barcodes and Radio Frequency ID tags.
It intends to improve patient identification, medical record tracking, phar-
macy services, and asset management.
– Choose and Book, which is a national electronic referral service which
gives patients a choice of place, date and time for their first outpatient
appointment in a hospital or clinic.
– Electronic Prescription Service (EPS), which enables prescribers, such as
GP’s and practice nurses, to send prescriptions electronically to a dis-
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penser, such as a pharmacy, of the patient’s choice. This makes the pre-
scribing and dispensing process more efficient and convenient for patients
and staff.
– GP2GP, which enables patient’s electronic health records to be transferred
directly and securely between GP practices.
– NHS e-Referral Service, which improves the quality of the referral experi-
ence for patients and better support business processes for clinicians and
administrative staff.
– NHSmail, which is a secure email service and its purpose is for sharing
patient identifiable and other sensitive information.
– Picture Archiving and Communications System (PACS), which enables
x-ray and scan images to be stored electronically and viewed on screens,
helping to improve diagnosis methods.
– Registration Authorities and Smartcards, which are used by health pro-
fessionals for secure access to confidential information, as governed by
registration authorities.
– Summary Care Record (SCR) (NHS, 2011a; NHS, 2012b). A patient’s
SCR contains essential health information about any medicines, allergies,
and adverse reactions derived from their GP record. Where a patient and
their doctor wish to add additional information to the patient’s SCR, this
should only be added with the explicit consent of the patient. Once SCRs
are created, authorised NHS healthcare staff in urgent and emergency
care settings that need access to the information will view these records
when delivering clinical care. Figure 6.4 shows how the SCR looks (NHS,
2012a).
– Spine, which provides the infrastructure that enables increased patient
safety, improved quality of healthcare, greater clinical effectiveness, and
better administrative efficiency. Its role is to support all the previous
services, by providing a central repository of SCRs that can be shared with
NHS staff, a national repository of NHS organisations and all registered
users, authentication of staff access, and supports a single NHS number as
a unique identifier facilitating the safe, efficient, and accurate sharing of
patient information across organisational and system boundaries within
the NHS.
• General Practitioner (GP): The General Practitioner is a doctor who works
in primary care (NHS Careers). They are the first point of contact for most
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patients. The bulk of the work is carried out during consultations in the surgery
and during home visits. GPs provide a complete spectrum of care within the
local community, such as dealing with problems that often combine physical,
psychological, and social components. GPs call on an extensive knowledge of
medical conditions to be able to assess a problem and decide on the appropriate
course of action. They know how and when to intervene, through treatment,
prevention and education, to promote the health of their patients and families.
Most GPs are independent contractors to the NHS. This independence means
that in most cases, they are responsible for providing adequate premises from
which to practise and for employing their own staff.
• Pharmacist: A pharmacist is an expert in medicines and their use (NHS Ca-
reers). The majority of pharmacists practice in hospital pharmacy, community
pharmacy, or in primary care pharmacy, working to ensure that patients get
the maximum benefit from their medicines. They advise medical and nursing
staff on the selection and appropriate use of medicines. They are responsi-
ble for dispensing medicines, and clarify with GPs and other prescribers that
dosages are correct. In addition, provide information to patients on how to
manage their medicines to ensure optimal treatment, for example, making sure
that patients are aware of potential side effects. Finally, Pharmacists can also
give advice to members of the public on how to improve their health and
well-being.
Once we had gathered as much information as we could from the domain, we
constructed the system under development goal model. By system, we mean the
information system for NHS that includes the aforementioned services that establish
a paperless national health service. We do this in order to model the goals of the
system under development and to identify which of them can be accomplished by
the system itself and for which ones the system is depending on other entities. It
was vital to examine this, as these dependencies are a potential threat to the system
trustworthiness. The NHS system goal diagram was constructed using the JTrust
tool and is depicted in Figure 6.5.
The high level goal of the NHS system is to provide e-Health Services
to patients and health care professionals. This high level goal was decomposed
into smaller and more specific subgoals, which in turn they were decomposed into
smaller subgoals. Therefore, the high level goal of the system under development is
to provide e-health care services. This goal has a number of subgoals as depicted
in Figure 6.5. The most important goal is Update SCR as it is essential that the
SCRs have up-to-date and accurate information about the patient. All the subgoals
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Figure 6.4: Summary care record of a patient
of the high level goal e-Health Services have an equal share of contribution 0.1,
apart from the most important subgoal SCR which has 0.2. Hence, the ”share”
property of the decomposition links is set accordingly. The Referral subgoal has in
turn two subgoals, the Choose and Book and the e-Referral. Both of the goals
have an equal share of contribution to their parent goal, so the ”share” property of
their decomposition link is 0.5. Also, the SCR goal has subgoals as well. These
are the Create SCR, View SCR, Update SCR, and Additional Information,
which have an equal amount of share to their parent goal so their ”share” property
is 0.25. The Additional Information goal has two further subgoals Get Consent
and Add Information with an equal amount of contribution so the ”share” prop-
erty of their decomposition link is 0.5. The EPS has EPS Prescriber and EPS
Dispenser as subgoals with and equal amount of contribution 0.5. The EPS Pre-
scriber has four subgoals, the Prescription Tracker, Dispenser Nomination,
Sign Prescription, and Cancel Prescription with an equal amount of contribu-
tion 0.25. The EPS Dispenser has two subgoals, the Download Prescription
and Confirm Medicine with an equal amount of contribution 0.5. In other words
the system goal diagram is a hierarchy of goals of the NHS system along with their
relative importance in the hierarchy. Constructing the system goal diagram is vital
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in order to identify the goals that can be achieved solely by the system itself and
the ones that cannot.
Figure 6.5: NHS System goal diagram
The next step is to examine each goal and decide whether the goals can be
achieved by the system itself or it requires interacting with other actors of the system
domain. Our focus is on three goals, the Update SCR, Sign Prescription, and
Confirm Dispense, which cannot be fulfilled by the system itself unless it interacts
with other entities of the system domain. The rest of the goals are considered as
goals that can be fulfilled by the system. Thus, using the tool we change the
capability property of the goals to false where needed(Figure 6.6). This represents
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that the system cannot fulfil the aforementioned goals and the confidence level in the
fulfilment of the goals is 0. For example, in order the patient’s summary care record
to be updated and accurate it requires the contribution from the GP. After a GP
has examined a patient then he needs to update the patient’s SCR. Only then, the
NHS system can be trustworthy by maintaining updated and accurate SCRs. Up
to this stage, by consulting the JTrust tool the trustworthiness of the system to be
is 97.5%. Thus, for the non-achievable goals the interacting actors that contribute
to the goal’s fulfilment need to be identified.
Figure 6.6: Modifying the capability property of a goal
In the system domain there are other actors that can fulfil the goals that the
system is incapable of fulfilling by itself, so the appropriate correspondences need
to be modelled. To this end, the goal diagrams of the candidate actors need to
be constructed. For the goals Update SCR and Sign Prescription the can-
didate actor is the GP, who can update the SCR and also sign the prescription
after he has examined a patient. For the goal Confirm Dispense the candidate
actor is the Pharmacist. Thus, the goal diagrams for the aforementioned actors
are constructed and the appropriate correspondence links are added between the
corresponding goals of the NHS System and the GP and the Pharmacist as
show in Figure 6.7. Once added, the JTrust tool automatically added the respective
dependency links of the NHS System on the GP and the Pharmacist.
The NHS system’s goals that cannot be accomplished by the system itself,
were modelled as dependencies on other interacting actors. Figure 6.8 depicts the
modelled dependences by the JTrust tool. These are the following:
• The NHS System depends on the GP to Update SCR after the examination
of patients.
• The NHS System depends on the GP to electronically Sign Prescription.
All prescribers need to apply advanced electronic signatures to prescriptions.
These advanced electronic signatures are unique to individual users and are
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Figure 6.7: Correspondences links between NHS System and GP and Pharmacist
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applied using their smartcard or passcode.
• The NHS System depends on the Pharmacist to confirm that the medicine
has been dispensed to the Patient.
Figure 6.8: NHS System dependencies
The modelled dependencies represent the means with which the system can fulfil
its goals and be trustworthy for the stakeholders. Nevertheless, they represent just
assumptions, hence they require further attention.
The modelled dependencies of the system on other entities of the system domain
constitute a potential threat to the NHS system trustworthiness. The system is
required to be trustworthy, but if the dependencies are not fulfilled when the system
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is put in operation, then it will not be trustworthy. In particular, if the GP does
not constantly update the SCR then the SCR will not be updated and accurate
and the system is not trustworthy in terms of holding and updated and accurate
SCR. If the GP does not sign the prescription, the system will not be able to show
the prescription to the Pharmacist in order to dispense the patient’s medicine in
time, thus the system is not trustworthy in terms of showing the prescription to
the Pharmacist. If the Pharmacist does not confirm the dispensing of the medicine,
the system will not have an accurate record of the medicines taken by the patient,
thus the system is not trustworthy again. Moving on and implementing the system
without investigating further these dependencies by identifying ways to remove the
uncertainties at this stage, will result in a system that has the risk of not being
trustworthy.
ACTIVITY 2: RESOLUTION ANALYSIS
To build confidence that the NHS system dependencies on other entities will be
fulfilled and the NHS system will be trustworthy, trust and control resolutions of the
modelled dependencies need to be found. Each one of the identified dependencies
from the previous activity constitutes a potential vulnerability to the system because
there is uncertainty whether they will be fulfilled. To remove the uncertainty the
dependencies must be resolved either by trust or control. The dependency on the
GP to Update SCR is resolved by Control. This means that at this stage there
is the assumption that the NHS England is controlling the GP to update the
SCR after the examination of a patient. The dependency on the GP to electron-
ically Sign Prescription is resolved by Normative Trust. Initial information
suggests that it is a norm in the health care domain of England that the GPs sign
the prescriptions in time. The dependency on the Phamacist to Confirm Dis-
pense of the medicine to the Patient is resolved by Normative Trust. Similarly,
it is considered a norm that the Pharmacists confirm the dispensing of medicines
to the patients. For the specific dependencies the resolutions are shown in Fig-
ure 6.9. These resolutions are just assumptions at the specific stage of the software
development process and they were based on initial domain information. However,
the introduction of a new dependency on the NHS England raises the question of
whether NHS England will actually do this once the system is implemented.
The reliance of the NHS System on the NHS England to control the GP
introduces a new dependency on the NHS England. The system can be considered
trustworthy as long as NHS England has the control means to force the GP to
Update the SCR. As a result the System will be trustworthy because it will
constantly have an updated and accurate record. Consequently, there is a new
dependency, i.e., the NHS System depends on the NHS England to control the
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Figure 6.9: First iteration of resolution analysis
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GP. In the developed model, the NHS England actor is added and its goal diagram
is constructed that will contain the goal Control GP as shown in Figure 6.10.
On the other hand normative trust type of resolutions do not introduce any new
dependency.
The newly introduced dependency on the NHS England is a potential vulnera-
bility for the system and needs to be resolved as well. So, the dependency is resolved
by External Trust, i.e., the UK Government states that the NHS controls the
GP. That is why there is no further introduction of new dependencies, but there
is a need now to examine what are the entailments that derived from the identified
resolutions.
ACTIVITY 3: ENTAILMENT ANALYSIS
The identified resolutions point out the underlying trust relationships. From the
resolutions we need to identify the entailments, which represent the existing trust
assumptions about the trust relationships in the e-health care socio-technical system
that are underlying our analysis.
The developed model for the analysis of the entailments is shown in Figure 6.11.
So, the control resolution NHS England controls GP to update SCR required
an entailment that NHS England can was trusted to control the GP. The
external trust resolution, i.e., UK government states that NHS England con-
trols the GP, required an entailment that UK government was trusted for
what it was stating. Then the normative trust resolution that GP signs the pre-
scription required an entailment that the environment norm was trusted for
GP to sign the prescription. The normative trust resolution that Pharmacist
confirms the medicine required an entailment that the environment norm
was trusted for the Pharmacist to do so. These entailments would have an
impact on the trustworthiness of the developed system and their validity needed
justification.
The next step was to justify if the entailments were valid or not and to modify
their ”Valid” property accordingly as shown in Figure 6.12. The entailments by
default were set as false unless we found evidence that proved the opposite. For the
entailment that the environment norm was trusted for the GP to sign pre-
scriptions was true as there was history of evidence that supported this assumption.
However, for the entailment that environment norm was trusted for the phar-
macist to confirm the medicine given to the patient there was evidence, i.e.,
history of events that showed the opposite. Therefore this is not a valid entailment
and as a consequence the dependency between the system and pharmacist may not
be fulfilled. In addition, for the entailment that UK Government is trusted for
stating that NHS controls the GP to update the SCR it is false as there
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Figure 6.10: Second iteration of resolution analysis
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is not sufficient evidence that UK Government is trusted in the context of health
care. Therefore, the entailment that NHS is trusted to control the GP becomes
invalid as well. The invalid entailments represented trust assumptions about trust
relationships on which the further development of the NHS system would have been
based. Eventually they would have become potential vulnerabilities of the system.
Thus, additional requirements were added to the functionality of the system to en-
sure the fulfilment of dependencies and as a consequence the trustworthiness of the
NHS system.
ACTIVITY 4: TRUSTWORTHINESS REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS
This activity considered the invalid entailments of the entailment analysis. Such
entailments originated from dependencies that were not resolved and constituted
a potential vulnerability to the trustworthiness of the developed NHS system, as
there was no confidence that the dependencies would have been fulfilled once the
system was developed and put into operation. As a result, there was the need to
identify new resolutions to feel confident in the fulfilment of the dependencies. The
new resolutions were control resolutions where the NHS system would act as the
controller and force actors to fulfil their dependencies.
Therefore new resolutions were necessary for the dependencies between the NHS
System and the GP and between the NHS System and the Pharmacist as shown
in Figure 6.13. For the first case of the dependency between the System and the GP
there was new system functionality added, which consisted of two trustworthiness
requirements:
i) The NHS System shall examine whether the SCR of a patient has been accessed
and updated.
ii) The NHS System shall prevent the issue of a prescription from the GP unless
he has updated the patient’s SCR.
Between the two requirements, the first one was observation and the second one
deterrence.
For the second case, new functionality was added, which consisted of three trust-
worthiness requirements:
i) A pharmacist shall input the medicine given to the patient to the NHS system.
ii) The NHS System shall verify whether the pharmacist provides the exact medicine
to the patient.
iii) The NHS System shall prevent the pharmacist from issuing a receipt if the
pharmacist does not provide accurate medicine.
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Figure 6.11: Entailments analysis
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Figure 6.12: Entailments validation
Among the three requirements, first two were observation and third one was deter-
rence.
Therefore, through observation and deterrence requirements the system enforces
the fulfilment of the dependency on the pharmacist to confirm the medicine given to
the patient and the fulfilment of the dependency on the GP to update the patient’s
SCR.
ACTIVITY 5: NHS SYSTEM TRUSTWORTHINESS ASSESSMENT
At any stage, the JTrust tool automatically assessed the NHS system trustwor-
thiness. Before the trust analysis the trustworthiness was at 91.25% as shown in
Figure 6.14. When the trustworthiness requirements were added to the system the
trustworthiness became 100%.
6.1.3 Data analysis - Evaluation results and discussion
Our experience in using the JTrust methodology presented in the thesis for the
NHS System revealed a number of issues that are worth pointing out. The richness
of the trust issues in the case study gave us confidence that we had succeeded in
our aim to develop a trustworthy information systems development methodology.
In general the results of the evaluation were favourable. There was a qualitative
analysis of the data collected in the previous step. The objective of the analysis was
to derive conclusions from the data, keeping a clear chain of evidence. The chain
of evidence means that the reader should be able to follow the derivation of the
results and conclusions from the collected data. To this end, sufficient information
from each step of the methodology application and decision taken was presented
in the previous section. During the case study we made a number of observations
and these observations contributed to the evaluation of our methodology. In this
regards, the main observations were the following:
• The methodology provides a useful systematic way to identify and
model direct and indirect trust relationships: This systematic way is of
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Figure 6.13: Trustworthiness requirement analysis
Figure 6.14: Trustworthiness level before and after the trust analysis
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high importance especially when the success of the information system under
development will depend on the strength of such trust relationships. Con-
structing a model of an information system includes modelling of entities that
are free to behave however they want, such as humans and third party software.
These are trust relationships that underlie the information system and the de-
veloper cannot easily identify them. The modelling of direct and indirect trust
relationships makes them explicit and brings them into focus. For example,
our model of the case study included a dependency on the GP to update the
SCR, which was not clear to the developer that it is also a trust relationship
with the GP. Moreover, the indirect trust relationship on the NHS England
it would have been difficult to identify. Therefore, identifying the underlying
trust relationships, both direct and indirect, is a necessary first step towards
the implementation of a successful information system.
• The methodology successfully enables the developer to reason about
trust relationships: This structured way is also important especially in situ-
ations where the development team consists of members with different cultural
backgrounds and perceptions about trust. Employing JTrust’s structured way
of reasoning about trust relationships, i.e. experiential trust, reported trust,
normative trust, external trust, it is easier for the development team to explain
why they believe that a trust relationship will be realised. For example, when
the model of our case study included the dependency on the GP to update
the SCR and to sign the prescription, it was hard to explain why she would
actually do it once the system was developed. With structure reasoning about
trust relationships becomes clear where such development decisions are based.
• The methodology successfully enables the identification, modelling,
and analysis of trustworthiness requirements: The methodology enables
the developer to identify trustworthiness requirements, by recognizing func-
tionality that is required to ensure the system trust trustworthiness and to
model trustworthiness requirements by associating system functionality with
specific system dependencies in which there is lack of confidence that they
will be fulfilled once the system is in operation. In addition, JTrust provides
a systematic way for the developer to analyse trustworthiness requirements
by examining them in detail and discovering essential features, such as ob-
servation and deterrence functionalities. For example, in case of the system
dependency on the GP to update the Summary Care Record there was not
trust that he will do it, so a trustworthiness requirement was identified and
modelled. That trustworthiness requirement was analysed and consisted of an
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observation functionality to examine whether a SCR has been accessed and
updated and a deterrence functionality to prevent the issue of prescription
unless the SCR has been updated.
• The methodology successfully enables the identification of situations
where there is a trade-off between trust and control: The more the de-
veloper trusts the entities that are interacting with the technical system that
he is developing the less stringent the system requirements are that force the
interacting entities to behave in a desired by the developer way. These situa-
tions are implicit and not clearly visible to the developer. However, employing
JTrust such situations are discovered and become explicit. The developer is
able to comprehend the different alternatives between trust and control and
consider the benefits, risks, and implications of her decisions to the system
under development. For example, in the case of system dependency on the
GP to sign the prescription was resolved because there was normative trust
that made us confident that the GP will actually do that once the system is
put in operation. However, even if there was not enough trust the developer
could have considered not to add any extra trustworthiness requirement as this
would have increased the complexity of the system, decreased its usability for
the GP and it would have outweighed the benefits. The introduction to the
software system control measures because of luck of trust, it will have a neg-
ative effect. The control measures will result in a less usable software system
and also they will decrease its performance. The negative effect is not only
limited to the usability and performance of the system, but it will also affect
other non-functional requirements, e.g. usability or availability.
• The methodology successfully provides an early assessment of the
trustworthiness level: This assessment is reasonably beneficial during the
early development. It provides the advantage of identifying early potential
threats to system trustworthiness in order to be mitigated. Therefore, the
system development is based on strong foundations that will help develop a
successful system. Otherwise, the development of the system is based on the
wrong assumptions and can lead to a potential failure of the developed system
or cost a vast amount of resources, such as time and money, in order to fix
them. For example, in the case of system dependency on the GP to update the
SCR, if there was no trustworthiness requirement the GP would not have been
updating the SCR, and as a result the system would not have been trustworthy
because it would not possess a patient’s medical record that is accurate and
updated.
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• There is an overhead of modelling elements and activities: First, when
the project focuses on a large number of system dependencies, the efforts for
developing and maintaining the models are considered high. In particular,
JTrust needs more effort in analysing the dependencies and constructing res-
olutions and entailments models. The models were often becoming too big
which constituted them less readable.
• Additional guidelines are needed regarding the validation of the en-
tailments: The methodology identifies entailments, which are conditions of
trust relationships on which the system development is based. Therefore, these
entailments require validation. JTrust provides some general guidelines that
evidence needs to be collected, such as historical data or testimonials from
various stakeholders. However, more guidelines could have been helpful for
the developer.
6.2 Study 2: Evaluation of JTrust methodology by survey
research
An important category of empirical study is that of the survey, where expert indi-
viduals that have used specific methods or tools on projects are asked to provide
information about the method or the tool (Kitchenham, Linkman, and Law, 1997).
Then the information collected from the survey is analysed using standard statistical
techniques. We adopted the survey method as way to further evaluate our JTrust
methodology and confirm, strengthen, and further generalise our research claims
about the efficacy and usefulness of our methodology.
The survey included both oﬄine and online phases. Expert individuals, including
academic and industry researchers, performed a trial of our proposed methodology
using a simulated case study and then they answered the online questionnaires after
an evaluation has been completed. Throughout this thesis we will use the term
”user” for those expert individuals as they were the users of the methodology. The
evaluation study was both a quantitative and qualitative survey. On one hand it
was quantitative because it was an investigation of the number of researchers that
they were agreeing with the statements presented to them. And on the other hand
it was qualitative because there was a feature-based evaluation carried out by users
who had studied and had experience of the methodology. Users assessed the extent
to which the methodology and the tool provide the required features in as usable
and effective manner based on personal opinion. The survey approach is depicted
in Figure 6.15.
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The goal of the survey was to build up ”weight of evidence” to support our
claims and confirm the propositions that were generated from the data of the pre-
vious evaluation through the case study. In particular, to collect enough data from
sufficient number of subjects, i.e. the users, all adhering to the same treatment, i.e.
our proposed methodology, in order to obtain a statistically significant result on the
attribute of concern compared to some other treatment, i.e. the methodologies that
users were using at their institution.
Figure 6.15: Survey approach
6.2.1 Survey design
SURVEY OBJECTIVES
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The survey objectives are to answer the research questions of the evaluation
study RQ4, RQ5, and RQ6. Therefore, the following research objectives were de-
fined in order to address the research questions of the evaluation study, which used
perception-based measures and performance based measures.
O1: Measure to what extent the methodology enables the user to model and reason
about trust relationships during information systems development (perceived
efficacy).
O2: Measure to what extent the methodology enables the user to model and analyse
trustworthiness requirements during information systems development (per-
ceived efficacy).
O3: Measure to what extent the methodology enables the user to assess system
trustworthiness at a requirements level (perceived efficacy).
O4: Measure the ease of use of the methodology (perceived efficiency).
O5: Measure the actual effectiveness of the methodology by evaluating how well
the participants perform the evaluation exercise. The evaluation will be in
terms of validity and completeness of the developed models.
SUBJECTS
To evaluate our methodology we organised four lab sessions, each one at a dif-
ferent research institution and invited groups of users to apply our methodology on
a scenario. The specific institutions were selected based on judgmental and conve-
nience sampling, because of their research speciality, which can bring more accurate
results, and because of the ease of recruiting them, their accessibility to us, and the
availability of limited resources. The users who participated in the sessions had al-
ready experience with software development methodologies and especially the ones
from the academic institutions were familiar with virtual learning environments. In
particular the lab sessions were organised at the following institutions:
• University of East London, UK. Its Software Systems Engineering Research
Group is focussed on applied software engineering in an industrial context,
where distributed systems engineering and secure systems engineering are es-
sential concerns. It contributes to the fundamentals of software engineering
through its research on architectures, evolution, requirements and reuse.
• British Telecom, UK. Its Security Futures Practice is conducting research in
three broad areas: securing the converged network; security the virtual organ-
isation; security management framework; In securing the virtual organisation
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trust is essential in any form of communication and especially in securing rela-
tionships between enterprises. BT’s researchers are exploring the development
of systems that can enable the appropriate sharing of information assets while
protecting them from external software attacks and physical theft.
• University of the Aegean, Greece. Its postgraduate program on cultural in-
formatics includes a module where students learn how to analyse and design
cultural systems that ensure the security and privacy of information. The
students had experience with goal modelling techniques.
• University of Castile-La Mancha University, Spain. Its Institute of Informatics
Technologies and Systems is to enhance research in different areas of Computer
Engineering in order to develop and transfer to the organisations, information
systems and technologies that contribute to the progress and well being of so-
ciety. The ITSI has over 70 researchers with great experience in both basic and
applied research. Researchers develop their work in eight groups addressing
different research lines related to technology and information systems.
In total there were thirty-two users who voluntarily took part in the four lab
sessions. More specifically, six were from the University of East London, seven from
British Telecom, twelve from the University of the Aegean, and five from the Univer-
sity of Castile-La Mancha. Among the users were academics, industry researchers,
research students and postgraduate students. Five users had more than fifteen years
of experience in software engineering, seven users had experience between six to fif-
teen years, and the rest of the users had experience in software engineering up to five
years. Also, the majority of the users were experienced in security engineering, while
there were some users that had experience in trust engineering, risk analysis, soft-
ware protection, privacy analysis, dependability analysis, and quality assessment.
Almost, all users were familiar with UML, while there were some users that were
also familiar with iStar modelling language, Secure Tropos, and PriS.
ETHICS PROTOCOL
During the study the guidelines from the European Code of Conduct for Research
Integrity (Drenth, 2012) were followed. More specifically, subjects were informed
fully about the purpose, methods, and intended possible uses of the research, what
their participation in the research entails. Also, the subjects voluntarily participated
in the research study and provided their consent. In addition, the confidentiality of
any sensitive information supplied by subjects and their anonymity was respected
and preserved.
LOCATION
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The evaluation sessions were carried out at the locations of the institutions. Lab
rooms were used in the case of academic institutions, while a meeting room was
used in the case of BT.
TOOLS
For the case of academic institutions the labs included personal computers with
Microsoft Windows XP operating system, while for the case of BT the users brought
their BT laptops with them. Furthermore, a web link was provided to the users in
order to download the JTrust tool. The link included versions of the JTrust tool for
the Microsoft Windows operating system and the MacOS operating system.
TRAINING
Since JTrust is a new methodology and the users were not familiar with it, a
forty-five minute presentation of the JTrust methodology was carried out in order
to provide training to the users. The presentation did not include any general in-
formation regarding trust in software engineering, but it was very focused on the
methodology. It explained the goal of the methodology, its concepts, the process,
and the calculations regarding the resolution levels of a dependency and the system
trustworthiness. At the end of the methodology presentation users’ questions were
answered and the scenario on which the users applied the JTrust methodology was
described. The scenario was about the development of a trustworthy Virtual Learn-
ing Environment (VLE). A VLE is a system for delivering learning materials to
students via the web. These systems include assessment, student tracking, collab-
oration, and communication tools. They can be accessed both on and off-campus,
meaning that they can support students’ learning outside the lecture hall 24 hours
a day, seven days a week.
TASKS
After the description of the scenario the users were asked to carry out a trust
analysis of the system of the scenario and the following task were given to the users:
• Model trust relationships and identify the underlying trust assumptions about
such those trust relationships.
• Identify and model trustworthiness requirements.
• Assess the trustworthiness of the system at a requirements level.
To this end, the users had to construct the respective JTrust models and the dura-
tion for the completion of the task was one hour. Moreover, specific functionality
regarding the VLE was given to the users in order not to spend time on the system
requirements but focus the trustworthiness aspect of VLE analysis. In particular,
students, as users of the VLE, should be able to carry out the following actions:
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• Access any academic material related to their course.
• View their coursework group members and be able to collaborate.
• Access any administration forms or informational documents related to their
studies.
• Access and modify the personal information of their student record.
• Access their academic student record (grades, attendance, registered courses).
DATA COLLECTION METHODS
In this study the unit of analysis was the individual user, and based on this
the questionnaire was selected as one method for collecting data as shown in Fig-
ure 6.16. After completing the tasks the users were asked to complete a question-
naire. The questionnaire collected both quantitative (close questions) and qualita-
tive data (open-ended questions). More particularly, the questionnaire contained
twenty-three questions, which can be categorised as follows:
• User’s profile related.
• Modelling language related.
• Tool related.
• Methodology activities related.
• Methodology usability related.
• Open recommendations.
The survey was carried out with an online questionnaire by employing the Google
Forms service. Therefore the data was collected and stored online automatically.
In addition, a second way to collect data was observation of the subjects while
they were carrying out the requested tasks. The observation was in terms of how
much time the users were spending on each task, the questions they asked, and the
comments that they made verbally. Also, the users were told that we were there
for answering their questions and not to observe them in order to ensure that those
being observed are not constantly thinking about being observed and to ensure that
the observed behaviour was normal, i.e. what usually happens in the environment
being observed and is not affected by the observer. The gathered data from the
observations were recorded in the form of field notes, which begun during the actual
observation, where we wrote what was necessary and we filled in the details later,
but as soon as possible.
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Figure 6.16: Survey data collection methods
DATA ANALYSIS METHODS
The first step in the analysis of the survey data was to tabulate them and then
to identify patterns in the tables. The second step was to evaluate the different
aspects of the methodology based on the survey data. In particular, there was a
distinction of two types of measures:
• Performance based measures. How well did the users perform the task? There
are three measures used to evaluate the performance on the task, i.e. syntactic
quality, semantic quality and pragmatic quality.
• Perception based measures. How useful and how easy to use did the users
perceive the methodology? Perceived usefulness is defined as the degree to
which the participant believes that the methodology is effective in achieving
its objectives. Perceived ease of use is defined as the degree to which the
participant believes that the methodology is free of effort.
STUDY VALIDITY
In terms of construct validity the quality of the questionnaires was improved af-
ter several iterations of improvement by following the feedback from questionnaire
experts from BT in order to make sure that there were no major discrepancies of
understanding by the users. In addition, we also carried out a pilot test at the
university of East London and there was a process of reflection and redevelopment
of definition, in order to make sure that the users understood the terms being used.
Moreover, there was an investigation in the literature and comparison with other
metrics used in similar surveys. We evaluated the JTrust methodology and cor-
rectly measured quantitative metrics, such as the efficacy and the effort required to
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undertake trust analysis activities in a software project. The participants answered
most of the questions apart from those that were perceived as difficult at an early
stage.
In order to increase the internal validity of the study we were not directly involved
in the application of the methodology on the scenario given apart from answering
any questions of the users regarding the methodology and observing their behaviour.
Also, there was method triangulation as we collected data with two different ways,
through questionnaires and observation of the users while applying the methodology.
The workshops were held at three different countries, UK, Spain and Greece in
order to increase the external validity of the study. Also, participants were from
various countries around the world and we ensured data triangulation. Moreover,
among the users were academics, industry researchers, research students, and post-
graduate students in order to ensure the representativeness of the user population.
6.2.2 Data collection
On the days in which the lab sessions were held, the presentation slides, the JTrust
tool were made available to the users. The tool contained an already started project
for the VLE scenario with an instance of a dependency resolution in order to make
the users get started.
The users once they attended the JTrust presentation, started performing the
evaluation tasks. We were present during this time in order to observe and capture
first-hand behaviour and interactions for data collection, and to answer any possible
additional questions that the users might have. The goal was to capture if possible
the users’ thought process and what work takes place inside the users’ head. To this
end we wanted to establish a communication with the users, since users reveal their
thought process most naturally when communicating with other users (Seaman99),
so this communication offers the best opportunity for us to observe the application
of JTrust. All users constructed the JTrust models with at least a part of the system
functionalities proposed.
At the of the trust analysis of the scenario, the users were given web links to
the online questionnaire in order to fill in and complete the evaluation lab session.
With regards to data validation, in general we observed that the users developed
the proposed JTrust models satisfactorily. This means that the JTrust methodology
was applied correctly and in accordance with the planning. Therefore, we can claim
that the obtained data was valid to conduct the proposed evaluation.
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6.2.3 Data analysis - Evaluation results and discussion
The results were evaluated by a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis
techniques. For the quantitative data descriptive statistics techniques were used,
while for the case of qualitative data there were first coded, then patterns were
identified, and generalisations could be formulated. These analyses achieved the
objectives that were set at the start of the survey evaluation.
Among the users, 92% that said that the modelling language is powerful enough
in order to support trust analysis and modelling. 54% of the users said that the
modelling language did not included redundant concepts. Nevertheless, there was a
35% that agreed that the modelling language had redundant concepts. In addition,
65% agreed and 31% strongly agreed that the modelling language concepts were well
defined respectively. Moreover, 58% of the users agreed and 27% strongly agreed
that the graphical notation employed by the modelling language were intuitive (Fig-
ure 6.17).
Figure 6.17: Results related to JTrust modelling language
With regards to the JTrust modelling tool, the majority of the users agreed that
the tool required further improvement. On the other hand, 81% and 15% of the
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users agreed and strongly agreed that the trust related functions of the tool are
satisfying respectively. Moreover, 62% and 31% of the users agreed and strongly
agreed respectively that the JTrust tool was easy to use (Figure 6.18).
Figure 6.18: Results related to JTrust tool
With regards to the methodology as a whole, 69% and 23% of the users agreed
and strongly agreed respectively that with the use of JTrust methodology the trust
assumptions are explicitly captured. In addition, 50% and 46% of the users agreed
and strongly agreed respectively that the methodology successfully captures trust-
worthiness requirements. This is a very significant result as this is one of the most
important aspects of the methodology. Furthermore, 62% and 31% agreed and
strongly agreed respectively that the methodology successfully assesses the system
trustworthiness at a requirements level. In terms of the usability of the method-
ology, 58% and 35% of the users responded that the activities of the methodology
were easy to follow (Figure 6.19).
The qualitative data from the users’ responses were coded and patterns were
identified. Based on these patterns we can report the following:
• The trust and control techniques are useful. In particular the techniques
are useful in order to identify the nature of trust and level of control that is
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Figure 6.19: Results related to JTrust methodology
154
Chapter 6. Evaluation
required. Moreover, these techniques enable the calculation of the system
trustworthiness at a requirements level.
• UML style of notation would be more preferable. The goal modelling
language is not very popular among developers. Thus, a JTrust modelling
language with a UML-like graphical notation could have been easier to learn
and to remember.
• Developers with no prior experience of goal modelling might find
challenging to use the methodology. As the methodology is greatly based
on goal modelling, it requires a decent level of knowledge of goal modelling from
the developers. As a consequence, developers not familiar with goal modelling
will require detailed training to learn to use the methodology.
• The JTrust tool could be improved. The improvement could be in the
form of integration of the tool with other tools or the integration of other
relevant concepts, such as associative risk, into the JTrust tool. Moreover,
JTrust models tend to become large in size and there is lack of modelling
space for the developer.
During the lab session we observed the execution of the survey tasks by the users
and we collected data in the form of notes. This data was coded and we made a
number of observations, which contributed to the evaluation of our methodology.
In this context, the main observations were the following:
• JTrust process: The activities of the JTrust methodology were identified
as fully operational and adequate, as the approach provided adequate tech-
niques to model and analyse trustworthiness requirements. The combination
of these techniques was treated as being systematic, reasonably applicable and
in particular, reducing the bias for the trust relationships reasoning.
• Artefacts: JTrust provides graphical representation of artefacts produced
by its activities. In particular, visual presentation is provided through trust
models, which made it easy, to communicate the trust analysis information
with other developers, as observed during the lab sessions.
• The size of JTrust models may become big: This is a problem the Jtrust
models have inherited from goal modelling. A system under development may
have a great number of interactions with other entities of the system envi-
ronment. By representing all the system dependencies in a model the model
becomes large in size. JTrust adds an overhead to that, since it requires the
155
Chapter 6. Evaluation
modelling of resolutions and entailments of dependencies. Also, it requires the
modelling of trustworthiness requirements. As a result, the models tend to
become big and complex to read.
• Entailment validation techniques were limited: We have proposed that
once the entailments have been identified and model, the developer needs to
seek evidence, such as historical records and past experience, in order to exam-
ine their validity. However, this may not be adequate for the developer in order
to proceed to such examination of validity. To this end, new techniques could
be needed. For instance, for each entailment there could be techniques that
guide the developer on where to seek for evidence and what kind of evidence
to seek. Such techniques will allow a more system validation of the entailment
and will complement the methodology.
6.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter we have conducted an empirical evaluation of our proposed method-
ology. It included two evaluation methods, a feature based case study, which con-
cerned the e-health care system in England, and a qualitative and quantitative
survey. For the survey we organised four lab sessions inviting software developers
and researchers to apply our methodology. The case study and the survey enable us
to evaluate our methodology. We have reported the feedback we got from the soft-
ware developers and the researchers and the observations we made during the case
study and the lab sessions. This included the limitations of our methodology and
the areas that need further research. Overall, the JTrust methodology was found
to be valid, and the observations during the case study were consistent with each
other and with the feedback that we got from the users. Our findings were that our
proposed methodology was both easy to use and useful in modelling and reason-
ing about trust relationships, modelling and analysing trustworthiness requirements
and assessing the system trustworthiness at a requirements level.
156
Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
Trust is so all pervasive in all of our lives, online or not, that it sometimes seems
strange to either have to ask or answer the question of why trust is important. Trust
is a part of the decision making process and as such it remains a paramount part
of our daily lives, which is especially true when other humans are involved when
making decisions. Such is the case of the development of an information system
where decision-making is at the core of the process and where trust is an element
in the decisions. Real world systems involve large populations of humans who use,
configure, and maintain them. The trustworthiness of the information system de-
pends on the trust relationships between the developer and the components of the
information system. The components are expected to behave in a desired way in
order the system to meet all its goals. This behaviour is reflected in the model the
developer is constructing during the requirements stage.
However, components do not always behave as expected. For example, they
tend to circumvent, misuse, and abuse security controls. They do not always do
it as attacks, but as a way to achieve their job activities and organisational goals.
Therefore, appropriate constructive techniques are required to enable the developer
to capture trust relationships and to reason about them. Also, constructive tech-
niques are required to enable the developer to identify trustworthiness requirements.
To this end, this thesis aimed to develop appropriate trust and control abstractions,
along with a methodological process that provides such ability to the developer. In
addition, it enables her to assess the trustworthiness of the system to be a require-
ments stage.
Chapter 7. Conclusions and future work
7.1 Thesis summary
In this thesis, we have proposed a requirements engineering methodology for mod-
elling and reasoning about trust relationships and modelling and analysing trust-
worthiness requirements. We adopted Goal Oriented Requirements Engineering
concepts, such as goal, actor, and dependency, in order to capture the trust re-
lationships between the developer and the components of the information system
under development. Such trust relationships concern the behaviour of the system
components and they affect its ability to meet its requirements and be trustwor-
thy. So capturing those trust relationships with the system components and their
expected behaviour is essential for achieving system trustworthiness.
We suggested to resolve the uncertainty of the behaviour of the system com-
ponent by utilising means of building confidence in their expected behaviour. To
this end we defined trust and control abstractions in order to enable the developer
to reason about her trust relationships and build confidence. Sources of trust were
categorised in four categories, Experiential Trust, Reported Trust, Normative Trust,
and External Trust. On the other hand, control components that make control ef-
fective were defined such as Observation and Deterrence. Reasoning about trust
relationships allows the assumptions that underlie the system development and can
potentially harm its trustworthiness if they are not valid to surface naturally. All
the end assumptions are assumptions of trust. Once identified, the developer can
examine their validity and proceed to a justified decision about the design of the
system.
Furthermore, constructive techniques were developed for the modelling and anal-
ysis of trustworthiness requirements. In situations where trust assumptions are not
valid, the software system-to-be acts as the controller who enforces system compo-
nents to comply with the expected behaviour. To this end, the control abstractions
are used in order to identify the capabilities of the system to observe certain resources
for monitoring purposes, and the deterrence capabilities, for preventing system com-
ponents from achieving some goals of their own, as a leverage for enforcing them to
behave in an expected way.
Moreover, algorithms were developed for evaluating the trustworthiness of the
system at a requirements stage. The first algorithm calculates the resolution level of
a dependency, while the second algorithm calculates the confidence level of a goal.
The third algorithm calculates the trustworthiness of the system under development
by considering the confidence level of the high level goals of the system along with
their importance to the overall system trustworthiness.
We have developed a CASE tool, named JTrust Tool, which supports the devel-
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oper in using the methodology. Trust models can be constructed using the modelling
capabilities of the tool and also the syntactical correctness of the models is auto-
matically checked by utilising the meta-model. Moreover, the developed algorithms
are run by the tool, so the resolution levels of a dependency, the confidence level of
goals, and the system trustworthiness are automatically calculated by the tool.
We have applied our methodology using a case study from the e-health care sector
in England. The case study was an e-health system for storing medical records of
patients, which allows the access of basic patient information from any hospital or
medical care record in England. It enables also a more efficient dispense of medicines
to patients. Furthermore, a survey was conducted in four different institutions across
Europe. Three of these were universities, University of East London, University of
the Aegean, and University of La Mancha, while one was a company from industry,
the British Telecom. The methodology was evaluated based on the results of the
case study and the survey, and the evaluation results were discussed.
7.2 Research questions
A set of research questions was formulated according to two phases, the development
of the methodology and the evaluation of the methodology. In this section we review
the research questions and the findings, which have been presented as initial answers
to them. In Table 7.1 we present a summary of them and then we explain each row.
RQ1: What are the required trust abstractions and their relationships in order to
reason about trust relationships at a requirements stage? We defined four
trust abstractions, namely experiential trust, reported trust, normative trust,
and external trust. We defined their relationships in a semi-formal way by
defining a meta-model that describes the relationships with each other and
with concepts adopted from goal oriented requirements engineering.
RQ2: What are the required abstractions and their relationships that can ensure the
development of trustworthy information systems at a requirements stage? We
defined two control abstractions, namely observation and deterrence. Similarly,
we defined their relationships in a semi-formal way by defining a meta-model
that describes the relationships with each other and with concepts adopted
from goal oriented requirements engineering.
RQ3: How can we assess trustworthiness of the system under development at a re-
quirements stage? The ability of the system and the resolution levels of the
dependencies inside the information system are required to be considered. We
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Table 7.1: Summary of research questions and answers
Research
Phase
Research Question Research Answer
Methodology
Development
RQ1: What are the required
trust abstractions and their re-
lationships in order to reason
about trust relationships at a re-
quirements stage?
Trust abstractions, JTrust
meta-model, and JTrust
Process (Sections 3.5, 3.7,
Chapter 4)
RQ2: What are the required ab-
stractions and their relationships
that can ensure the development
of trustworthy information sys-
tems at a requirements stage?
Control abstractions,
JTrust meta-model, and
JTrust Process (Sections
3.5, 3.6, 3.7, Chapter 4)
RQ3: How can we assess trust-
worthiness of the system under
development at a requirements
stage?
Trust and Control abstrac-
tions, JTrust meta-model,
and JTrust process (Sec-
tions 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8,
Chapter 4)
Methodology
Evaluation
RQ4: How well does the method-
ology support modelling and rea-
soning about trust relationships?
Case study and survey
evaluation (Chapter 6)
RQ5: How well does the method-
ology support trustworthiness re-
quirement modelling and analy-
sis?
Case study and survey
evaluation (Chapter 6)
RQ6: How well does the method-
ology assess the system trustwor-
thiness at a requirements level?
Case study and survey
evaluation (Chapter 6)
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developed two algorithms that calculate the confidence and resolution level
of goals and dependencies and a third algorithm that calculates the overall
system trustworthiness by considering the confidence and resolution levels.
RQ4: How well does the methodology support modelling and reasoning about trust
relationships? During the case study we observed that the methodology fully
supported the modelling and reasoning of trust relationships. Furthermore,
92% of the participants responded the same thing in our survey.
RQ5: How well does the methodology support trustworthiness requirement modelling
and analysis? During the case study we observed that the methodology fully
supported the modelling and analysis of trustworthiness requirements. Fur-
thermore, 46% and 50% of the survey participants strongly agreed and agreed
respectively with our observation.
RQ6: How well does the methodology assess the system trustworthiness at a re-
quirements level? During the case study we observed that the methodology
successfully assesses the system trustworthiness at a requirements level. Fur-
thermore, 31% and 62% of the survey participants strongly agreed and agreed
respectively with our observation.
7.3 Contributions to the state of the art and impact
In the literature, there were gaps in the reasoning of developers’ trust relationships
with components of an information system and in the identification and analysis
of trustworthiness requirements. The research that was carried out in this thesis
contributed immensely towards filling this gap and allow for reasoning of trust re-
lationships and modelling of trustworthiness requirements. In section 1.4, the four
novel contributions of the thesis were briefly introduced, along with the development
of a CASE tool. However they can be grasped in more detail as to how fruitfully they
have contributed to the state of the art from the answers to the research questions
and more precisely they were the following:
Contribution 1: The identification of limitations, problems, and chal-
lenges of the current state of the art with respect to trustworthy infor-
mation system development. This contribution provided the foundation for the
research carried out in this thesis. This contribution substantiates that there are
limitations in the current state of the art.
Contribution 2: The development of trust abstractions as part of a
modelling language and their associated constructive methods to allow
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modelling and reasoning of trust relationships. This paper introduces a trust
based process that enables the developer to identify direct and indirect trust rela-
tionships and to analyse the respective trust assumptions. The process makes use
GORE, trust, and control related concepts. Using concepts like resolution and en-
tailment allows to model and reason about the trust relationships. Therefore, trust
assumptions within a socio-technical system are not left unexamined by using our
approach. The proposed process leads to design trustworthy system. Nevertheless,
a trustworthy system does not ensure that users will fully trust the system. User’s
trust is subjective and depends on factors like marketing of the final product and
reputation. However, the trust abstractions establish a common understanding of
trust among the developers. There is a clear definition about trust and trustworthi-
ness, so the developers are not confused from the subjectivity of the concept.
Contribution 3: The development of control abstractions as part of a
modelling language and their associated constructive methods to allow
modelling and analysis of trustworthiness requirements. Trustworthiness
requirement is the functionality added to the system in order to replace gaps of
trust in the chain of trust relationships between the system and its environment.
A modelling language for trust and control in order to represent how confidence
in the dependencies between the system under development and its environment is
achieved. A process, which describes the methods in a structured way that consti-
tutes the development tasks clear and visible to the developers.
Contribution 4: The development of a methodological process that
employs the modelling language in order to reason about trust rela-
tionships and identify trustworthiness requirements in a systematic and
structured way. Moreover, the development of algorithms that allow the early as-
sessment of the trustworthiness of the system under development at a requirements
level.
Contribution 5: The development of a CASE tool to support the
proposed methodology. The development of a supporting tool for the
methodology was deemed of high importance. Therefore, a CASE tool was
developed to support the developers in constructing the required models to anal-
yse the trust relationships. It enables the developers to model dependencies among
actors, their kind of resolutions, i.e., experiential, reported, normative, and exter-
nal trust, and control, along with their respective entailments. The tool is used
throughout the case study. The case study was from the health care sector where
the applicability and benefits of the proposed process were demonstrated. In par-
ticular, the case study revealed that the initial design is based on trust assumptions
that were not valid. As a consequence it could lead to a untrustworthy system. Using
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the proposed process and concepts, those invalid trust assumptions were identified
and extra functionality was added to the system design to address the identified
vulnerabilities.
7.4 Limitations of the approach
While our proposed methodology enables the developer to model and reason about
trust relationships, model and analyse trustworthiness requirements, and assess the
system trustworthiness at a requirements stage, this ability is also limited in some
aspects. The following list provides some points of criticism that we have identified
for the approach:
• Castelfranchi and Falcone (2000) argues that the measurement of trust should
not be attempted because of the complexity of the process of trust and they
multiple aspects that it has. Nevertheless, still when a phenomenon is simpli-
fied it provides great insights to an issue that in other circumstances it will not
be investigated (Cofta, 2007). We believe that the proposed trust and trustwor-
thiness metrics, no matter how simplified they are and they may not exactly
measure trust and trustworthiness, are still useful. They force the developer
to look into issues that otherwise would not have considered. The investiga-
tion of whether the dependencies will be fulfilled once the system is put in
operation or what is required in order to ensure their fulfilment is necessary in
order to build strong foundations from the requirements stage and proceed to
further system development. Trust levels are ambiguous at best, in terms of
semantics and subjectivity, but we will use them anyway. We believe benefits
far outweigh their disadvantages, and include the ability to narrow down and
discuss important aspects.
• Trust cannot give us certainty, it is a judgement based on evidence, (Marsh
and Briggs, 2009). Active components can still go against a control and they
can still go against the expected behaviour (Mo¨llering, 2005). In other words
this means that even if there are control measures in place for an individual to
behave as expected, she can still behave in a different way. This is apparent
in everyday life where even though there are prisons as a control measures for
individuals that commit illegal acts, yet they still commit illegal acts. Going
back to the running example, even if there is system functionality that controls
the lecturer to upload the lecture slides in advance of the lecture, she may still
decide not to do so no matter how strong is the control measure.
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• The trust analysis is occurring during the development stage. Over time things
can change, such as norms and entities may not be trusted anymore. Trust
relationships change over time and therefore the trust analysis made during
the development time may not be valid anymore and constitute the system not
trustworthy to meet all its requirements. For example, if during the develop-
ment of the system it was decided that the lecturer can be trusted to upload
the lecture slides in advance of the lecture this trust relationship may change
after some time and the lecturer may not be trusted anymore. By that time
though the system could be already developed and put in operation. Thus, it
may not be trustworthy in terms of providing the lecture slides to the students
because the lecturer is not uploading the slides and there is no control measure
to force him to do so.
7.5 Future work
For the future work, we are interested in addressing some limitations of our pro-
posed methodology and some further challenges that have appeared in developing
trustworthy information systems, and propose possible areas for future research that
build upon the contributions arising from this thesis. The research questions are
the following:
• What are the requirements that lead to adaptation capabilities of a system
because of changes in the trust relationships? A more dynamic assessment of
trust assumptions is required in order to adapt to possible changes. Moreover,
modern software systems become more complex and the environments these
systems operate in, become more and more dynamic. So, users’ expectations
change and this has an immediate effect on users’ trust level (Hoffman, Lawson-
Jenkins, and Blum, 2006). Also, the number of stakeholders increase and the
stakeholders’ needs change constantly as they need to adjust to the constantly
changing environment. A consequence of this trend is that the number of
requirements for a software system increases and changes continually. As a
result, in order for software systems to maintain their ability or competence
as trustees to satisfy their trustors, which are the stakeholders, and remain
trustworthy need to adapt to the changes.
• What other concepts can be used that motivate entities to behave as expected?
Apart from control there are also other reasons that someone can show trust-
worthy behaviour. Such motives can be ethical obligation or driven by greed
(Cofta, 2007). Instead of deterring a system component from achieving one of
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her own goals an alternative way to motivate her to behave in an expected
way is to provide a reward as long as she behaves in an expected way.
• How to engineer systems that facilitate the assessment of trust among parties?
This research questions belongs in the area of trust management. Transacting
and interacting through information systems and computer networks makes
it difficult to use traditional methods for establishing trust between parties,
such as the ones used in face to face communication between humans. Modern
information systems are increasingly removing us from familiar styles of inter-
acting and doing business, which both rely on some degree of trust between the
interaction or business partners. Most traditional cues for assessing trust in
the physical world are not available through information systems. So, there is
the need for systems that enable the assessment of trustworthiness of another
party that someone is collaborating with. Systems that enable trustworthy
parties to demonstrate their trustworthiness, while they prevent parties that
are not trustworthy to show themselves as trustworthy.
While the tasks for future work are the following:
• Develop validation techniques for entailments. This requires more research
in human psychology and will still be far from perfect. As future work, we
intend to propose methods that will further support developers for validating
the entailments, for instance what kind and how much evidence is required for
the entailments to be validated.
• Formalise the proposed methodology. The formalisation will complement the
methodology by extending the JTrust modelling language into a formal spec-
ification language. It can also be employed to perform formal analysis of the
system and verify the trust model by employing formal verification techniques.
• Improve the CASE tool. Trustworthiness requirement concepts should go in-
side the system goal diagram, because they are system functionality. Also
improvements in terms of usability, such as to not allow the user to put what-
ever values in the share property of the decomposition link and add colours to
the graphical notations to represent different value properties.
Apart from the specific research questions and tasks, another interesting area for fu-
ture research is computational models of trust that can be used to create substitutes
by which software agents can derive trust in others through information systems.
The developed trust abstractions could be incorporated into such computational
models of trust.
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